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ABSTRACT

THE ETHICAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP TO
COMMUNITIES OF STAKEHOLDERS IN HEALTHCARE

By
Lisa A. Martinelli, JD, MA
December 2020

Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerard Magill
While much is written on organizational ethics in healthcare, this dissertation uniquely
links organizational ethics and stakeholder theory to the ethical accountability of leadership to
their distinct, vulnerable stakeholder communities. It does so by examining the healthcare
organization’s moral agency in relation to stakeholder theory and applies those considerations to
three major stakeholder categories: confidentiality and privacy of healthcare information,
research and attention to specific pediatric populations, and ethics of care concerning the elderly
and persons with disabilities.
Comparing the complex and interdependent healthcare delivery system in the U.S. to the
anatomy and physiology of the human body, this dissertation demonstrates that maintaining
organizational homeostasis depends up ethical accountability of leadership to its constituent
stakeholder parts. The argument unfolds in a centrifugal fashion, beginning with an
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understanding of organizational moral agency as illustrated through the metaphor of soul,
individual and institutional agency, and stakeholder theory. Chapter 3 considers the
organization’s moral obligation to stakeholder privacy and confidentiality in light of the
competing information age.
Returning to specific stakeholder communities, the remaining chapters outline the moral
obligation and ethical accountability of healthcare organizations to create opportunities for their
most vulnerable normative stakeholders across the life continuum. Specifically, it probes this
duty to pediatric communities within several contexts: children with HIV, those who are
maltreated, children with special cognitive needs, and those with pediatric obesity. It concludes
by expanding ethical accountability to include respect for human dignity and improving the
human condition for the elderly and persons with disabilities by applying ethic of care.
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Chapter 1. – Introduction.
There is much written on organizational ethics in healthcare. The majority of the
literature addresses the organization’s moral duty to adhere to its mission, vision and values
through ethical decision-making in light of competing interests. There is nothing in the literature,
however, which directly links organizational ethics and stakeholder theory to the ethical
accountability of leadership to their distinct stakeholder communities in healthcare. This
dissertation confronts this gap by addressing how moral agency guides an organization’s
decisions and actions for the common good of constituent needs; particularly vulnerable
communities of stakeholders.
Addressing this gap is important. The contemporary healthcare organization in the U.S. is
complex and is comprised of intricately interdependent systems of stakeholders with varied
needs and interests. Traditional stakeholder theory espouses corporate responsibility and strategy
by managing for the interests of the organization’s stakeholders. Because of this, stakeholder
theory is a promising model for creating and maximizing value and opportunities in healthcare.
Accordingly, literature on healthcare management increasingly includes applications of
stakeholder theory to specific care settings.
Further, the present research and literature on ethically accountable leadership focuses on
singular stakeholder concerns that are internal and external to the organization. However,
healthcare is no longer binary. Ethical accountability of leadership demands that moral agency
and the preservation of the organization’s moral soul, is necessary not merely for its own benefit
but for the benefit of the communities it serves. Respect for human dignity and enabling
stakeholder communities to flourish are quintessential moral obligations of accountable
leadership.
1

The thesis of the dissertation addresses the ethical accountability of organizational
leadership to communities of stakeholders in healthcare. The analysis examines the highly
complex anatomy of contemporary healthcare organizations whose constituent parts are
interdependent and shaped by corporate leadership. The ethical accountability of leadership
includes both individual and institutional moral agency. This combined approach to moral
agency, referred to by the metaphor of an organization’s moral soul, guides an organization’s
ethical decisions for the common good of its stakeholders. Hence, the ethical accountability of
organizational leadership in healthcare highlights the moral obligations owed to its communities
of stakeholders.
This dissertation focuses on these specific obligations. There is considerable literature on
stakeholder confidentiality and privacy in healthcare, the needs of children, the elderly, and those
stakeholders with disabilities. However there is nothing linking these entitlements and
stakeholder needs to ethical leadership. Leadership in the current healthcare environment
requires an awareness of multi-stakeholder needs that are unified with its own in order to sustain
a morally accountable organization. Hence, this dissertation integrates moral agency and a
positive ethical climate to the ethical accountability of organizational leadership to communities
of stakeholders in healthcare.
This dissertation discusses moral agency in relation to stakeholder theory to explore the
ethical accountability of organizational leadership. This discussion is applied to three major
stakeholder categories: the confidentiality and privacy of healthcare information, research on and
treatment of pediatric populations, and the ethics of care with regard to the elderly and persons
with disabilities.
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The thesis is presented in a centrifugal fashion, expanding outward as the chapters
develop. Chapter 1 presents a general overview of the argument. Chapter 2 discusses
organizational moral agency regarding its individual and institutional components, combining
them in terms of the metaphor of the organization’s moral soul, to explain moral agency as a
cornerstone of accountable leadership through adoption of stakeholder theory. The scope of the
analysis broadens in Chapter 3 to explain leadership accountability to the multi-stakeholder
interests in terms of maintaining individual confidentiality and protecting privacy in the
healthcare digital age. The subsequent chapters explain how the ethical accountability of
organizational leadership must demonstrate respect for human dignity and the common good
regarding vulnerable stakeholder communities. Chapter 4 examines the vulnerable population of
pediatric stakeholders to discuss two pivotal issues in the delivery of healthcare, undertaking
pediatric research and managing pediatric obesity. Chapter 5 discusses the vulnerable
populations of the elderly and those with disabilities, insofar as these populations have similar
healthcare needs.
1. A.

Overview of the Argument

Like the human body, a singular healthcare organization (HCO) is comprised of many
affiliated pieces and parts that provide, support, and pay for some form of healthcare service and
treatment to patients. The anatomy of an HCO includes physician-centered, affiliates as well as
independent legal entities such as integrated professional physician organizations, facility
providers; and may also include integrated payer and health insurance services. These intricately
interdependent systems of providers practice medicine amidst a backdrop of environmental
challenges and external influences in the form of regulators, insurance companies and most often
perplexed patients who want to make their own choices. 1
3

As such, the HCO cannot operate in a vacuum concentrating only on its own self-interest
while remaining blind to competing ones. It is accountable and has ethical obligations to a
variety of internal and external constituents whose values, needs and professional standards may
be in tension with its own. Just as the human body maintains homeostasis, the HCO seeks to
maintain order among its diverse stakeholders in order to achieve organizational homeostasis.
One way that organizational homeostasis is measured is by how well the HCO, through its
leadership, achieves its goals through rational decision-making vis-à-vis competing values and
constituent interests. Its constituents include not only its patients, but the broader society it
serves, those whom it employs, and even the corporate community with which it interrelates. 2
Hence, this dissertation argues that homeostasis in this sense is reflected in the ethical
accountability of organizational leadership to community stakeholders in healthcare.
This argument unfolds and is developed in the following way. Chapter 2 provides the
foundation for the broader discussion concerning the ethical obligation for leadership
accountability to community stakeholders in healthcare by first articulating an understanding of
moral agency. It bifurcates organizational moral agency into two broad components – individual
and institutional agency. Individuals and institutions are expected to support the core values,
culture and structure that define the organizational ethics of the HCO. And, just as the human
body cannot depend solely on the form of anatomy to achieve health, it is also the case that it
takes more than the anatomy of an HCO to survive and thrive in an era of unprecedented change.
It requires the exposition of moral integrity and the virtue of its leadership. That is, it requires
soul. This chapter then illustrates the unification of individual and institutional moral agents, and
their ethical decision-making through appreciation of the HCO’s moral soul. It will reveal,
through a specific use case, how deficiencies in governance, unaccountable leadership,
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stakeholder abandonment, and uncritical decision-making can permit and even cause an HCO to
lose its moral soul.
Ethical decision-making, as a cornerstone of accountable leadership, requires awareness
of the community of stakeholders, an understanding of those to whom the leaders serve, and the
expectations of those constituents. Accordingly, this dissertation presupposes and adopts as an
undercurrent, “stakeholder theory” as an approach to organizational ethics that heeds the rights
and interests or groups who interact with and could be affected by the organization’s decisions. 3
The potential for corporations lacking soul and moral accountability for the consequences of
their actions to do real harm to people necessitates checks on their power. It also bespeaks of the
need to shift the managerial mindset from the shareholder to other alternative constituents who
possess a stake in the company. The birth of the stakeholder theory is the epicenter of that
mindset shift, and is discussed briefly in the conclusion of Chapter 2.
Understanding what it means to have a stake in a matter is rather uncomplicated.
However, determining who is entitled to such a claim, the scope of the claim, and identifying
those who are responsible to the holder of those claims, particularly in an HCO, is varied and
widely diffused. As the title suggests, this dissertation selects particular communities of
stakeholders – pediatric, the elderly, and persons with disabilities (Chapters 4 and 5) - and argues
for the ethical accountability of the HCO to those stakeholder groups. Chapter 3, however,
introduces an unconventional approach to understanding this argument. By briefly delaying
discussion of the specific health interests unique to the particular stakeholder communities, this
dissertation first illustrates the HCO’s moral accountability to a set of multi-stakeholder interests
that are inherent to all persons. That is, leadership’s accountability to protect the confidentiality
and privacy of the normative stakeholders to whom the HCO has a direct moral obligation.
5

Many stakeholder expectations are tied to social norms, and many are fundamental
expectations that are not unique to healthcare but exist as a central aspect of human dignity.
Confidentiality, as an expectation and cornerstone of trust in healthcare – is one such aspect.
Consisting of two distinct subchapters, Chapter 3 first dives deeply into confidentiality; the
ethical obligation to preserve that which every human person has, holds sacred, and may deny
having at all - their secrets. Confidentiality is embattled in an age where knowledge is power,
and predictive data analytic decision-making and technology provide a crushing influence of
diverse stakeholders. Many constituents compete to ingest as much secret rich health data as they
can swallow in order to advance their own, or their constituents’ interests. To that end, this
chapter emphasizes the ethical justification for exceptions to the legal and professional
obligations of the duty of confidentiality in clinical care, and the effects of those exceptions on
patient and third party stakeholder expectations.
It further explores the fundamental stakeholder expectation of privacy, which is often
erroneously conflated and confused with the duty of confidentiality. This chapter illustrates the
differences between confidentiality and privacy through examination of the duties and rights of
the confidant and confider respectively. It further illustrates the intersection of the individual
stakeholder’s right to privacy in their personal information, the legal and ethical justification for
use of such digital information to do good, and the need for an ethical guidance to minimize
threats to privacy while respecting the dignity of the person.
Amplifying respect for human dignity, this dissertation then demonstrates how ethical
accountability of leadership recognizes the common good and advances stakeholder interests for
the benefit of specific communities of health - especially those who are the least empowered –
across the life continuum. The analysis in Chapter 4 submits that concern for disempowered
6

stakeholder populations is essential for ethically accountable leadership. And to that end, it
examines pediatric populations; specifically demonstrating the ethical justification for involving
children in medical research according to specific ethical principles, as well as exploration of
ethical remediation of the psychosocial and physiological harms from childhood obesity.
Equally critical, yet at the far end of the life-continuum, are the needs of the elderly and
the oldest old. Ethical accountability in healthcare requires reasonable assurance that the unmet,
long-term health needs of this seemingly inaudible stakeholder population are included in
attempts to improve the human condition. Chapter 5 further articulates the ethic of care that
focuses on the interconnectedness of people rather than their separateness in its discussion of the
needs of elderly stakeholders. In the same distinctive manner, this chapter also explores the
ethical accountability of healthcare leadership to embrace and improve the human condition of
disabled populations through alleviation of human suffering, and to promote human flourishing,
without endeavoring to eliminate human disabilities through genetic intervention. The analysis of
each chapter is set forth in greater detail in the following sections.
Chapter 2. – Organizational Moral Agency
Because persons within an HCO are not unthinking automatons operating in lockstep
with nothing more than a mere code of conduct to dictate behavior, a positive ethical climate
requires synergy between its moral goals, the HCO, and the competing interests of its moral
agents. When they are not in sync and the leaders and stakeholders are not aligned with the
critical values and norms of the HCO because of different ethical perspectives, homeostasis is
threatened, distrust ensues and perpetuates a negative ethical climate. 4
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As the seemingly endless demand for compliance standards and adoption of “best
practices” seize the various domains within the U.S. healthcare system, establishing values and
norms that are transparent to everyone within the HCO is critical to ensure ethical cohesion. The
push for cost-containment, treatment alternatives, utilization management, and quality of care are
merely a few of the realities that give rise to ethical tensions. 5 Establishing a relationship with
the cohorts who are called to advocate for and are charged with acting in accordance with the
values and norms, is vital to creating and sustaining an ethical climate. 6
Employees and other workforce members of organizations are its agents. They are the
cells and tissues supporting the organ systems of the organization. Additionally, they are most
often the face of the corporate mission, and are the embodiment of its values. They are
responsible for executing on its mission and they step into the shoes of the organization every
time they act within the scope of their role – and quite often even when they are not acting
officially. The expectations of this principal/agent relationship, and the HCO’s prescribed norms
and standards are at the core of the organization’s ethics program. And with that, moral
expectations must be known by all of the individuals in order to ensure that the HCO doesn’t
“require beliefs that some of them do not have.” 7
Morality concerns the norms surrounding human behavior which are good and right and
are so universally shared that they are able to cement a stable social framework. It includes
measures of conduct: standards such as moral/ethical norms and beliefs, principles, rules and
theories. Some aspects of morality are so embedded into our social fabric that the norms they are
said to dictate are said to form a common morality shared and recognized by all moral persons
across different cultures. These include standard ethical norms such as do not kill and tell the
truth.8
8

Some moral norms prescribe rules, obligations and duties to reduce or prevent harm.
Others are created to increase the good, or to provide relief to those who are harmed by a
particular situation. Since the HCO is structured as a system of integrated and varied affiliated
stakeholders, it needs an ethical blueprint to clearly and unambiguously identify and memorialize
its mission and deeply held values by which it is defined and how it makes its decisions. When
the mission and vision, and the principles espoused in the ethical blueprint are consistent with the
norms, actions and moral behaviors of leadership, what results is a positive ethical climate
capable of supporting a trusted and sustainable organization. 9
2. A.

Common Morality and Moral Agency

The roles occupied by individuals within the HCO are tied to the norms and standards
that define expectations – e.g. the qualities of an outstanding assistant, a respected leader, and an
effective and strategic-thinking CEO. The presumed standards constitute the notion of role
morality and the individuals performing in accordance with these moral standards help to
establish and sustain the ethical organization, in conformance with its ethical blueprint. Actions
that fail to meet these standards, as well as the persons attributed to those actions are said to be
immoral.10 To satisfy these moral standards, and in the execution of their duties, individual moral
agents acting on behalf of the HCO indisputably must be persons of unwavering integrity and
character who are also adept at collaboration. Honesty, integrity and truthfulness are but a few
examples of moral character traits, and represent virtues indelibly engraved in common morality.
A variety of stakeholders come together to contribute to, build, and sustain a morally
accountable HCO. As moral agents, nearly all of the professions represented in the delivery of
healthcare are expected to adhere to prescribed professional standards and codes of conduct
unique to those disciplines; while upholding the virtues of common morality. The moral agency
9

ascribed to the HCO requires it to cohabitate with its professional, clinical and business
professionals, and integrate their normative ethical duties and values into the HCO mission. 11
This ability to cohabitate must be bi-directional. However, because individuals do not react to
competing internal and external influences the same way, and given the diversity of their
interests, conflicts between stakeholders within the HCO and the HCO itself can emerge, and
homeostasis upset is inevitable.
Although they do not act independent of their agents, and the cannot be moral
individuals, organizations act as moral agents when they set moral goals defined by their ethical
blueprint and when the organization acts through the collective decision-making of its agents. 12
And while an organization cannot have motives in the same way a person does, an organization
is evaluated and adjudged to be moral, as well as immoral, by its constituent stakeholders as well
as other organizations within its community. An organization is adjudged according to the
decisions, intentions and actions of its agents as well as by the tone and configuration of its
ethical blueprint. 13
Since it is not unusual for individuals within an organization to decide matters and act
collectively, such group actions are often so inextricably intertwined that it is often impossible to
distill the individually identifiable actions and separate them from the moral agency of the
organization itself. Nevertheless, when an organization performs in accord with a positive ethical
climate, it is deemed a moral institution. When conflict remains unresolved, the blueprint is
breached, and the integrity of the organization is threatened, it may be nearly impossible to know
which individual is responsible for the deviation. Anticipatory understanding of where these
decision-making conflicts and deviations may occur within the institution will help preemptively
mitigate the risk of disorder. A morally justified decision-making process is critical to preserve
10

and even restore trust and integrity in an organization experiencing discord amidst its agents and
other stakeholders.
2. B.

Organizational Leadership and Ethical Decision-Making

The presence of a genuine conflict of interest may itself explain an agent’s desire to
circumvent the decision-making process even at the risk of loss of soul to the organization.
However, even in the absence of conflict, the organization’s soul can be lost when ultimate
decision-making is vested, intentionally or by default, in one dominant leader. Real leadership
entails more than management and decision control. Accountable leaders and their followers are
responsible for enacting the organization’s vision, mission and strategies in ways that are socially
and morally responsible. 14 Homeostasis is at risk when leaders are dispossessed of their moral
agency and propagate environments of secrecy, hidden agendas, and physical settings that isolate
workforce members from leaders, and emphasize status over human concerns. 15 The Allegheny
Health Education and Research Foundation (AHERF) epic story exemplifies this dispossession.
Established in 1983, AHERF morphed over time to become a behemoth organization
comprised of rapidly-merged healthcare entities. By 1997, the Allegheny Health System had the
distinction of being the first and largest statewide nonprofit integrated health system in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In 2003, it died a $1.6 billion death and carried the paradoxical
distinction of the largest non-profit HCO bankruptcy in U.S. history. The tragedy of AHERF’s
rise, fall and disintegration is polluted with conflicts of interests, corruption, lack of stakeholder
awareness, and various forms of cooperation that went beyond losing its moral soul and suffering
anatomical disorder. In a Faustian sense, in the midst of morally unjustified decision-making it
sacrificed its soul, and during its indiscriminate abandonment, gave no consideration to the fact
that life cannot exist apart from it.16
11

Goodpaster and Matthews hold that rational and respectful decision-makers notice and
care about whether or not the consequences of their actions lead to indignities and offenses
towards others. 17 The stakes are even higher for the healthcare decision-maker. Unlike other
industries where the consequences of decisions most notably affect products, services and
profitability, decisions within an HCO can have direct impact on the quality, and even the
longevity, of human life. 18 A notable paradox for an industry which advocates for human
wellness is that decisions in healthcare are often devoid of humanness; the humanness attributed
to all of its stakeholders.
The integrity of ethical decisions can be further abraded by the reality that healthcare is
morally and ethically complicated. 19 Ethical decision-making, according to Weiss, depends upon
the moral majority of the people engaged in the ethical reasoning. And while there are different
levels of maturity, the tightly controlled corporate environment which typically characterizes an
HCO can stifle ethical decision-making.20 Further, issues and dilemmas affecting moral decisionmaking result from pressures that, as Weiss advances, are exerted at personal, organizational,
industrial as well as societal levels. This chapter concludes with a brief understanding of these
levels and decision-making approaches as demonstrated through the lens of stakeholder
considerations.
2. C.

Stakeholder Theory and Normative Constituencies

Organizational homeostasis relies upon the systematic ability of the organization to
respond to unanticipated sudden or gradual, threats to its stability and health. Determining the
appropriate course of action often demands making choices that benefit some to the detriment of
others. R. Edward Freeman is credited with developing the stakeholder theory to underscore and
draw attention to the way that managers and other individuals act and the consequences of those
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actions, based upon ethical principles. The most striking feature of the stakeholder theory is that
it demonstrates ways in which organizations can exercise social responsibility through moral
management without contradicting the framework of a capitalistic economy. 21 Because of the
complexity of the entwined and interdependent interests within an HCO and its susceptibility to
disruption, stakeholder theory is a promising model for maximizing value and creating
opportunities. It acknowledges moral agency and diversity of values 22 which appeals to the
climate of the HCO and helps to ensure homeostasis.
Freeman holds what is widely recognized as the seminal definition, and will unless
otherwise stated, be the position that this dissertation adopts. An organization’s stakeholder is,
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s
objectives.” 23 Methods of identifying stakeholders and determining the organization’s duty to
them is an exercise in moral classification. In shaping its argument, this dissertation assents to
Phillips’ theory of normative and derivative stakeholders; focusing specifically on specific
normative stakeholder communities.
According to Phillips normative stakeholders are those individuals and groups of
individuals to whom the organization has a direct moral obligation to attend to their well-being.
It does not matter whether they are internal or external to the organization. What matters for
Phillips and for this dissertation is that they are descriptive of their relevance and presences as
customers, patients, employees, local communities, suppliers, financiers and lenders. By virtue
of their humanness, normative stakeholders are afforded greater moral consideration –
stakeholder fairness – in corporate decision-making than other social actors. 24
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Chapter 3. – The Ethical Challenges of Maintaining Stakeholder Confidentiality and
Privacy
In applying Freeman’s stakeholder definition, which looks at those who can affect or are
affected by an HCO’s objective successes, this chapter extensively examines the concept of
confidentiality, and the right to individual privacy. In a society where knowledge is power,
predictive analytics dictates decision-making, and data has become “the raw material of the
information age,” 25 the time-honored respect for patient confidentiality, and the evolutionary
establishment of patient privacy rights are axiomatic multi-stakeholder issues. These issues
transcend all communities of care, and are in most cases agnostic to the particular patient’s
healthcare condition. These issues are instead intrinsically tied to humanness. Because these
confidentiality and privacy interests are inseparable from their subjects, and influence decisionmaking across the HCO spectrum, this dissertation thoroughly explores both interests ahead of
the subsequent normative stakeholder discussions. It does so by bifurcating both interests into
two distinct sections; one setting forth the duty of confidentiality, and the other illuminating
expectations of privacy.
3. A.

Confidentiality and the Ethics of Secrecy

Preserving the confidentiality of patient secrets while satisfying legitimate HCO
stakeholder interests is daunting, and is not without limits. 26 To that end, this chapter illustrates
the ethical justification for deviations from the legal and professional obligations of the duty of
confidentiality in the delivery of care, and the effects of those deviations on patient and third
party stakeholder expectations. At the core of confidentiality is the sacred status of a human
person’s secrets, as exhibited at the beginning of this chapter.
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This section introduces the anatomy of a secret, the ethics of secrecy, and the fact that
secrets are a natural part of humanness. Because there are limits to man’s willingness to reveal
certain truths about himself, those truths, or secrets live in the essential recesses of every person.
Secrets define aspects of selfhood that intentionally remain hidden in order to preserve that
which is uniquely human and different. 27 In healthcare, secrecy is a controversial matter as
confidentiality is frequently abdicated to advance the interests of persons other than the patient. 28
Moral agents cloaked under the seal of confidentiality of secrets are found anywhere and
everywhere humans interact, including within families, businesses, and professions. However,
the somewhat contradictory reality in today’s healthcare is that confidentiality is a porous
obligation.
Keeping secrets about oneself demonstrates respect for the demarcation line between
public and privacy life. It demonstrates respect for autonomy. This dissertation looks at the
works of Sissela Bok and Anita Allen to better understand the connectivity between keeping
secrets and telling the truth and their relevance in contemporary healthcare. To that end, Sissela
Bok writes that secrets concerning those areas of their lives about which humans are most
comfortable and know most intimately warrant the most intense attention, yet “we also
experience as secrets the spaces from which we feel shut out.” 29 Such is the case for the patient
seeking care from a physician. Allen explores the fact that people conceal information about
their health long before they see a physician, as what people learn about themselves often occur
through self-encounters. 30 In addition to concealment of secrets, this section also investigates the
moral imperative to tell the truth which is incumbent upon both the patient and the physician
who have entered into the treating relationship.
3. B. Professional Duty and Legal Obligation
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Both mental health professionals and laypersons alike advance the notion that confessing
one’s secrets is good for the soul, and that revealing secrets that one withholds about themselves
is cathartic.31 However, since antiquity respect for patient confidentiality has been a fundamental
moral precept and professional responsibility of physicians. The promise to “not divulge, as
reckoning that all such should be kept secret” 32 concerning things learned about a patient in the
course of the treating relationship still resonates today. However the dynamics of modern
healthcare, and the demands of civil society to adjudicate the truth serve as disruptors to many of
the traditional roles of confidentiality. Thus creating ethical dilemmas for clinicians; leaving
some to argue that confidentiality is dead.” 33 This section concentrates on the ethical justification
for exceptions to confidentiality and the tremendous uncertainty by and among physicians
concerning when secrets can become public. This is explored more fully when considering the
tension between the scope of privileged communications and the need for compelled disclosure
of patient secrets.
3. C.

Clinical Ethics

The lines between what is protected under the duty of confidentiality, what is required to
be disclosed by law, and what is necessary for the benefit of society are obfuscated at best. In
sum it can be said that trust protects secrets, and “confidentiality protects trust.” 34 As this chapter
expands and demonstrates later, trust invokes privacy, and the law protects privacy. But the gap
between what prevents breaches of trust, and departures from the rule of law, from becoming
violations of privacy must be backfilled with principles of clinical ethics.
Nowhere in healthcare do ethical principles align with specific contextual needs more
than in direct clinical care settings. Clinical care defines the humanness of medicine through
direct physical contact and observation, and has the most notable impact on respect for human
16

dignity and well-being. The therapeutic relationships created within the clinical care setting are
supported by the core principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. 35
Specifically, this section examines how patient secrets are obtained and shared in right
relationship with the ethical principle of autonomy and its constituent principle of
confidentiality; particularly when these principles are in conflict.
3. D.

Psychotherapy: Secrets Kept…Secrets Shared

Few areas of healthcare venture closer to the core of humanness than that of the
psychotherapeutic practice. Psychotherapeutic practice has long respected the rule of
confidentiality stating that information disclosed by the patient to the therapist in the course of
the therapy may not be shared with others without the patient’s express prior written consent. 36
Freud considered the promise to preserve the confidentiality of psychotherapy quintessential to
successful treatment. So much so, that he encouraged patients to not reveal the fact that they
were in treatment with anyone else, including intimates, spouses and other family members. 37
The rule of confidentiality protecting psychotherapeutic secrets is an ethical principle, a
professional obligation, and in many jurisdictions is supported by state law. 38 Despite these
safeguards, ethical and societal conflicts unique to behavioral health and psychotherapy arise
when breaching confidentiality is necessary to prevent imminent harms to other stakeholders, or
to deliver justice. The tension between the principles of autonomy, beneficence and nonmaleficence are vividly illustrated in this moral dilemma. Because the content of these secrets
may subject the therapist to a dual allegiance; that which they have to their patient’s
confidentiality, and that which they may owe to society, this dissertation delves deeply into that
ethical tension. The tension between protecting psychotherapy as a public good, vis-à-vis the
duty to protect the public from patient-induced harm is discussed more fully in this chapter.
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3. E.

The Genomic Dilemma

The moral value of confidentiality, and the duty to respect secrets is no longer confined to
those belonging only to patients and research data subject. When ethical conflicts and competing
obligations such as those exemplified in psychotherapy arise, principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence may override confidentiality for the sake of non-patient third party stakeholders –
thereby creating a moral dilemma. 39 Even when the third party benefit is imperative, those
principles may beget a moral predicament for the physician. Such predicaments must reconcile
not merely how much information to disclose to the unsuspecting and perhaps disinterested
patient or non-patient, but also what kind of information to disclose, and perhaps most
importantly, whether to disclose any information at all. These dilemmas are traversing
unchartered terrain especially in the context of genomic mapping, genotyping, and genetic
testing information. The duties of the physician, and the rights of patients and other stakeholders
to know, and not to know predictive genomic information is a probing matter that defies
traditional understanding of the duty of confidentiality and the practice of medicine, and rounds
out the discussion of confidentiality in this chapter.
3. F.

Privacy

The challenges of maintaining confidentiality in healthcare are further exacerbated by the
reality that patient information holds the key to unlocking crucial medical advances. Data is the
lifeblood of the HCO. Like blood, which transports nutrients and waste, regulates balance,
protects against pathogens, 40 good data not only helps to maintain homeostasis it enables growth,
regeneration and even procreative transformation of the organization. As big data analytics
draws from this lifeblood and innervates its body through the new age of algorithmic neural
networks, personal privacy is endangered. This section explores this most controversial issue in
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contemporary healthcare; how much, and to what extent must stakeholder privacy be protected,
and the ethical justification for sacrificing privacy to ensure the HCO meets its obligations to
deliver care for the common good.
This chapter section proceeds by briefly considering the evolution of privacy as an
individual stakeholder claim, providing the foundation for current concepts articulated by
contemporary theorists Alan Westin, Daniel Solove, Adam Moore, Julie Inness and Anita
Allen.41 Although it is a timeless concept, and its earliest expressions date back to antiquity and
beyond,42 it is not always clear what the word privacy means. It is unclear whether privacy is
nothing more than a feeling evoked, or if it is to be respected as a moral, or legal claim; whether
it is an individual, or collective condition. This section considers privacy’s societal concepts and
values as evidenced through the ponderings of the aforementioned theorists and privacy
advocates.
Solove underscores the reality that “the matters we consider private change over
time…because of changing attitudes, institutions, living conditions and technology 43 and are
often contextual. This section shifts the dissertation focus to the right of privacy as a healthcare
value. The intimate details about a patient’s body, their mind, and all of their life experiences,
including those surreptitious trials that may affect their health and dignity, are bathed in privacy.
This dissertation is concerned specifically with the legal and moral challenges created by
physical, decisional, and informational privacy; although as the subsequent sections demonstrate,
the demarcation line between all three is blurring.
3. G.

Protected Health Information and the Need to Know

19

Healthcare is predominantly an information business. Treatment, quality measures,
patient safety, efficacious clinical outcomes, clinical research, and reliance on advanced
technology are merely a handful of the objectives that depend upon the acquisition and use of
patient information. 44 But personal patient data has not always been the main course in the
digital information feeding frenzy that is the hallmark of healthcare today. Prior to the
introduction of computerized data in the 1970s, most data sets were created manually from the
individuals treating the patients. 45 As recently as 20 years ago, physician notes and the mental
impressions of patient encounters were still written by hand, memorialized on paper and treated
with confidential reverence. All of that has changed.
This dissertation examines how the body politic of the late 1990s and the mobilization of
healthcare public policy whetted appetites for what would amount to a far-reaching liberation of
personal patient information. It proceeds to articulate the need for individual stakeholder legal
rights to privacy in their protected health information (PHI) as promulgated through various
legislative and executive pronouncements such as the HIPAA Privacy Rule (2002) and Security
Rule (2005).46 It then introduces how the proliferation of health information technologies that are
dependent upon digital data is in palpable tension with the patient stakeholder privacy
preferences, their exercise of control, and their expectations. 47
Specifically, the interoperability of electronic medical records between multiple providers
means that the physician-patient relationship is no longer binary 48 Nearly all information
conveyed in the course of the treating relationship, presumed to be confidential, will now be
accessed and used by hundreds, if not thousands of entities; many of whom will be unknown to
the patient. Just as important, they will likely only know the patient as an identifiable data set,
and never as a unique and distinct person. And, because of big data, the number of those
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unknown end users grows exponentially. This implications from big data, and particularly the
future of digital data must elevate concerns over stakeholder privacy to a place of prominence in
the ethically accountable HCO.
3. H. Big Data, Big Opportunities
“Data is not information, information is not knowledge, knowledge is not understanding,
understanding is not wisdom.” 49 By describing the world of information according to what it is
not, Clifford Stoll contends that knowledge obtained from information requires a process of
applied learning, continual improvement, and refinement of data. All with goal of achieving
some great outcome. 50 The evolutionary progression from raw data to knowledge, and then to
action is typically the purview of data scientists whose job it is to pour over and tease through
terabytes of data in order to interpret and analyze presumably for some anticipated good of the
organization and its stakeholders. Data drives innovation in healthcare.
Because more and more data sets are being created for and about people every second of
every day, this data will continue to persist under the control of others 51 whose relationship to the
HCO and patient stakeholders is increasingly distanced and attenuated. This attenuated control
endangers the notion of stakeholder autonomy, and the unanticipated secondary uses of the
information could call into question the validity of the consent voluntarily provided by the
patient stakeholder. Weakened individual control is only one of the challenges presented by ‘big
data.’ This chapter will probe further into the complexities of big data use in healthcare. It will
consider the opportunities for profound advances in medicine and care delivery through
advanced analytics and technologies. In addition it examines the ways in which big data affects
how stakeholders wield power, methods of decision-making, the privacy tradeoffs, and the
inadequacy of privacy laws to address those tradeoffs.
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3. I.

Algorithmic Decisions

Likely the most appealing attributes of big data for business and governments are its
ability to monitor human behavior individually and collectively, in addition to its predictive
capabilities. It is important to recognize that the bigness of big data is not so much because it is
massively amalgamated for anyone to remove pieces and chunks as desired. Rather, bigness
refers to its nearly irrepressible capabilities. Capabilities which “connect disparate datasets
through algorithmic analysis” that cobble together unpredictable relationships from data
collected and various times and places, in various formats, drawing inferences for myriad of
purposes. 52 This section of Chapter 3 takes an in-depth look at big data analytical insights in
healthcare, and specifically at algorithmic decision-making as an inflection point that provides
the means for decisions that were once made by data scientists, to be made by computer
systems.53
In so doing, this section defines the roles, and illuminates the virtual detonation of
artificial intelligence and machine learning in healthcare through notable examples such as
Google’s DeepMind. In addition it looks at the proliferation of medical devices which perform
their life-saving functions according to a machine’s thought process; devoid of human thinking.
To that end, this section argues that algorithmic decisions, as a critical tool, provides incalculable
good to healthcare. But as an unchecked weapon, it can do great harm.
Because of the intrinsic risk of data-driven discrimination, this dissertation contends that
the ethical challenge for algorithmic decisions is to inculcate moral judgment – that uniquely
human capability – into the big data universe. For, according to Purves, Jenkins and Strawser,
“[h]uman moral judgment is not codifiable…Moral judgment requires…the ability to perceive
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certain facts as moral considerations.” 54 Such should be the impetus for accountable healthcare
leaders to establish and implement ethical guidance for big data use.
3. J.

Ethical Guidance

The erosion of individual control exacerbated by artificial intelligence and robotics, facial
recognition, undetectable wearable technology, augmented realities and even transhumanism
threatens to invade and alter the sanctity of stakeholder privacy in healthcare. It is apparent,
more so than ever, that the ethical commitment to privacy as an indivisible constituent of human
dignity is a constant that, as yet, cannot be digitalized. Ethical decisions and moral judgment
requires human influence. So much so, that privacy is revitalizing the field of ethics. According
to Forrester Research, “ethical privacy practices will be the next consumer-driven, values-based
source of differentiation” 55 As argued throughout this paper, ethical decision-making considers
the humanness and dignity of the individual. This dissertation will show that accountable
healthcare leaders must consider the moral rights of their stakeholders, which includes their
privacy rights and interests when setting data use and strategy policies. Understanding ethical use
and management of stakeholder information necessitates the creation of an ethical approach that
considers what is legal, fair, and just, and has at its heart a better respect for human dignity. 56
Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation closely examine respect for human dignity through the lens
of leadership accountability to those who are most vulnerable: pediatric, elderly and disabled
populations.
Chapter 4. – Community Stakeholders in Healthcare: Pediatric Populations
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is concerned with the HCO’s duty to respond to its
stakeholders, and is a continuing commitment to look beyond its core business to the
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externalities that affect all of its stakeholders and constituents. Pointedly, the morally responsible
organization must realize and understand the complex interconnectedness between social and
economic forces on its stakeholders. To do otherwise would, as Freeman predicts, 57 “fail to
describe and predict the business world as it really is.” 58 For the sake of its stakeholders,
healthcare cannot afford such a miscalculation.
As this dissertation argues, providing for the common good is both a human right inured
to the members of society, and a duty, for those empowered, to provide. Healthcare is a common
good of a moral and civil society. 59 To that end, these next two chapters focus on the HCO’s
moral obligation, and social responsibility, to ensure access to clinical advances, and respect the
dignity of stakeholder groups who are most vulnerable and disempowered across the life
continuum.
4. A.

Transcending Risks to Serve the Vulnerable

With its concentration specifically on human flourishing at the beginning of the human
life continuum, Chapter 4 proffers an ethical justification for managing risk and engaging
children in clinical and social research studies. Society’s long-held preconceptions that women
and children were weak, cloaked them under layers of protections and safeguards that
historically excluded them from involvement in clinical research trials. Such exclusion resulted
in a dearth of research on women and children, and a lack of clinical understanding of these
groups of people. This chapter will argue for the need to avoid exploitation of children through
equitable selection of participants, principles of informed consent, and concise ethical risk of
harm and benefit analysis that respects human dignity. Pivotal to this argument are the roles of
physician and researcher; who are most often one in the same. Throughout this chapter ethical
issues specific to particular clinical, cultural, and social contexts relating to pediatric
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communities will be illuminated; such as children and adolescents with HIV 60, those who suffer
from abuse and neglect, and children with special cognitive needs.
Since at least the Enlightenment period, mankind’s desire to discover and uncover the
answers to life’s mysteries through inquiry and scientific thought, has been fueled by the notion
that knowledge is power. In much the same way that extracting knowledge from big data
necessitates a process of repeated refinement and understanding to avoid harm, the pursuit of
knowledge of the medical world does not come without risk. While it can help and heal, the
pursuit of knowledge from human research can also bring with it infinite harms that may
disempower populations of people if obtained unethically. Specifically, ethically deficient
clinical research can exploit children on many levels. 61 This section provides a synopsis of the
dynamic history of clinical research – specifically relating to children - and the development of
the principles and processes enabling their participation in it.
4. B. Applying the Principles to Pediatric Research
Because they differ from adults, research with children is essential to understand the
pathology of disease and disorders involving them. Some diseases are unique to children, and
because they are not little adults, nor are they non-adult beings, their physiology and psychology
must be understood within the pediatric context. Although research with children is vital to child
health, this species of research remains a source of controversy. 62 The ethical challenges arising
from pediatric participation in research emanate from the presupposition that it is appropriate for
children to participate in research in the first place. This paper will not debate appropriateness
but will begin with the premise that ethical research ought to include children, provided that the
researchers first employ principles of justice and equitable selection of children. It will approach
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the topic of inclusion versus exclusion through the lens of a few notable theological and
philosophical theorists.
Ensuring that human research participants validly grant their consent is one of the core
ethical principles of the Belmont Report; which codified the basic principles of respect for
autonomy, beneficence and justice into the cornerstone principles of research ethics.63 Consent
underscores respect for persons, preserves autonomy and ensures that people maintain control
over their lives – especially children. In addition, there is a legal basis for procuring consent
from those who have parental responsibility over children. 64 This section addresses this topic by
highlighting the regulatory approaches to valid parental consent, the child’s assent, barriers to
informed consent, and the intersection of institutional review boards (IRBs) accountability for
situations when consent may not be necessary.
The idea of avoiding harm, proffering benefit, and minimizing risk to children in clinical
research has many dimensions. Harms are not always physiological, and are wide-ranging and
dynamic – from unanticipated intrusions into privacy and embarrassment, to violations of
personal dignity and self-respect.65 Benefits are not always known and are often not detected
until long after the study closes; they may not even inure to the study participants themselves. 66
Further, risk assessments look at probability and severity of harm through the lens of what is
reasonably foreseeable or what is already known to have occurred.
Accordingly, this section addresses the fundamental importance of risk of harm
assessments – particularly as they are influenced by the condition of the child entering the study.
On the one hand, a child with a disorder may be susceptible to greater harm from a research
procedure than a child who is healthy. Conversely some argue that children who are healthy

26

ought to remain so and are therefore entitled to greater protection. These relative positions are
part of the ongoing conversation surrounding risk of harm assessments. 67
4. C. Pediatric Vulnerability in Three Contexts
As this thesis demonstrates, ethically accountable healthcare organizations have a moral
duty to address the needs of its community of stakeholders. Vulnerable populations and
subpopulations of stakeholders are within the purview of an HCO; and they are dependent upon
it to satisfy many of their physical and emotional needs. Children are inherently and
conditionally vulnerable. Contextual vulnerability considers more than the intrinsic
characteristics of the individual; it considers the contexts in which they find themselves. 68 This
section explores, through the lens of pediatric research as a contingent vulnerability, the
contextual backdrops to vulnerability unique to children with HIV, victims of abuse and
maltreatment, and children with special intellectual and cognitive and disorders.
4. D.

Ethical and Legal Strategies for Managing Pediatric Obesity: A Moral Duty

The concept of population health refers to an “understanding of the epidemiology of a
particular population and aligning a community’s healthcare resources to not only treat
illnesses…but to keep the population healthy.” 69 Managing population health, particularly with
respect to vulnerable populations, requires accountable leadership who possess a moral
commitment to the sustained health and lifelong fulfillment of patients and communities served
by the HCO.70 Principles of stewardship, normative stakeholder theories, community-oriented
health programs, and the duty to provide for the common good dictate an urgent commitment
from HCOs, providers and even policymakers to disrupt this environment and act to protect this
at-risk population. The remainder of this chapter addresses a specific slice of this population
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health sphere. It considers with some depth, the ethical and legal strategies for accountable
leaders to prevent and mitigate the psychosocial and physiological effects of pediatric obesity on
children.
Even though one-third of the world’s population goes to bed hungry each night, overnutrition – that which occurs when too many calories and excess nutrients and food components
are consumed vis-à-vis suboptimal energy expenditures – is rampant in the United States.
Barring some intervening metabolic disorder, over-nutrition nearly always results in excess
levels of fat tissue and bodyweight. Calculated against an individuals’ height, the resulting body
mass index (BMI) is the standardized yardstick used to determine whether an individual is obese.
American’s are among the top ten fattest people in the world, and its children are among the
largest.71
Since 1980, childhood obesity rates have tripled to the point that close to one-third of
children over age 2 are overweight or obese. 72 More than a mere descriptive word associated
with BMI calculation, obesity is a multi-factor condition73 that has wide-ranging genetic, societal
and behavioral causes that begin in childhood and can continue into adulthood – rendering it a
two-stage disease. 74 Obesity’s impact is so diverse and dramatic that the World Health
Organization Consultation on Obesity’s prescient report determined it to be a highly neglected
public health problem with a potential impact as great as that of smoking. 75 Since this conclusion
was drawn, obesity as a public health threat has gained the same recognition as anti-tobacco and
related legislation, especially with respect to its influence on children’s behavior. This section
examines the state of the childhood obesity as a public health crisis through the lens of societal,
socio-cultural and environmental influences.
4. E. Obesogenic Vulnerability
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It is widely understood and accepted that untreated obesity-related medical conditions
will threaten the life of a child if they are sufficiently severe; particularly when the conditions are
in the later stages of deterioration. Physical manifestations such as Type II diabetes,
hypertension, asthma and sleep apnea can have devastating and debilitating effects well into
adulthood. While the long-term medical consequences of pediatric obesity are well-recognized,
the less obvious but highly destructive and indelible consequences of pediatric obesity, and
clearly the most pervasive one in Western societies, are its psychosocial costs. 76 Because of the
stigma, shame and isolation of obesity that often follow the child into adulthood, the
psychosocial costs of pediatric obesity are often more chronic over their lifetime than the
physiological. 77 Following a sketch of the most sinister physiological effects of obesity, this
section will present the sobering psychosocial consequences and harms that threaten children;
harms that can scar well into their adult lives.
4. F.

Parens Patriae – Parenting the Community

The psychosocial consequences from being obese are socially constructed harms. As
such, the social costs along with discrimination of all sorts are significant public health risks that
warrant community intervention in executing remediation strategies. As an interdependent unit,
it is incumbent upon the community of stakeholders, which includes the HCO, to consider the
vulnerability of obese children in the face of obesogenic influences, and its duty to protect them.
Somebody must account for those who cannot yet fully take care of themselves. And, the
strategies employed must take into account the cultural influences and community values that
affect obesity trends. 78
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Individualism and individual choice and the freedoms associated with them undergird the
prevailing ideology in the United States. In conformance with societal norms and generally
accepted values, a person should be able to choose what is best for them. Childhood obesity is
not typically an example of personal choice, but rather a public health and societal problem.
However, balancing the autonomy of the parent and their right to raise their children in their own
way, according to their views and values is paramount. Parents have right to raise their children
according to their perceived best interests, and interference against their will is highly controlled
and limited only to the most serious cases. 79 However, where the best interest of the child is
threatened, and where the choices of the parent endanger a child’s life, or in the case of public
health, the lives of obese children generally, community stakeholder intervention – which may
include the government – can be ethically justified.
The argument for intervention requires a foundation from which the principles of the duty
to do good and avoid harm, intersect with the individual rights to be left alone, and the state’s
responsibility to advance the community’s best interests. This final section proffers a theory of
principled communitarianism as that foundation. It applies the best of all three objectives. It
incorporates the communitarian emphasis on the social and interdependent nature of life and
what is best for the community in establishing society’s moral thinking, and attributes
responsibility for execution to the community. 80 This section then presents the legal doctrine of
parens patriae to cases of persistent obesogenic environments engendering medical neglect, and
argues that the state, in cooperation with the community and HCO have a moral and legal duty to
protect these children.
Chapter 5. - Community Stakeholders in Healthcare: The Elderly and Persons with
Disabilities
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Vulnerability ensues when consequences and conditions render certain stakeholder
populations susceptible to physical, economic and social harm, or disadvantage. However,
people are also at risk from social biases that have less to do with their actual conditions and
more to do with societal perceptions and preconceptions of them. Biases can disadvantage,
discriminate and disempower. Elderly persons and persons with disabilities are often victims of
such biases. For example, at some point in the life continuum, the elderly face a culture that
frequently treats them differently from youth; buoyed with the presumptive undercurrent that
they have lived a good life already. 81 Youth represent beauty and promise, whereas the elderly
demonstrate the transient nature of life, and the death that is certain for everyone. 82
Even though most people will experience some type of physical or mental impairment
before they die, few people are willing to identify themselves as having a disability, or admit to
the inevitableness of such condition. As such, persons with disabilities very often become the
“other” and are dehumanized; often considered a “counterpoint to normality.” 83 This chapter
illustrates the ethical responsibility of accountable healthcare organizations to meet the needs of
their most inaudible stakeholder populations; that is, the elderly, and those with disabilities. It
explains this through an ethic of care for long-term assistance for the elderly, and through the
promotion of human flourishing through respect for the human condition concerning persons
with disabilities.
5. A. The Elderly Population – The Cared For and the Caregiver
Aging is an ambivalent reality. While the vast majority of emotionally healthy and welladjusted people hope to live a long life, few relish the thought of growing old. Hardly anyone
can admit a willingness to embrace and welcome the physical, emotional and even economic
challenges that inevitably accompany growing old. “Even at their healthiest, the aged are
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vulnerable and fragile.” 84 Living a long life presents challenges to the elderly as well as to the
communities within which they live. Nowhere are these challenges more visible than in the
resource allocation and mechanisms that provide access to long-term healthcare services to the
very old. This chapter will demonstrate the ethical justification for providing long-term and
informal care to the chronically ill elderly, despite the era of age-based rationing, and ageism
tendencies. This justification is articulated through policymaking initiatives that are supported
by an ethic of care.
Not only is the process of aging and the attitudes surrounding it ambiguous, the meaning
of the term elderly is equally nebulous. Any conversation addressing the needs of the elderly
must emerge from an understanding of how the population is defined in the United States. In
1935, the United States determined the age of 65 to be the benchmark retirement age through its
adoption of the Social Security Act; 85 patterning itself after the European nations chronological
eligibility for old-age insurance. Older has since been defined as those aged 65 and over.
According to the most recent U.S. Census, this group now represents 13 percent of the total U.S.
population.86 As of 2016, there were more than 6 million persons over the age of 85 living in the
U.S. with 81, 896 of them over the age of 100. This expanding population represents some of the
most acutely sick persons requiring some of the costliest and most protracted health care. This
statistical profile is an essential launching point from which policy makers consider the needs of
this vulnerable segment of society.
Because medical advances and technology have made it possible to prolong healthy
human life, this medical progress also includes prolonging the lives of those with chronic
disabling conditions and functional disabilities. Women are more likely than men to suffer from
multiple chronic conditions that are not necessarily imminently life-threatening although they
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generally result in limitations to mobility, physical and social activities. Men utilize more inpatient services – reimbursable by Medicare – whereas women use more prescription and
custodial care services. The net result is that Medicare covers a smaller portion of women’s
healthcare needs. In addition, women are disproportionately impacted by healthcare access issues
because they live on average 7.5 years longer than men. 87 This section unpacks the need for
formal and informal long-term care for these elderly, as well as the benefits such services confer.
It further argues that current policy trends and age-based rationing preferences obstruct access to
these vital services; providing them only to the most dire, means-tested, financial need while
denying access and assistance to those on the fringes.
5. B.

Public-Policy and Age-Based Allocation and Rationing

The purpose of policies are to articulate how governments allocate resources, influence
behaviors and help to ensure the security of its constituents. They also reflect common
consensus about values, and tell a story about people, history and what is important to the
populace. As Holstein, Parks and Waymack aptly state, policies try to solve problems or support
core beliefs. 88 Throughout the past several decades, certain core beliefs concerning the rationing
of healthcare needs of the elderly have dominated policymaking thinking. Recognizing that there
are various meanings ascribed to the term “rationing,” this dissertation accepts the definition
adopted by the Catholic Health Association as “the withholding of potentially beneficial services
because policies and practices establish limits on the resources available for health care.” 89 This
chapter will review several predominant views of allocation and age-based rationing in order to
demonstrate that an ethic of care must overwrite any consideration of such rationing and
therefore support liberating constraints on the provision of long-term care services.
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The belief that the elderly are a “bottomless pit of needs” and that meeting those needs
will disproportionately stress already stressed financial resources, undergirds much of current
public policy and forms the basis for age-based rationing. 90 This analysis looks closely at the
range of thinking espoused by Callahan, Daniels, Menzel and Kilner. 91 Their thinking spans the
continuum from rationing of services based on a perceived natural lifespan, to a care-oriented
approach with “care” as the central principle.
As this chapter demonstrates, society’s frail and elderly stakeholders have unmet needs.
Policymakers must also understand better that the cultural and economic contexts coupled with
the healthcare system’s reimbursement payment structure, fail to provide for these needs. Current
policy trends fail to consider the total-care delivery package which takes into account a
comprehensive view of the elderly patient before, during and after acute care treatment.
Healthcare cannot be considered independent of the social services required to support the
elderly when their capabilities begin to decline. 92 This section explores further the implications
of the U.S. model of needs-based claims, and considers briefly the opportunity of providing
long-term care through social insurance.
5. C.

Reshaping Public Policy through Ethic of Care and Compassion

Reshaping public policy on long-term care requires redefining what is meant by care, the
persons and communities involved, as well as their obligations and duties necessary in providing
that care. The traditional medical model recognizes the interaction between the clinician and
patient, and to some extent, third-party payers. However, many more persons and organizations
are involved in critical ways when in-home and other community-based long-term care services
are considered. 93 With the patient at the center, the delivery of appropriate, affordable and
quality services depends upon the relationship between the patient and the encircling community
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of stakeholders. Stakeholders include family members, professional and facility providers –
including social workers and therapists - as well as government agencies, and professional
associations who establish standards of care.
Accountable leadership necessarily obligates the HCO and its stakeholders to accept the
need for community support for access to long-term elder care. To that end, Holstein, Parks and
Waymack advocate for an ethic of interconnectedness in policymaking. They assert that the
interconnectedness of individuals and groups are linked together by the values and ethics of the
group. Further, they submit that policymakers and legislators must first assent to the importance
of access to long-term care and the values attributed to it. 94 In short, this analysis contends that
ethically justified care for the elderly must shift its focus from high-technology acute medical
services to recognition of the community-based interdependent relationships. Relationships that
support low-technology, informal care standards – based on the ethic of care and compassionate
humanism.
This chapter explains that the healthcare delivery system in the United States is
traditionally far less centered on care and is more precisely a health management delivery
system. It further argues that to focus on the interconnectedness of people rather than their
separateness, and to establish care as an organizing principle supported by norms and an ethic of
care for the population, enriches the lives of the vulnerable within the community. Policies
supporting long-term care for the aged and elderly must include provisions that strengthen the
relationships that sustain people and bolster the interconnectivity and interdependency of
humanity. Interdependency reminds everyone, including policymakers and accountable
healthcare leadership, that the human lifespan encompasses a lifetime of stewardship, which just
as the Catholic Church teaches, is necessary at every stage of life. 95 When policymakers imbed
35

this virtue into policy, the moral justification for public support of long-term care communities
become self-evident. As is the case with pediatric communities described in Chapter 4,
stewardship promotes the authentic good of human beings and human society, and preserves
human dignity and self-respect; both for the aged and their caregivers.
While the principle goal of long-term community-based care is respect for the human
dignity of the aged and chronically ill elderly, policymakers and healthcare leaders must develop
and promote policy models that sustain person-focused compassion. As advanced by TellisNayak and Tellis-Nayak, that entails a model that considers and advocates for the needs of all
participants in care – the elderly, the family, and other caregivers. 96 The remainder of this
chapter examines the issue of person-centered, collaborative and holistic care through the works
of Nayak and Nayak, Nancy Fox, and Murial Gillick, and by providing examples of current
models of care.
5. D. The Dignity of Disability
This dissertation’s argument for ethical accountability of healthcare leaders to their
communities of stakeholders, will conclude its analysis with a vivid examination of the needs of
stakeholders with disabilities, and the attendant obligations of the HCO. Specifically this final
section will demonstrate the healthcare profession’s obligation to improve the human condition
of persons with disabilities through the alleviation of human suffering and disease; hence
enabling them to flourish. The alleviation of suffering and disease, however, does not presuppose
the total eradication of disability. To the contrary. This analysis contends that disabilities entitle
those who possess them the dignity to live with their particular disability identity in right
relationship with their environments; 97 without obstacles to obfuscate them.
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Consistent with this paper’s emphasis on human dignity and concern for the
disempowered, this section opens by exploring what it means to be human, to flourish, and to
live a good life; with particular emphasis on the unique demographic of with those disabilities. It
illustrates the aspects of humanity and human disability from evolutionary and theological
perspectives. Understanding the various dimensions of the human condition of disability –
especially the medical model - are necessarily influenced by the principles of beneficence,
autonomy, non-maleficence and justice. These principles alongside genetic technology and
medicine undergird the duty to improve the human condition by preventing mortality, morbidity,
and even disability. 98 With that, this dissertation will also look at humankind’s desire to improve
the human condition from beneficent interventions, to understanding the roots, history and
evolution of eugenics.
The argument for HCO leadership accountability to this vulnerable stakeholder group
concludes with demonstrable justification for enabling opportunities to reverse the negative
attitudes towards disability through the ethic of care. It further asserts recommendations for
imparting disability ethics into decision-making, and eliminating barriers to human flourishing
for those with disabilities, rather than the eliminating a disability, through the musings of leading
theorists, including Paul Jewell, Celia Deanne-Drummond, and Tobin Siebers. In the end, it
contends that accepting what are considered human disabilities requires a shift away from a
culture that pursues perfection at all costs, and insists instead on recognition that the beauty
found in the person with a disability is not dependent upon human perfection. 99
Disability is pertinent to the human condition. 100 In order to fully understand the moral
obligations that HCO’s have towards those with disabilities, the conversation must begin with an
understanding of what it means to be human. Accordingly, this section explores humanness from
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the evolutionary, and theological perspectives. From the position of evolution, humans and their
embodied nature are distinguished from other animals, and are studied according to how they
live in relation to tensions in their environment; as well as in terms of human biology and
characteristics. 101 The Judeo-Christian tradition, which has influenced western thought, holds
that what makes animals human is that they are made in the image and likeness of God. And,
humans possess divinely bestowed dominion for overseeing things produced for the good of
humanity, as well as for those who produce such them. 102 This dominion presupposes the duty to
change and improve life for the rest of humanity. The complex variables that challenge and
affect human life, and inspire change are what Doerfler refers to as conditio humana or the
human condition.103
The human condition – the endeavor to move humanity through these challenges and
variables – is universally seen as broken and flawed. Accordingly, whether the human condition
is viewed theologically or scientifically, it strives to eliminate human limitations, alleviate
suffering and improve the quality of human life and fulfillment. Understanding the depth to
which humanity may dive as it pursues elimination of limitations – particularly those perceived
limitations associated with human disability – requires examination of the concepts of human
flourishing and the good life.104 The remainder of this section is dedicated to that examination.
5. E. Improving the Human Condition of Disability
In its moral quest to improve the human condition, humanity wrestles with the lure of
eliminating all unacceptable characteristics, and traits not deemed typically human. To profess
that someone is disabled, or that they carry some undesirable trait, or genetic defect presupposes
that there exist criteria for what it means to be non-disabled; to be the ideal human. One widely
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accepted view of ideal humanness is to possess a productive body. A body that fails to meet that
societal demand is considered disabled.105
It is in society’s best interest to place a high value on health and well-being, to value
good health over ill-health and to reduce morbidity and improve overall health. While most
people would prefer being able-bodied to being disabled, and healthy rather than unhealthy, the
fact of the matter is that much of what is considered normal and able are subject to normative
beliefs.106 Because the roles occupied by HCO leaders are tied to norms and standards which set
stakeholder expectations, in order to recognize the common good for these vulnerable people, the
normative state of play must be understood.
To that end, a principle issue for those who seek to improve the human condition is to
consider whether it is in the purview of society to decide the state of any future person by
eliminating disability through genetic intervention. The connection between genetics and
historical eugenic philosophies, which associated social ills with the prevalence of mental and
physical defects, undergirds much of contemporary thinking concerning the way persons with
disabilities are treated. 107 This chapter looks at genetic testing, prenatal testing and ethicaldeselection through the expressions of several theorists including Stephen Wilkinson, Paul
Ramsey and David Wasserman.
5. F. Creating Enabling Environments through Ethic of Care and Disability Ethics
This final section addresses the ethical accountability of healthcare leadership to its
stakeholders with disabilities by arguing for care environments that reverse negative thinking and
embrace all life as a gift. Doing so enables human flourishing, not through pursuit of genetic
perfection but through enabling and acceptance of a good life worth living, 108 despite its puzzling
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differences. The argument begins with the presupposition that all life is a gift, and develops that
assertion according to Judeo-Christian thought leaders; for example Nancy Eisland, Hans
Reinders, and William May.
It then expands to the need to impart disability ethics as part of the HCO culture of ethics
in order to provide for the common good of its stakeholders. It unfolds according the social
model of disability first introduced by Michael Oliver, 109 and expands to include the
contemporary postures of Alicia Ouellette and Jackie Leach Scully. The social model of
disability shifts attention away from the individual’s traits and conditions and focuses instead on
how the environment and society create obstacles for the person. 110 According to this model,
those societal obstacles are themselves disabling barriers to human flourishing, not the physical
or emotional manifestations of the disorder or injury.
Awareness of the barriers to healthcare that adversely affect and obstruct flourishing and
enjoyment of a good life is a moral mandate for accountable healthcare leaders as they serve
their stakeholders with disabilities. However, awareness without advancing affirmative measures
to overcome such barriers is futile and will fail this vulnerable population. Empathy towards this
population is a contingent of the moral agency ascribed to the HCO; it is an attribute imbedded
within its moral soul. As such, this dissertation concludes with recommendations to create
enabling environments. 111 Environments that reverse negative thinking about disability, respect
the identity of disability, enhance access to care,, and ensure that respect for the dignity of the
person’s abilities directs moral decision-making.
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6.

Conclusion

Healthcare organizations are morally accountable and have ethical obligations to a wide
variety of constituents, including the broad community of stakeholders that it serves. While
maintaining organizational homeostasis through ethical accountability, the HCO requires a
unification of individual and institutional moral agents, and adherence to its values in order to
preserve its moral soul. The title of this dissertation, “Ethical Accountability of Organizational
Leadership to Communities of Stakeholders” emphasizes the importance of moral decisionmaking and presents it through the lens of distinct stakeholder groups and concerns.
As the AHERF example demonstrates, HCOs that abandon stakeholder considerations,
and engage in unchecked critical decision-making are dispossessed of accountable leadership
and risk losing its moral soul. This analysis further shows that an HCO’s moral soul
acknowledges the diversity of stakeholder values and interests and the impact of the
organization’s decisions on them. The dissertation explores those communities of stakeholders
and their unique interests.
Privacy rights and the respect for the confidentiality of secrets are inherently human
concerns and are of particular significance to the dignity of healthcare stakeholders. This analysis
dissects the legal obligations and challenges of maintaining stakeholder confidentiality at a time
when healthcare in the United States practically demands and unleashes unfettered access to
patient information. It then argues for an ethical justification for deviations from these
obligations when accountable leaders establish guidance and practices that undergird the moral
rights of their stakeholders with respect to their secrets.
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Respect for human dignity and providing for the common good of society are moral
imperatives of accountable healthcare leaders. This moral mandate unfolds fully in this
dissertation by considering the needs of the most vulnerable and fragile stakeholder populations
across the life continuum. It illustrates how ethical accountability of organizational leadership is
made manifest through the HCO’s moral considerations, and their contribution to the enrichment
of the lives of their pediatric, elderly, and disabled populations.
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Chapter 2. – Organizational Moral Agency
2.

Introduction
The human body is organized into interdependent structural and functional levels of

increasing complexity. 1 Each level of form and function builds upon and incorporates the
structures and functions of the previous lower levels. Human anatomy’s rich composite of
chemicals, cells tissues and organs are precisely amalgamated to form organ systems that
contribute to and enable particular bodily functions. 2 Anatomy and physiology represent form
and function, respectively, and are the essential disciplines driving the science and the practice of
medicine. When form and function are in union, a body experiences a state of good health.
Homeostasis – the body’s ability to maintain stable and normal functions despite
exposure to constant internal and external changes – depends upon the proper form and function
of each organ and system. As such, when changes influence the order of form and function, the
body must respond appropriately. Alerted to those changes, interdependent response mechanisms
implicate all of the organ systems of the body, and are accountable to them to ensure proper
functioning. Institutional medicine as represented by the contemporary healthcare organization,
attempts the same synergy as the principles of human anatomy, physiological accountability, and
homeostasis.
For purposes of this dissertation, the terms organization/organizational and
institution/institutional and are used interchangeably, and have the same meaning. As Craig
Johnson suggests, “Organizations consist of three or more people engaged in coordinated action
in pursuit of a common purpose or goal.” 3 As the body through which modern medicine is most
commonly delivered, the healthcare organization (HCO) similarly seeks to maintain order among
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its diverse stakeholders to achieve organizational homeostasis. When internal and external
influences threaten order, the survival of the organization and the health of its stakeholders
depend upon its ability to maintain homeostasis. As this dissertation demonstrates, maintaining
order depends upon the ethical accountability of leadership to its constituent stakeholder parts.
More than just anatomy, an ethically accountable HCO requires the exposition of moral integrity
and the virtue of its leadership.
This chapter opens with an understanding of moral agency as the cornerstone of ethical
accountability and decision-making to support a common morality. It presents a portrait of
common morality and its framework including a historical snapshot of ethical norms, principles,
rules and theories, and contemporary views espoused by Beauchamp and Childress, as well as
Gert, Culver and Clouser. The discussion bifurcates organizational moral agency into individual
and institutional components, and illustrates how their unification and ethical decision-making
can innervate and preserve the HCO’s moral soul. The discussion then explores the theological
exposition of soul through the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. It further develops the
metaphor of soul in healthcare as that which enables the intimate relationships generated
throughout the healthcare experience. 4 As a contrast, it then examines demise of an HCO when
leaders are dispossessed of their moral agency, lack discernment, forfeit soul, and a ct with
Faustian motivations that are morally irresponsible. Specifically it deeply probes the case of the
Allegheny Health Education, Research Foundation’s notorious bankruptcy.
Because decisions rendered by the HCOs implicate more than its bottom line, this section
concludes with a brief introduction to stakeholder theory. As an approach to organizational ethics
that heeds to the rights and interests of individuals or groups who interact with the HCO, this
section examines the moral obligations to these groups as articulated through normative
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stakeholder theory. Specifically, it presents stakeholder theory through the lens of dominant
theories which are based upon stakeholder relationships; the ethics of care, 5 stakeholder
fairness,6 and stewardship.
2. A.

Common Morality and Moral Agency
Morality concerns the norms surrounding human behavior which are good and right and

are so universally shared that they are able to cement a stable, predictable social framework. It
includes measures of conduct; standards such as moral/ethical norms and beliefs, principles,
rules and theories. Some aspects of morality are so embedded into our social fabric that the
norms they dictate are said to form a common morality shared and recognized by all moral
persons across different cultures. These include, but are not limited to, standard norms such as
“do not kill” and “tell the truth” as well as moral character traits such as integrity, fidelity and
kindness.7
Some moral norms prescribe rules, obligations and duties to reduce or prevent harm,
others are created to increase the good, or provide relief to those who are harmed by a particular
situation or encounter. Moral principles and rules are norms of obligation; that is, they create
standards of action required of all people who subscribe to common morality. According to
Beauchamp and Childress, the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice
provide the basis for specific rules and for moral reasoning and apply to all persons committed to
morality.8 Autonomy refers to the freedom to decide for oneself, beneficence imposes an action
to do good, nonmaleficence calls for refraining from harmful actions, and the principle of justice
refers to that which is fair, equitable and appropriate in light of what is owed to someone. 9 For
Beauchamp and Childress, these principles of morality further rely upon sets of substantive,
authority and procedural rules to arrive at right moral conduct.
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Gert, Culver and Clouser, in contrast, dispense with principles and their cascading rules
and propose instead that there are ten highly comprehensible general moral rules governing all
right conduct. Five are designed to prevent direct harm: do not kill; do not cause pain; do not
disable; do not deprive of freedom; and do not deprive of pleasure. And five moral rules prevent
likely harm: do not deceive; keep your promise; do not cheat; obey the law; and do your duty. 10
These rules establish rights and obligations for actors and decision-makers. Gert refers to those
to whom these moral rules apply as moral agents. 11 Those moral actors, and the rules and
principles with which they work, must fit within a set of societal, or in the case of an HCO, its
organizational beliefs and decision-making processes. Those beliefs and processes are establish a
basis for common morality and associated moral action. Use of the term ethics throughout this
dissertation will be construed as the moral beliefs and behavior of people, the rules devised to
prevent conflict, to support the mores of the society and to reinforce principles of human duty. 12
2. A. 1. Individual Agency
An institution cannot act on its own. It requires morally justified decision-makers and
actors to help define its mission and purpose, and then act and perform in accordance with it,
while supporting critical values and norms. These moral agents, who are both internal and
external to the organization, are responsible for building and binding together a trusted
organization. In short, an ethical healthcare organization is only as sound as the decisions and
actions of those who create and support it, and who are also encouraged and equipped to make
ethical choices according to prescribed ethical principles. 13
The mission, values, and principles of ethics define the moral standards and illustrate the
moral identity of the entity. Employees and other members of the workforce are an
organization’s agents and reflect that identity. They are the face of the organization’s mission,
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identity and culture, and are the embodiment of its values. As moral agents, they are responsible
for executing on its mission and they step into the shoes of the organization every time they act
within the scope of their role - and quite often, even when they are not acting officially. The
roles occupied by individuals within the HCO are tied to the norms and standards that define
expectations; for example, the qualities of an outstanding assistant, a respected leader, and an
effective and strategic-thinking CEO. The presumed standards constitute the notion of role
morality and the individuals performing in accordance with these moral standards help to
establish and sustain the ethical organization. Actions that fail to meet these standards, as well as
the persons attributed to those actions are said to be immoral.14 To satisfy these moral standards,
and in the execution of their duties, individual moral agents acting on behalf of the HCO
indisputably must be persons of unwavering integrity and character who are also adept at
collaboration. Honesty, integrity and truthfulness are but a few examples of moral character
traits, and represent virtues indelibly engraved in common morality.
Although the United States has long been recognized as the source and summit of some
of the finest and most advanced forms of medicine in the world, it cannot claim to be the original
architect of morality in medicine. That distinction rests with the ancient Romans and Greeks
from as far back as the fifth century, BCE as evidenced in the moral precepts of the Hippocratic
Oath and other codes promulgated during this era. 15 These ancient codes were proclamations
dedicated to achieving what was considered the end or goal of medicine – the good of the
patient. And was the duty of the physician to achieve that good. 16 Medical ethics began as
descriptive – someone was a physician, therefore it was known how they would act, and what
they would do. 17
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The physician-centric precepts of these early codes found stickiness in Western medicine.
The notion of what was ethically right relied upon the character, duty and the social ethics of the
physician. Character addressed the inherent good qualities of one who heals; duty set forth the
obligations of the good physician “to benefit the sick and do them no harm.” 18 These were often
reinforced in the form of oaths and codes, however they also existed in the moral beliefs and
divine commands present in Judeo-Christian tradition. For example, the respect for life imposes
a moral duty not to end a life. Finally, social ethics is the idea that the physician assumes
responsibility for the entire profession through their behavior in the community. The American
Medical Association, for more than a century, modeled the code of medical ethics as
synonymous for rules of professional conduct, physician integrity, and social responsibility. 19
From the early twentieth century, solo practitioners were the model of medical integrity.
The notion of what they ought to do was baked into them from professors, colleagues and trusted
mentors. Rarely was their judgment of their own ethical duties called into question. But, as
science and medical technologies redefined and reshaped the clarity with which the medical
doctor’s conscience once operated, the patient-centered mindset of what constituted the good
became distorted. Medical interventions provided by or directed by machines challenged the
concepts of physician duty. The physician who once saw her healing art inextricably tied to the
good of her patient, and their relationship, was forced to share her relationship with science and
technology.20 The transformation of medicine, and the evolution of the contemporary healthcare
organization influenced the shift away from descriptive nature of ethics to more of a normative
approach. And since an HCO is more than an accumulation of physicians, these transformations
influenced a broad swath of moral agents.
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Aside from the standards attributed to their roles, individuals also have personal values,
which act as guiding principles in their lives. 21 They typically subscribe to their own unique
beliefs and standards. Personal values are reflected in individual attitudes and are most often
rooted in experiential as well as cultural influences. For the most part, an organization’s values
are similarly shaped by its tradition, culture and the amalgamated personalities of its leaders, and
may not be identical to the personal values of its individual agents. However, good leadership
must be able to articulate those values and strive to ensure a degree of congruence with
individual values. 22 Dissonance between individual stakeholder and organizational values,
however, is oftentimes inevitable.
A variety of individuals come together to build and sustain a morally accountable HCO.
As moral agents, nearly all of the professions represented are expected to adhere to prescribed
professional standards and codes of conduct unique to those disciplines; while upholding the
virtues of common morality. The moral agency ascribed to the HCO requires it to cohabitate
with its professional, clinical and business professionals and integrate their normative ethical
duties and values into the HCO mission. 23 This ability to cohabitate must be bi-directional.
Because persons within an HCO are not unthinking automatons operating in lockstep
with nothing more than a mere code of conduct to dictate behavior, a positive ethical climate
requires synergy between its moral goals, the HCO and the competing interests of its moral
agents. When they are not in sync, and moral agents are not aligned with the critical values of
norms of the HCO, homeostasis is upset. Diversity of interests, and divergent methods for
reacting to competing internal and external influences further enable conflicts to emerge, distrust
to ensue, and the perpetuation of a negative ethical climate. 24
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2. A. 2.

Institutional Agency and Decision-Making
Since an organization cannot act as individuals do, it is the HCO’s ethics program which

represents a memorialized and formalized mission and vision statement. It sets forth the
principles of ethics adopted by the organization which guide behaviors and actions. Although it
does not act independent of its agents, and an organization cannot be considered a moral
individual, it does act through the collective decision-making of its moral agents. And while it
cannot have a motive in the same way a person does, an institution is evaluated and adjudged to
be moral or immoral by its constituents as well as other organizations according to the decisions,
intentions and actions of its moral agents. 25
“Organizational ethics applies moral standards and principles to the organizational
context.” 26 Organizational ethics provides the framework for a code of conduct, or ethical
program of core values, culture and structure that undergird an organization and illustrate its
optimal normative mission. In building its ethical character, the governing board of directors
must unambiguously identify and make public the mission and values that are deeply held by the
organization and are associated with its identity. They must also establish the ethical standards
with which members of the board as well as management and frontline employees will comply. 27
The board’s actions in developing the mission and vision statements establish the parameters of
its ethics program – setting the tone for a culture of ethics. 28 But a framework alone is
insufficient to ensure a culture of ethics within an HCO.
The notion of culture implies that certain norms, habits and beliefs are shared identities
which reflect an organization’s most important values, and its good governance and character.
An organization’s culture includes rituals, narratives and assumptions, and even power struggles
that constitute a way of life for constituents formed of shared behaviors and norms. 29
54

Organizations with robust cultures are able to transfer their identities onto new members in order
to acculturate them into the values system of the organization. Culture and organizational
identity are most often demonstrated through an organization’s programs, policies and
procedures. Additionally, leaders within the organization are the most important antecedent of
ethical organizational identity. 30
Group decision-making is an integral part of an organization’s operations. Group actions
are often so inextricable intertwined that it is may be impossible to distill the individually
identifiable actions and separate them from the moral agency of the organization itself. It may be
the case where a decision is made individually, but executed collectively as a group.
Nevertheless, when an organization renders decisions, and performs as part of a positive ethical
climate, self-interest is minimized, trust is imbedded internally and externally, and it is deemed
to be a moral institution. 31
To that end, moral and political philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argued that good
management and good judgement is based in part on practices – the collective human activity of
seeking of moral excellence – that relies upon moral reasoning, not merely emotivism.
Emotivism, according to MacIntyre, is the notion that moral judgments are mere expressions
preferences, feelings or emotions and because preferences are subjective and can be manipulated,
they breed moral uncertainty. 32 Moral agents who act collectively in furtherance of the missions
and values must be cautioned against organizational emotivism, and should instead rely on sound
moral reasoning. G. Moore contends that emotivism can be minimized when organizations
establish a power-balance method of decision-making oversight to ensure that views and desires
of some are not privileged and preferred over the preferences of others. 33
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Reliance on unique facts and circumstances that are often intermingled with emotions and
other conflicting, life-altering factors is one of the complicating hallmarks of decision-making in
contemporary healthcare. The amorphous and frequently ad hoc nature of healthcare decisions
underscore the need for methods of systematic and morally justified decision-making. Without a
systematic framework, decisions, particularly those which, on their face violate a moral rule, are
subject to allegations of arbitrariness. Balancing these preferences in decision-making is an
organizational challenge. For example, physicians endeavor to first do no harm to their patients
while secondarily complying with medical necessity proscriptions and insurance coverage
constraints. Nursing staff advocate on behalf of the patient’s best interest face moral choices
when those perceived interests conflict with physician orders. And HCO leadership seeking to
fill demographic gaps in care by increasing market penetration through potentially anticompetitive means all represent conflicts of commitment and interests, which present challenges
to moral agency. 34 Reconciling these conflicts requires a moral decision-making process that
recognizes the values and virtues espoused in the constituents’ ethical positions and creates
opportunities to include those positions in appropriate places within the organization.
2. A. 3. Virtue and Moral Soul
The ethical decisions of its moral agents ought to be in harmony with the organization’s
moral identity and remain synonymous with its character and collection of virtues. Although
secular and theological references to virtue and the state of being virtuous differ in terms of their
origins and ultimate goals, 35 their commonly understood meanings, reflective of the desire for
good, are not dissimilar. For simplicity and continuity, this dissertation adopts the meanings
promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church.
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Human virtues are attitudes and dispositions that guide conduct and actions according to
sound reasoning and make it possible to live a good and moral life. A virtuous person seeks to
perform only good actions and to use reason to achieve good. 36 Virtues such as prudence and
practical wisdom provide direction for the moral agent to know what is good. And similarly, an
organization’s virtuous character, which ought to be the core of the organization’s self-concept,
allow it to recognize the good when it is present. 37 Virtuosity requires human effort and
disposition to maintain what is good. And the human body and mind, in concert, deliberating
what is good rely upon its soul to animate and bring to life the decision-making. In the same way
that virtues rely upon deliberation and thought to fuel the good, the body of the ethical healthcare
organization unifies with its moral soul and relies upon it to be virtuous. It can be said that virtue
– affection for that which is good - is the armor that safeguards the soul.
Because much of human reasoning often confronts abstract and indiscrete information,
good reasoning typically requires the imposition of artificial boundaries and illustrations to help
make sense of human experiences. It is often easier to comprehend what something is like or
unlike, than to understand what it is. As such, human thought seeks clarify from ontological
metaphors – images that associate human experience in terms of familiar nonhuman entities or
things.38 For example, a deviant actor may be labeled a bad apple, while a top performer
compared to a rising star. Frequently, ontological metaphors will characterize a nonhuman object
as a person or as having human traits. Difficult concepts such as motivations, characteristics and
emotions are often described through personification which imputes human qualities and traits to
nonhuman things. 39 To illustrate, the right set of facts can help and investigator get to the heart
of a case, while a successfully marketed computer program could be the brain of an
organization.
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Historically, industrial-age ontological metaphors were used to describe organizations:
promoting the image of a successful enterprise as a well-oiled machine, or a finely-tuned watch.
Today however, the contemporary digital information age would make little sense of the
machine metaphor. Instead the soul is a more illustrative and contemporary representation of the
unifying and holistic web of connectedness in an organization. 40
In both the secular and the spiritual sense, the soul depicts the core essence of a person –
it is the energy which gives life and manifests virtuous character and is the spirit of human
reasoning. Moral agents are fueled by their soul. The soul is the union of spirit and body and
reflects that two-fold constitution of humans. Since the integrated HCO is a unified system of
people, things, and processes that function like a human body, the soul of an HCO is the spirit
that seeks to preserve cohesion of its mission, values and virtuous character.
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It can be said that

just as the human body is united to its spirit and virtues through its soul, the ethically accountable
organization is united to its mission and values through its soul.
As a human characteristic, understanding the theological union of body and soul is
essential to understanding the soul of an HCO, and the gravity of the negative consequences
when the soul is compromised. According to the Roman Catholic Church, the spirit and body
together form one unique human possessing a soul that is individual, immortal and created by
God alone. 42 The soul animates the body and is the subject of its consciousness, and although the
immortal soul does not die with the physical body 43, the body that loses its soul is eternally dead.
The Church further teaches that the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity are the
foundations of Christian morality, and are divinely infused into human souls enabling the person
to live virtuously. They are so fundamental that they undergird all other moral virtues that live
deeply inside the human soul. Theological virtues describe belief in the Divine, the desire for
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eternal life, and the love of God above all things. 44 Moral virtues such as justice, prudence,
fortitude and temperance guide human conduct and govern acts. When rooted into action with
the soul, they result in good works and moral decisions. 45
The soul is a unique attribute of humanness and is the lived manifestation of spirituality
in an individual, and represents the good in an organization through the actions of its moral
agents.46 Just as the mortal soul is a unity with the body, so is the soul of its moral agents a unity
with the organization. The leaders and governance bodies of organizations must look deep within
their own souls and reflect upon and activate their moral virtues in order to make just and
prudent decisions. William O’Brien aptly contends that maintaining soul and managing morally
is difficult for most organizations because moral excellence requires commitments that often
contrast with society’s inclinations and habits. It demands more than mere compliance with law
and conformance with principles; it requires a vigorous and authentic commitment to moral
truths. Leadership desires such as instant gratification about lifetime satisfaction, technological
fixes in lieu of advancement of the human spirit, and an emphasis on looking good over and
above being good jeopardize the soul of the HCO. 47 Such tendencies, which treat the soul as
fungible, will separate it from the organization and threaten both of their survival.
2. B.

Organizational Leadership and Ethical Decision-Making
The Roman Catholic Church teaches that evil and sin, which are inextricably tied to

Adam’s fall, amount to death of the soul and eternal condemnation. 48 Just as the German
protagonist Faust knew that his decision to trade his immortal soul for earthly pleasures would
forever separate him from that which was good, organizations can knowingly compromise their
moral soul. Faust’s willful failure to recognize the consequences of his decision, his failed
consciences, and his denial of his own fallibility, nearly cost him his eternal soul. Organizations
59

can lose their moral soul through Faustian bargains, imprudent decision-making and actions of
leadership that fail to discern the consequences of their choices.
The Christian practice of discernment – a decision-making process that engages the
spirituality, imagination and beliefs of those involved in the matter – although still relatively
rare, is used in organizational decisions. 49 Ascension Healthcare, the world’s largest Catholic
healthcare system in the world, and the largest non-profit system in the United States practices a
highly structured mission discernment process as part of its business culture. 50 Ascension
concedes, however, that not all situations are ripe for the discernment process. Instances where
precedent has been set by prior decisions, and cases that need to be decided quickly may not fit
well within this highly deliberate process. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases where it is
applicable, Ascension’s model adopts a multi-step approach. It includes, inter alia, identifying
the central problem or question to be answered, considering the stakeholders who are affected
most directly, consideration of the salient values and moral concerns, and any alternatives that
may be considered, including what other organizations and prudent persons in similar
situations,51 have done.
Corporate discernment is a reflective process that involves sifting through individual and
collective experiences in order to know which choices will best support the ethical mission of an
organization.52 According to Margaret Benefiels’ work on spiritual leadership in organizations,
mission discernment is a reflective decision-making process designed to stimulate discussion
abound decision-makers enabling them to identify and report reasons for or against a particular
course of action in relation to corporate values and mission. This continual process ensures that
appropriate business and clinical analyses are elevated and prioritized in light of the mission and
core values.
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Discernment does not merely help determine what to do; rather, mission discernment
embraces the core values of what matters to the organization in every decision. It requires trust
and openness among the organization’s moral agents and presupposes that decision-makers and
leaders hold the mission and values of the organization at the center of their leadership.
Discernment demands the avoidance of temptation to make important decisions too quickly, or
with underdeveloped information. When leadership is called to make decisions on behalf of the
organization, the expectation is that they will provide strategic solutions to a variety of different
problems. In so doing, they often must wrestle with conflicting values among stakeholders as
well as find courage to render unpopular decisions. They are called to examine the collective
conscience of the organization. 53 Discernment is the process of deliberating what is good and
allowing the moral agents’ soul to guide the ethical decision. However, when the soul is lost to
conflict or vice, then the process of ethical decision-making, like the body that is separated from
the soul, is already dead.
2. B. 1.

Enabling Conflicts of Interest, Complicity, and Principles of Cooperation.
Standards of role morality apply throughout an HCO. However, moral agents who sit in

leadership and management roles, particularly members of boards of directors, are held to a
higher level of fiduciary duty. 54 Conflicts arise when decision-makers are confronted with
incentives – personal or financial – to act in ways that breach the fiduciary duty and normative
standards of their moral role. Acting on these incentives compromises their best judgment,
integrity and soul. Most notable conflicts of interest in healthcare are attributed to physicians 55
however high-level decision-makers such as executive management and board participants are
often targets of external influence. 56 Conflicts of interest can be eliminated by removing the
incentive or inducement to abandon soul, however, conflict of conscience originates from the
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ontological wiring of the actor and is impossible to eliminate unless the offending situation is
materially altered.
Conflicts of conscience result from the inability to act in ways that are faithful to an
individual’s conscience and moral convictions. Since healthcare organizations have moral
identities, and since their morality is adjudged according to the actions of its agents, the process
of moral reasoning and discernment can be impacted by agents’ individual consciences.
Moreover, the organization’s collective conscience is inextricably tied to its mission and vision
and cannot be separated from its moral agency. Conflicts between various agents and
stakeholders within the healthcare organizations are nearly inevitable and render collective moral
choices particularly challenging. Reconciling conflicts of conscience requires a moral decisionmaking process that provides a systematic approach to ethical problem solving acknowledging
moral sensitivity, judgment, motivation and character. 57 The process must recognize the values
espoused by the constituents’ ethical positions and create opportunities to discern the value of
those positions vis-à-vis the organization’s ethical identity.
Suboptimal decision-making is a barrier to reconciling the conflicted conscience with the
moral identity of the organization. Decision-making is obstructed and moral reasoning is
threatened when conflicted moral agents compartmentalize decisions and issues such that they
are isolated from the rest of the organization. Insulating individual conflicts from the rest of the
organization eclipses discernment, collective reflection, and moral agency; thus minimizing
accountability and enabling loss of soul. 58
The motivation or desire to compartmentalize conflicts may also make mission
discernment – that is, evaluating decisions in light of the mission and core values of the
organization impossible. Without the ability to identify and report reasons for or against a
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particular course of actions, the rational decision-making process is woefully incomplete. 59 The
presence of a genuine conflict of interest, or conscience may themselves explain an agent’s
desire to circumvent the decision-making process, even at the risk of loss of organizational soul.
However, an organization can also lose its soul when ultimate decision-making is vested,
intentionally or by default, in one dominant leader.
Role transference frequently occurs whenever there is a tightness binding the behavior
and desires of top-management to the ultimate decisions of the organization. The actor, who is
most frequently (but not exclusively) the CEO, represents the organization’s public face and is
assumed to also reflect its moral identity, and to exercise moral authority on behalf of all of the
organization. The danger of transference is that lower-level managers and frontline employees
abdicate their moral duties – by default – and begin to think and act as if moral agency is not
their responsibility. It is as if members of the workforce engage in a form of follow-theleader.60This phenomenon can affect the organization’s external reputation and public image
such that the image of the agent is the perceived image of the organization; in essence, the soul
and spirit driving the agent, drives the organization. In its most extreme, the mission and values
of the organization are surreptitiously replaced with the values and virtues of one dominant
leader – which may be in conflict with the moral identity of the organization. Role transference
may further endanger the organization’s soul if narcissistic behavior pervades decision-making.
Since organizations are assemblages of individuals, they adopt an organizational selfesteem often imparted from senior leadership. Senior leadership personalities that exhibit
extreme love of self, Faustian inclinations, compartmentalization and disclaiming awareness of
their faults are considered narcissistic. Grant and McGhee in their work on organizational
narcissism contend that narcissistic tendencies found in organizational culture are determined
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primarily by the effectiveness of corporate governance. Since the board is responsible for the
moral or immoral identity of the organization, they aptly hold that the character of the directors
and the manner in which they exercise judgement in choosing the CEO is directly linked to the
organizational culture of narcissism. 61 Extreme narcissism prevents an organization from acting
properly because it lacks a moral identity; it cannot act virtuously. It is morally flawed and is
soulless. As a result, organizations can project a narcissistic rather than moral identity. 62 They
can react and even respond to issues with ego-defense mechanisms just as people do – in order to
protect and preserve the organization’s image rather than its moral soul. Narcissistic leadership
creates a fertile environment for scandal, corruption and complicity.
When an organization, through its agents, succumbs to conflicts of conscience, behaves
objectionably and breaches its fiduciary duty to promote its mission and values, it often involves
cooperation with someone or something else. 63 However, not all acts of cooperation involve
wrongdoing or objectionable conduct. Consider the image offered by Linda and James Henry of
the high-flying geese who fly in perfect v-formation following the lead geese – a position that
regularly changes. They share a vision, trust, support of one another and a shared leadership to
achieve a common end. 64 Cooperation involves compromise. The image of the geese invokes
compromise of the rotating role lead geese – each taking their turn. Christopher Kutz similarly
describes group cooperation as individuals who are suitably combined acting upon participatory
intentions to achieve jointly intentional actions. 65 According to Kutz, participation in an act
renders an actor accountable for the outcome, and acts attributable to the group as a whole, as
well as to the other participating members. Just like high-flying geese, group identity is
explained in terms of individual participatory intentions. 66
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Cooperation can also involve the compromise of morality when person or institutions
cooperate in the wrongdoing of another for the purpose of achieving some end. The
consequences of cooperation are Januslike – the identical act will either result in llicit/material
cooperation, or it will result in illicit/formal cooperation with culpability as the determinative
factor in both instances. 67 Both the principle of cooperation, and the complicity principle
advanced by Kutz teach that accountability for what others do, and the harm associated with
wrongdoings turn on the intentions of the participant. 68 Plainly, anyone who knowingly
participates in a bad act, or influences the particular outcome, is accountable for their role in that
act. This is so even if their contribution to the outcome is slight relative to the collective
involvement of the group.
The scope of individual accountability to complicit actions looks at whether or not the
individuals are provided with reason to avoid and respond to harmful acts, as well as their
distance or proximity from the act. As such, it is necessary to determine whether or not their
intent to achieve a particular goal included the ensuing evil, or harm. Participatory intentions are
essential elements in assessing accountability and culpability. But just as knowledge can
implicate a participant, ignorance of the probability of harm does not fully exculpate an actor. 69
Those with a straightforward and purposeful intent to promote a particular action are
accountable to a different degree than those who participate in an action with different motives.
Consider the board member who votes affirmatively on a resolution to transfer corporate funds to
camouflage cash shortfalls from accounting disparities. And another who is persuaded to vote
affirmatively on the same resolution, but believes the cash transfer will fund the purchase of a
new ambulatory care center. Or, consider the board member who supports the resolution but does
not understand the nature of the transaction, the movement of the money and the history of the
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funds. She voted by proxy without sufficient opportunity to make a fully informed decision. All
of the aforementioned members are complicit and acted in cooperation with one another because
they voted on resolution that will result in a bad act – enabling the theft of funds. But,
notwithstanding their fiduciary duties, the former board member is the most culpable, while the
last member to vote is the least. 70
In addition, actor accountability can be further characterized according to a spatial
metaphor. That is, the stronger the link between the actor and the collective act, the less weight is
given to the actor’s ignorance of its nature. Those agents who intend a particular result are said to
be at the core of the activity and those who don’t are considered at the periphery. The distance
from the core to the periphery is measured through functional assessment of the facts and
circumstances. Notwithstanding any duty imposed upon the second and third board members to
fully understand the purpose of the funds transfer in the aforementioned scenario, the agent who
conjured up the funds transfer is at the core of the activity. The agent with the least insight would
likely be justified as having engaged in legitimate or licit cooperation. 71
The distance from immorality in decision-making is significant for the theological
metaphor of moral soul. For Fernandez Lynch, the proximity from the wrongdoing is the
essential distinction between licit (moral), and illicit (immoral) cooperation. In addition to having
a good reason for cooperating, the peripheral proximity helps to mitigate the unintended
wrongdoer’s culpability. 72
The Roman Catholic Church’s teaching on sin provides an appropriate window looking
out onto the notions of how morally licit and illicit cooperation parallels catechetical teachings
on moral and venial sin. Moral sin is an offense against God, reason, and truth. 73 A moral sin is
a grave violation of God’s law and destroys the theological virtues of charity ensouled in a
66

person’s heart. It is a guarantee of eternal damnation, and eternal hell. Commission of a moral
sin requires full knowledge of and complete consent to the sinfulness of the act, and presupposes
that the offender chooses to participate in the wrongdoing with the intent to sin, resulting in
death of the soul. 74 The characteristics of mortal sin are parallel to those associated with illicit
cooperation. As such, the existence of illicit cooperation among moral agents and other
organizational decision-makers translates into loss of an organization’s soul.
While a venial sin may impede the human soul’s progress in exercising the human virtues
of the moral good75 it does not break the covenant with God and result in mortal sin. Venial sins
lack the requisite knowledge and complete consent that moral sin possesses. Associated with
licit cooperation, venial sins are light moral infractions which do not separate the person from
their soul.76 However, the Church teaches its faithful that light infractions are like drops in the
ocean – their increased volume creates a great mass. Repeated acts of licit cooperation assaults
the soul of the organization. The act of sin creates the proclivity to sin, and sin again. When
moral and venial sin occurs repeatedly within a group of moral agents acting individually as well
as collectively on behalf of and HCO, its ubiquity can undermine its moral identity, moral
authority, and moral soul. The epic bankruptcy of the Allegheny Health Education and Research
Foundation demonstrates how wrongdoing can become so tightly woven into the fabric of
organizational conduct that it can be hidden from governance or ignored entirely.
2. B. 2.

The Sold Soul: The Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation.
Established in 1983, the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation (AHERF)

morphed over time to become an HCO comprised of rapidly-merged healthcare entities.
Hahnemann University of the Health Sciences and the Medical College of Pennsylvania in
Philadelphia merged with Allegheny General Hospital (AGH), a research and teaching hospital
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in Pittsburgh.77 Under the leadership of its president and CEO, Sherif Abdelhak, who was
appointed in 1986, the period between 1990 and 1997 marked unprecedented expansion and
organizational growth. By 1997, the Allegheny Health System had the distinction of being the
first and largest statewide nonprofit integrated health system in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
The HCO was initially inspired by a mission to expand its alliance with medical schools
to enhance medical education in Pennsylvania. This included preserving the richness of medical
education legacy in the Philadelphia region of Pennsylvania. However, AHERF’s original
mission proclaimed widely throughout internal and external publications, “to learn, to teach, to
heal the sick, and to conserve health” 78 was more akin to a mission of divide and conquer
through unprecedented mergers and consolidations. Almost immediately after Abdelhak took
the reins, the HCO was goaded into expansion by the prominence and dominance of its rival
competitor – The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Health System (UPMC). It’s refusal
to partner with AHERF in 1983 sparked jilted emotions that fueled AHERF’s longstanding
desire to increase the size of its market footprint. 79 In response to that desire coupled with
Abelhak’s Faustian professional ambitions, the organization embarked on a hospital shopping
spree of questionable acquisitions.
Abdelhak single-handedly spearheaded and orchestrated rapid and expansive hospital and
ambulatory care acquisitions. By 1997, the HCO swelled to include 14 hospitals, 310 primary
care physicians in the Philadelphia region, and 136 in Pittsburgh. They were purchased at very
high prices during a bidding war with competitors in order to enlarge its physician network.
These physicians and their practices were acquired without adequate negotiation, due diligence
and prudent assessment of the value and worth of the entities. Abdelhak set forth what he touted
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as inviolable mandates to AHERF’s chief operating officer; ordering that he put together deals as
fast as possible. 80
Induced into luring and buying up as many physician practices as possible, the chief
operating officer was offered an incentive commission of $15,000 for every physician contract
signed, and for every deal that was closed quickly; stoking numerous conflicts of interest.
Physicians and their practices were essentially devoured by accepting compensation packages
that included salary, percentage of revenues generated through care delivery, and grossly inflated
asset purchase prices. The total compensation package for each physician was often in the
millions of dollars. Those deals were made without any long and short-range projections for
performance or return on investment. Moreover the physicians’ employment contracts did not
provide AHERF with post-acquisition oversight rights to monitor productivity and did not
anticipate that physicians might refer patients outside of AHERF’s geographic proximity. The
absence of mission discernment, due diligence and poorly calculated assumptions created
financial distress amidst AGH and other merge entities; entities that were, for the most part, once
financially healthy. Or, at the very least, they were not on the precipice of dying at the time they
were merged.81
Losses mounted. Hospitals and physician practices purchased without adequate due
diligence, asset valuation, or planning eventually drained cash and reserves from the healthy
parent entity. AHERF purchased some hospitals that had little to no cash flow, and it was forced
to service the debt it literally bought with cash transfers between healthy facilities to compensate
for underperforming professional and facility providers. To make conditions worse, secretive
cash transfers between entities violated bond agreements, and raids on hospital endowments and
enormous debt amassed from the acquisitions. Debts were created and cancelled without any
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consideration to the creditor. Losses became astronomical – ballooning from $41 million in
1996 to $61 million in 1997.82
Clinicians and research faculty were lured by large salaries but were also baited with the
promise of new labs and staff – incentives that are considered delicacies among physicians who
are engaged in research. Additionally, associating with clinical and research faculty was a
necessity for AHERF to compete with UPMC. But also, and possibly more important, it meant
funding from the National Institute of Health (NIH); an avenue for enriching the cash-strapped
organization. Anxiety and discontent slowly bubbled up from these physicians and their
practices, as many of the promises made during their recruitment and affiliation were broken.
These promises were made by AHERF executives; many of whom knew at the time they were
made that the growing financial problems would most likely preclude fulfilling them. Physicians,
however, accepted the offers and promises without full knowledge of the impending financial
implosion.83
AHERF’s governance structure provided a very week undercurrent to support and
oversee the explosive growth, mounting debt, and other decision-making activity within the
organization. The organization was notable for having an enormous parent board consisting of
between 20-25 members. It also had ten different boards responsible for oversight of 55
different subsidiaries and diversified businesses. The board compositions did not provide any
director overlap such that directors on one board had little or no understanding or insight into
what was occurring elsewhere in the enterprise. 84 This resulted in silo-decisions made in a
vacuum without transparency into the overall impact of one businesses’ decision on another.
Because HCO’s are interdependent, the ability to achieve efficiencies, eliminate
redundancies and provide access to quality, cost-effective health care requires insight into the
70

horizontal and vertical dimensions of each entity within the integrated structure. AHERF did not
respect this interdependency; rather it operated under the command and control of one
individual.85 As economic shortfalls spread throughout each of the merged facilities, mere
survival became a priority, and depended upon the ability to subsidize one another rather than
achieve efficiencies of scale. Instead of enjoying market dominance, which was one of its
intended goals, AHERF’s hospitals were unable to make capital expenditures and improvements
and placed themselves at a competitive disadvantage in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh markets.
Eventually, AHERF’s auditors, Coopers and Lybrand produced a detailed report for the
AHERF audit committee reporting on the magnitude of the corporate debt. The debt was
calculated at $1.06 billion – a figure that was twice the size of AHERF’s unrestricted assets.
However, the full AHERF board never saw the report. Nevertheless, significant budget and
expenditure cuts ensued in October 1997. More than 1200 employees lost their jobs. Faculty and
staff were forced to take a 20% salary reduction, and care delivery budgets were slashed.
Budgets were so thin, that antiquated and deteriorating equipment was not replaced. Patient
safety concerns abounded. Access to critical medical supplies dwindled. Some operating rooms
did not even have intravenous tubing. 86 During this same period of dire cutbacks and substandard
care, Abdelhak and his top five senior executives received salary increases.
The corporate bylaws gave AHERF authority to engage in intra-company transfers of
money without parent/donor consent, which meant that money could be moved around by senior
management without consent of the board. This hole in the bylaws and the absence of oversight
checks and balances enabled and facilitated financial conflicts of interest and illicit cooperation.
For example, five members of the AHERF board were executives of Mellon Bank – a creditor of
AHERF. In 1998, crumbling under the weight of suffocating debts, Abdelhak unilaterally
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ordered the repayment of an $89 million loan to Mellon Bank without board discussion, or board
approval.87
Infected with conflicts of interests, corruption, and various forms of cooperation, AHERF
went beyond losing its moral soul. In the end, Sherif Abdelhak’s reign as CEO was
unceremoniously terminated on June 5, 1998, and AHERF subsequently filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection on July 21. At the time that the final decree and settlement was reached in
2003, the $1.6 billion dollar death of AHERF represented the largest not-for-profit health care
bankruptcy in the United States. 88 Like Faust, AHERF sacrificed its soul, and during its
indiscriminate abandonment, it gave no consideration to the fact that its life could not exist apart
from it.
2. B. 3.

A Soul Restored: A Post-Mortem Analysis
Faust eventually saw the error of his ways after spending nearly 25 years in diabolical

complicity and in pursuit of self-indulgent desires with Mephistopheles. Eventually he yearned
to reclaim the essence of what it means to be human and to preserve the subject of consciousness
and freedom – his soul. He wanted redemption. 89 AHERF’s leadership did not seek such
deliverance.
Sherif Abdelhak sold his professional soul, and AHERF’s moral soul, through imprudent
decision-making and immoral actions that failed to consider and discern consequences and
experiences that help to decide and support the ethical mission of the organization. Not a vestige
of AHERF’s original mission to learn, to teach, and to heal the sick could be found in its
decisions. Conflicts of interest eclipsed moral agency, and complicity circumvented virtuous
behavior. Additionally, AHERF’s system of governance was so adulterated that its original
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valued and mission statement were subsumed in the individual mission and motives of Abdelhak.
The annals of AHERF and the Allegheny Health System reflect an organization so rotted by
complicity that the possibility of redemption and restoration of such a decomposed soul seemed
helpless. Yet, redemption can reunite the soul with the body, 90 and in the case of AHERF it is
necessary to retrospectively explore missed opportunities for redemption while considering the
future of an HCO and its reunited soul.
The notorious collapse and decimation of the AHERF HCO set into motion a series of
investigations, civil suits, settlements and criminal indictments spanning the five year period
between 1998 and 2003. The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated the tangled
web of financial dealings. Moody’s Investors Service questioned the integrity of AHERF’s
audited financial statements. The U.S. attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania began
gathering information for a grand jury review. Pennsylvania’s Attorney General investigated
AHERF’s charitable assets, and Philadelphia Inquirer, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and a number of
other national media outlets began researching the epic tale of corruption and self-dealing.91 The
cumulative results of various investigations revealed a host of individual and institutional moral
deficiencies. Deficiencies which, had they been identified, communicated and remedied could
have not only saved the HCO, but allowed its moral soul and body to remain intact.
The AHERF debacle demonstrates a breakdown at each level of organizational
accountability. And the question of who was guarding the henhouse becomes a pivotal concern
when examining the conflicts of interest and cooperation that choked the blood supply from the
HCO’s values and virtues. Reflecting the interdependency of the constituent parts of an HCO,
the community relied upon the trustees of the foundation to guard its charitable assets. The
trustees relied upon the auditors to validate the finances, and the auditors relied upon AHERF’s
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executives, including the CEO, chief financial officers and lawyers. Whether through direct
proximate acts or failures to act, illicit cooperation was metastatic. Within Abdelhak’s ruling
clique, conflict of interest and alliances between the actors not only resulted in acts of illicit
cooperation, it encouraged the sale of its own moral soul. 92
The SEC investigation of Coopers & Lybrand revealed the auditor’s direct participation
in a fraudulent scheme to help AHERF management arrange for duplicitous transfers of
restricted funds and then cover the fraud, and their involvement. 93 Management knowingly and
recklessly caused Coopers and Lybrand to release false statements to enhance and enrich the
credibility of the financial statements to the board. Some may argue that of all of the culpable
actors, the board ought not to be held accountable as it relied upon the veracity of the
information provided, and was not privy to the recesses of Abdelhak’s dealings.
However, key responsibilities of the board are adherence to principles of organizational
ethics and the preservation of moral soul, in addition to fiduciary duties. Board responsibility
requires access to information, even if it entails probing further and more deeply than usual to
learn what goes on behind its veil. 94 As such many of the AHERF board members may have
lacked the intent to participate in wrongdoing when they voted affirmatively on deleterious
actions for which they had little or no information. The lack of openness and flow of
information, and the dearth of information generally was certainly a barrier to discernment; an
indispensable element of moral decision-making.95 And they may even have been far enough
from the act to justify mitigating culpability. However at a minimum, they are accountable for
failing to uphold their fiduciary duty to the community and the organization by not demanding
additional information or requesting substantiation of major acquisitions and expenditures. In the
absence of discernment, no heed was paid to the needs of AHERF’s internal and external
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stakeholders. Discernment and other affirmative board actions would have helped to ensure that
AHERF’s moral soul was intact and not at risk for liquidation along with its other assets.
Moreover, because the relationship between the board and the CEO is so critical to
preserving moral soul, 96it is reasonable to question the board’s rationale for appointing him
CEO in the first instance, given what was known of Abdelhak’s executive character. Abdelhak
was perceived as autocratic and controlling. He exercised top-down management which was
non-participatory and entombed in secrecy. His warfare style of management inspired fear and
emasculated others to the extent that insiders and leaders within the organization were fearful
and hesitant to express anything except high praise for him. He was described by those within
the organization as an empire builder who took high risks. 97
Complicity and illicit cooperation where the hallmarks of Abdelhak’s reign. Those
characterizations were largely attributed to his complete domination over all board decisions.
Board meetings were scripted affairs with decision-making relying solely and completely upon
his assessments and judgments. Abdelhak and the board chairman discouraged questions and
dismissed anyone who challenged actions and decisions. Abdelhak held himself out as having
full authority over the board. 98
Narcissism was his professional trademark. According to knowledgeable insiders, he
never admitted fault, blamed others for everything, and self-aggrandizement and demonstrable
self-love were the hallmarks of his professional persona. 99 He was wryly referred to as “the
maximum leader” and sacrilegiously as “the great I am.” 100 His identity became synonymous
with AHERF’s, and the two identities were so tightly aligned that it was difficult to distinguish
whether he was a person representing an organization, or an organization living through him.
Role transference enabled people to conflate Abdelhak with the organization. AHERF adopted
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his professional narcissistic personality, rather than promoting the face of the corporate mission
and values.
While the board cannot be responsible for his dysfunctional and disordered personality,
they can be held to in dereliction of their duty for appointing Abdelhak, and more importantly,
for retaining him. The board is also obligated to follow and monitor the conduct of its executive
management. As the author of the ethics model, and as the custodian for its mission and values,
the board breached its ethical and fiduciary duty when it consciously failed to take action against
Abdelhak and oust him once his destructive symptoms and characteristics surfaced. 101 The board
cannot use ignorance as an excuse to mitigate its culpability and responsibility. 102 It is culpable
for contributing to the loss of moral soul. 103
This sentiment was underscored by Judge M. Bruce McCullough during the bankruptcy
proceedings. He questioned the AHERF board in order to ascertain their roles and reporting
lines to determine what they were doing, and who was executing. To no one’s surprise, there
were findings of incompetence and gross mismanagement. He held that the trustees were tainted
by irreconcilable conflicts of interest culminating ineptitude and egregious disregard of their
fiduciary duties. 104 Everyone was enriched, except the wide swath of stakeholders who were
harmed. This includes but is in no way limited to the patients who suffered from a crippled
delivery model, and the practitioners, clinicians and other members of the AHERF workforce
who were financially impacted and ignored. While the AHERF bankruptcy discharged debt and
nominally recognized creditors, it was impossible to make whole again all impacted by this
moral and financial cataclysm. Nevertheless, like the human soul, if any vestige of the HCO
remains, its soul may be rekindled with virtue, and reunited with its body through moral agency
an a culture of ethics.
76

The Roman Catholic Church teaches that hope for the sinner is confession and
forgiveness. By restoring the venial offender’s moral progress, and reuniting the mortal offender
with Christ through reconciliation, the souls of the penitent are refreshed, renewed an reunited
again with human virtues to guide its moral reasoning. The soul and the body are made whole
again.105 Reconciliation with God requires moral accountability through reflection and
examination of conscience, contrition, 106 and penance. 107 The cohesion of the soul with the body
enables moral reasoning and discernment. Virtues cannot flow and permit good works without
unity with the soul.
Forgiveness is a necessary part of reconciliation, and so it is with an organizations
redemption and moral restoration. Since an organization cannot act on its own, it must rely on
the collective actions of its moral agents to demonstrate the intent to be reconciled with the
communities it may have harmed when it was soulless. This contrition must be reflected in the
exemplary conduct and integrity of its moral agents serving as organizational ambassadors
within the community. 108 Since role transference can tightly link an actor to the organization’s
persona such that the organization adopts any dysfunctional characteristics, it can also adopt and
project positive ones; importantly, those that represent missions of healing and virtue. 109 Moral
agents are visible and tangible representatives of the HCO’s values and purpose. Hence, role
transference can be used to the positive advantage of the organization that seeks redemption
Further, moral agents can reunite with the HCO’s soul through establishment of a morally
rational and systematic decision-making process. In this way, moral agents will place the best
interest of the HCO and its stakeholders ahead of their own self-interest and preferences. 110
Rational and systematic decision-making builds trust and restored integrity between and amongst
its agents and stakeholders. 111 The process of moral decision-making includes listening to the
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needs of the communities of stakeholders served by the organization. It ought not to entertain
narcissistic propensities. In fact, moral decision-making imbeds the trust of internal and external
constituents within the organization. 112
In the case of AHERF, if mission discernment advancing education, healing the sick and
conserving health had guided expenditure and acquisition decisions, instead of Abdelhak’s
professional narcissism, prudent due diligence would have prevailed. In that way, the soul would
not have been easily separated from decisions; rather, it would have become an inextricable part
of the solution. 113 Nevertheless, the lure and slipperiness of conflicts of interest and conflicts of
conscience can never be fully eliminated because persons, in their humanity, think, act and share
space in a world that is influenced by good as well as evil. As such, restoring soul also
necessitates a need to return to the principles of professionalism and compliance with normative
standards of conduct that guide organizational ethics and moral agency. 114 Professional codes of
conduct allow for self-regulation and assessment. This provides moral agents throughout the
HCO from the boardroom to the mail room, the opportunity to ask “how well are we doing” 115
and to react and respond accordingly. Self-performance assessments, metrics tracking goals and
professional standards keep moral agents in-check with the HCO’s vision and mission, and helps
to insulate and protect its moral soul.
2. C.

Stakeholder Theory and Normative Constituencies
Goodpaster and Matthews hold that rational and respectful decision-makers notice and

care about whether or not the consequences of their actions lead to indignities and offenses
towards others. 116 The stakes are even higher for the healthcare decision-maker. Unlike other
industries where the consequences of decisions most notably affect products, services and
profitability, decisions within an HCO can have direct impact on the length and quality of human
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life.117 A notable paradox for an industry that advocates for human wellness is that decisions in
healthcare often appear to be devoid of humanness.
The integrity of ethical decisions can be further abraded by the fact that health care is
morally and ethically complicated. 118 Ethical decision-making, according to Weiss, also depends
upon the moral maturity of the people engaged in the reasoning. And while there are different
levels of maturity, the tightly controlled corporate environment which typically characterizes an
HCO, can stifle ethical decision-making.119 In addition, issues and dilemmas affecting moral
decision-making result from pressures that, as Weiss advances, are exerted at personal,
organizational, industrial as well as social levels. To that end, the remainder of this chapter
illustrates an understanding of these levels of decision-making through the lens of stakeholder
theory, and its reliance on morality and ethical principles.
2. C. 1.

Normative Stakeholder Theory
Organizational homeostasis relies upon the systematic ability of the organization to

respond to unanticipated sudden or gradual threats to its stability and health. Determining the
appropriate course of action often demands making choices that benefit some to the determinant
of others. The traditional capitalistic view of corporate decision-making placed shareholder
interests at the center of such decision-making, with the managerial mind set of placing profit
and returns ahead of all other considerations. This all too ubiquitous mindset fueled the
perception that the corporation was a corrupt and shameless construct lacking in good will and
gratitude. Possessing unchecked power and resilient to shame or punishment, it was soulless. 120
Historically, the potential for corporations that lacked soul and moral accountability for
the consequences of their actions to do real harm to people necessitated checks on their power. It
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also bespoke of the need to shift the managerial mindset from the shareholder to other alternative
constituents possessing a stake in the company. The birth of stakeholder theory was the epicenter
of that shift. Broadly stated, stakeholder theory is an approach to organizational ethics that heeds
the rights and interests of individuals or groups who interact with, and could be affected by the
organization’s decisions. 121 R .Edward Freeman is credited with developing stakeholder theory
to underscore and draw attention to the way that managers and other individuals act and the
consequences of those actions, based upon ethical principles. The most striking feature of
stakeholder theory is that it demonstrates ways in which organizations can exercise social
responsibility through moral management without contradicting the framework of a moral
capitalistic economy. 122 Like the discernment process for ethical decision-making that reflects
upon those who may be affected by particular decisions, stakeholder theory applies moral theory
and considerations of right behavior to management decisions.
As described earlier, the structural and functional levels of anatomy come together to
sustain the human body. These levels include all of the organ systems that form the human
person; functioning together as interdependent components. For example, cells need nutrients
that are procured through the digestive system and distributed via the circulatory system. 123
These systems cohabitate alongside large populations of bacteria and microorganisms that exist
within the body to either enhance or disrupt homeostasis; depending upon their inherent purpose.
It can be said that these system functions and microbiota have a stake in the homeostasis of the
body. This stake is analogous to the interest or claim that a group or individual has in the
outcome of an HCO’s decisions or actions towards other. 124
Over the past thirty years since Freeman unleashed his groundbreaking theory, a variety
of modified stakeholder theories have emerged: each with its own set of assumptions and claims.
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Despite its appeal, the consequences of its popularity as well as the vigorous critiques of it have,
in many ways, muddled and obfuscated its utility. For example, with at least fifty-five
recognized definitions, there is much theoretical debate simply surrounding the definition of
stakeholder itself.125
Understanding what it means to have a stake in a matter is rather uncomplicated.
Determining who is entitled to such a claim and identifying those who are responsible to the
holder of those claims is a varied as the microbiota in the human body, or as diverse as the
stakeholders within an HCO. Freedman holds what is widely recognized as the seminal
definition of stakeholder, and will unless otherwise stated, be the position adopted throughout
this dissertation. An organization’s stakeholder is, “any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.” 126 Methods of identifying
stakeholders and determining the organization’s duty to them is often an exercise in moral
classification. In advancing the argument for ethical obligations for accountability of leaders to
stakeholders, this discussion illustrates the moral classification of stakeholder’s according to
Phillips’ theory of normative and derivative stakeholders.
According to Phillips, the organizational universe is not constructed and bisected by
legitimate stakeholders and non-stakeholders. It is, however, partitioned in the first instance by
normative stakeholders. Despite traditional problems with definitions of normative, this concept
is considered to be the heart or core of stakeholder theory. 127 In its broadest sense, normative
stakeholder theories seek to alter corporate behavior, either directly or through management,
leadership or governance bodies acting according to what ought to be done to achieve good. It
considers what should be done to meet the needs, interests and claims of the organization’s
individual or group stakeholders according to certain moral norms.
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Normative stakeholders are those individuals and groups of individuals to whom the
organization has a direct moral obligation to attend to their well-being.128 They are the
beneficiaries and objects for which the organization is managed – they give the organization
purpose. They are not recognized according to their proximity and situs to the organization.
They are not uniquely internal or external to the company. Rather, they are descriptive of their
relevance and presence as customers, patients, employees, local communities, suppliers, or
financiers and lenders. 129
By virtue of their humanness, normative stakeholders are afforded greater moral
consideration; that is to say, stakeholder fairness, in corporate decision-making, than other social
actors.130 That is not intended to suggest that non-normative stakeholders are morally
disregarded or diminished. But rather, there is a stakeholder-based moral obligation for fairness
that is layered on top, enriching the condition of the normative stakeholder. To further elucidate,
normative stakeholders do not misappropriate entitlements away from derivative stakeholders.
Rather, they are merely entitled to more.
Just as the human body is affected by external influencers that create disruption as well as
equipoise, so it is that an HCO can be influenced by derivative stakeholders. Derivative
stakeholders are groups who can sow seeds of detriment, or create benefit to the company by
virtue of their passions; such as activists, the media, and competitors. 131 Although the
organization has no direct moral obligation to advance the interests of the derivative stakeholder,
Phillips advocates that management acknowledge and pay them heed for the sake of normative
stakeholders.132
Even though derivative stakeholders do not directly derive benefit from the moral
obligations of the organization, they obtain their legitimacy as stakeholders nonetheless from
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their ability to affect and impact the normative constituent. While many may act in ways that are
salutary to the organization; for example: a journalist who reports a favorable story about the
company concerning their labor strike, they are contrasted by the derogatory news article
instigated by a company’s rival competitor. Powerful derivative stakeholders can effectuate
seismic influence and authority, and justify the moral decisions made by organization in support
of the normative stakeholder. 133
Because of the complexity of the entwined and interdependent interests with an HCO and
its susceptibility to disruption, stakeholder theory is a promising model for maximizing value
creation opportunities. It acknowledges moral agency and diversity of values 134 which appeals to
the climate of the HCO and help to ensure homeostasis. This discussion illustrates and contrasts
two of the dominant normative stakeholder concepts – the ethic of care, and principle of
stakeholder fairness as advanced by their most notable theorists. It includes each theorist’s
respective interpretation of what characterizes a stakeholder, as well as a recognition of the role
of stewardship in reconciling need with limited resources. In subsequent chapters, this discussion
expands to include a specific cross-section of internal and external HCO stakeholders, vis-à-vis
these concepts; evaluating their claims against the organization’s normative obligations to them.
2. C. 2.

Feminist Theory and Ethics of Care
In contrast to traditional economics-based views of management that are presumed to

protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders primarily, “stakeholder theory can be
viewed as a feminine normative counterpart, whereby corporations seek to promote stakeholder
satisfaction through a more cooperative, caring relationship.” 135 This reconstitution of normative
stakeholder theory is supported by the feminist ethics of care proposing that stakeholders are
viewed as connected sets of relationships with each other, not merely with the organization. 136 In
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contrast to social contract theories, feminist moral theory looks beyond legalistic, right-based
considerations of stakeholder interests and elevates the value of relationship to ensure that those
interests are brought to the forefront of managerial thought. Despite the feminist characterization,
research indicates that preference for ethics of care over justice is identified with men as well as
women.137
The discussion presented here and developed more fully throughout several subsequent
chapters illustrates five variations of feminine ethics of care, stakeholder theory and analysis
through the lens of distinct, but aligned theorists. Care ethics is traced to Carol Gilligan’s work.
She undergirds her critique of masculine economics-based management by suggesting that stages
of moral maturity transform inward assessments of the right course of action, into outward
considerations of those which whom we are in relation. Relationship requires connectedness with
others, while differentiating the other from the self. This results in care for others. 138 Nel
Noddings asserts that it is not merely those with whom we are in relation that should be the
object of our caring, but rather, caring ought to be a universal attitude that we demonstrate to our
wider shared society. 139 Ruth Groenhout considers ethics of care by exploring the connection to
human nature as a method for moral decision-making.
And, although highly recognized for their individual attitudes advancing stakeholder
theory and its application, this discussion unifies Andrew Wicks, Daniel Gilbert and R. Edward
Freeman’s conversations on the feminist theory and presents them as a single theory. They
collectively incorporate the ethics of care into the dominant masculine bias metaphors that are
the hallmark of traditional stakeholder theory. 140 Finally, Brian Burton and Craig Dunn similarly
present a unified theory incorporating care for the least advantaged stakeholder while ensuring
that some privilege is afforded to those who enjoy close relationships with the decision-maker.141
84

Obligations between stakeholders and the idea of accountability are bi-directional and
multi-dimensional. On the one hand, stakeholder relationships occur between persons or groups
of persons. Accordingly, there is a fundamental moral duty to treat people with respect and
recognize their unique human dignity, treat them fairly, and avoid harm. On the other hand, the
relationships often entail additional obligations stemming from the role-based relationship
between the HCO and its stakeholder. For example, an HCO executive is morally accountable to
its employees because of their humanness, and because of their status as employee/normative
stakeholders.142 Accountable leaders act in deference to their multi-dimensional stakeholder
obligations through demonstrable commitments to fairness.
2. C. 3.

Stakeholder Fairness, Social Contract, and Stewardship
Integrity, fairness, and trust are ethical concepts that comprise the moral principles that

should be applied in practical business settings. 143 The culture of ethical accountability within
each HCO determines the degree to which these concepts become rooted in the moral principles
of the organization. As Wallenhorst contends, the key marker of an ethically sound organization
is the tone set by its executive leaders. 144 And, with normative stakeholders at the center of their
minds, their business needs must be based on ideas of fairness. The shear breadth of normative
stakeholders to whom HCO executives are accountable makes employing fairness one of the
most ambitious demands placed upon leadership. Applying fairness requires that the needs,
interests, and concerns of particular stakeholders be considered in relationship to others. 145
Managing for HCO stakeholders seeks win-win outcomes through collaborative and
caring relationships. Complex situations, however, can result in zero-sum games where the gain
of one individual or group is necessarily lost by another. 146 This seemingly inevitable reality is
not intended to foretell that stakeholder theory is inherently uncompromising and self85

concerning. On the contrary, Robert Phillips’ notable principle of stakeholder fairness argues
that the obligations of fairness by and among stakeholders are created when benefits resulting
from cooperative efforts are accepted by a group of stakeholders. 147 Rather than attempting to
treat all stakeholders equally, which he believes is impossible, Phillips recommends the principle
of equity to determine which normative stakeholder should receive more. 148 Phillips confesses
that his work is based on John Rawls’s principle of fair play which, according to Phillips, is the
moral foundation of stakeholder theory.

149

This notion of fairness, according to Freeman, presupposes basic equality among
stakeholders in terms of their moral rights. He addresses how the inequalities that might arise
may be resolved through his doctrine of fair contracts. 150 Of the six fair contract ground rules
espoused by Freeman, the agency principle postulates that all agents participating in the contract
must serve the interests of all stakeholders. 151 This principle squares entirely with the moral
obligations of the ethically accountable HCO and its constituent interdependencies.
In contrast, the concept of integrated social contract theory espouses, according to
Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee, a foundation for stakeholder theory that suggests
management take into consideration stakeholder norms rather than interests. 152 Donaldson and
Dunfee’s model is communitarian in that it considers the normative voice of the relevant
stakeholder communities. Determining who is a stakeholder, and who or what is not depends
upon a number of factors and precise analysis of the facts and circumstances confronting the
organization and its constituents.
Principles of fairness must also nourish policy and decision-making with respect to
distribution of scarce resources; especially in healthcare. Justice and equity are key concerns 153
and are frequently central in the minds of management. However, morally accountable
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leadership is concerned with more than ensuring that resources are distributed with justice and
equity. They are called to remain faithful to the ethic of stewardship in the management of
stakeholders.
Stewardship in healthcare is an understanding that all of the resources of the HCO,
including real and intangible ones, are held in trust by the organization and its leadership for the
good of others. 154 It is not merely an aspiration of good leadership. Stewardship is a fiduciary
duty and a commitment to the organization. It is an ethic that transcends healthcare and is
integral to nearly every discipline, including theology, information management, 155
environmental management, and economics. The principle difference in the value of stewardship
within other disciplines lies in the origin of the resources at issue. That is, Catholic social
teaching provides that stewardship is the command of God for humankind to use the world’s
resources He gifted to them responsibly for the benefit of all. 156 For the non-religious HCO, the
value of stewardship requires that the care delivery system monitor and use its resources – varied
as they are – wisely.157
Because the range of stakeholders in healthcare delivery is diverse, the ability of an HCO
to achieve its mission, survive as a viable business and provide for the good of others without
breeding ethical tensions is dubious at best. 158 Adding to this tension is the fact that members of
management are normative stakeholders themselves. Although as stewards, their duty to
safeguard the welfare of the company requires a balancing of multiple claims which include
competing and conflicting stakeholders that could threaten their own self-interest.159 Despite this
conflict, it is possible for the soul of its leaders, projected onto and through the HCO, to maintain
homeostasis for the organization and its communities of stakeholders. Methods for accountable
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management of specific stakeholder interests and communities of health are explored more
deeply in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
2. D.

Conclusion
The anatomy of the contemporary healthcare organization (HCO), like the human body,

is an interdependent system of form and function responding to internal and external
environmental influences in order to survive and maintain homeostasis. The business model of
the HCO is highly complex as it is comprised of a series of unending interacting and coexisting
touchpoints and relationships; each with their own unique self-interests and objectives.
Maintaining healthy order within such a heterogeneous system depends upon the ethical
accountability of HCO leadership to its constituent parts; specifically to its normative
stakeholders.
Moral agency, as the cornerstone of ethical leadership, is the ability to discern, decide
and act according to what is right, and to be accountable for those actions. Moral soul is the
distinguishing characteristic of accountable leadership. Individual and institutional moral agents,
possessing distinctive qualities and moral obligations act on behalf of the HCO, and are the
embodiment of its moral soul. An organization is adjudged by those individuals and communities
it serves according to the decisions, intentions and actions of its agents; as well as by the values
and principles it espouses.
Conversely, the absence of moral soul is recognized in such things as conflicts of interest,
conflicts of conscience and all too often deficiencies in moral judgment that result in stakeholder
abandonment. When leaders are dispossessed of their moral agency and act in morally
irresponsible ways, the soul of the HCO dies, as demonstrated through the AHERF case study.
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Stakeholder theory, which takes into account considerations beyond mere economic, is an
approach to organizational ethics that heeds to the rights and interests of individuals who interact
with and could be affected by the HCO’s decisions. It is concerned with the HCO’s direct moral
obligations to its constituents. The ethics of care, and the principle of stakeholder fairness are
two dominant stakeholder concepts which appeal to the climate of the contemporary HCO to
help ensure homeostasis. They look, respectively to the relational quality of moral human
interaction, and to the principles of fairness as an undercurrent of policy and decision-making, as
well as stewardship as a fiduciary duty and commitment to the HCO and its community of
stakeholders. Stakeholder value and values are the foundation of ethical accountability and
organizational leadership and underscore the HCO’s moral duty to its interdependent stakeholder
communities.
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Chapter 3 – Ethical Challenges of Maintaining Stakeholder Confidentiality and Privacy
3.

Introduction
Contrary to intuitive assumptions, not all healthcare interests are purely corporal.

Obtaining wellness of the human body, mind, and even spirit are patent concerns of most
healthcare stakeholders, regardless of their specific relationship to the healthcare organization
(HCO). However, human flourishing and respect for human dignity also includes recognition of
the patient’s right and interest in preserving that which is most unique and personal to them – the
confidentiality and privacy of their most intimate thoughts and facts - their information. This
chapter thoroughly explores this stakeholder interest by bifurcating them into distinct sections;
one setting forth the duty of confidentiality, and the other illuminating expectations of privacy.
The timeless concept of confidentiality is embattled in an age where knowledge is power,
predictive analytics dictates decision making, and data has become “the raw material of the
information age.” 1 Confidentiality – the cornerstone of trust in healthcare – is further weakened
under the crushing influence of diverse stakeholders competing to ingest as much health data as
can be consumed in order to advance their own interests, or those of their constituents. Yet,
patient data holds the key to unlocking crucial medical advances. Patient data has become the
lifeblood of the contemporary HCO, and as Big Data analytics innervates its body through the
new age of algorithmic neural networks, personal privacy is endangered. Undetectable and
camouflaged amongst the digital data elements of this feeding frenzy, are the things which every
human person has, holds sacred, and may even deny having at all – their secrets.
Preserving the confidentiality of patient secrets while satisfying legitimate competing
stakeholder interests is daunting and is never absolute. Accordingly, this chapter dissects the
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concept of confidentiality as a multi-stakeholder interest in contemporary HCOs. It will
demonstrate the ethical justification for exceptions to the legal and professional obligations of
the duty of confidentiality in clinical care, and the effects of those exceptions on patient and third
party expectations. It will then illustrate the intersection of the individual’s right to privacy in
their personal information, the legal and ethical justification for use of such digital information to
do good, and the need for ethical guidelines and principles to minimize threats to privacy while
respecting the dignity of the person.
This chapter begins with an examination of the anatomy of a secret, the ethics of secrecy,
and the fact that secrets are a natural part of humanness, according to the works of Sissela Bok,
and Anita Allen. It then illustrates how the revelation of patient secrets in the course of the
physician-patient relationship, forms the seal of confidentiality, triggering the ethical principles,
and the professional and legal strictures protecting them. Despite these obligations, this paper
explores the disruptors that justify disclosures of protected secrets in the clinical setting and the
contradictions and ambiguous situations that besiege the ethics of physician-patient
confidentiality. 2
Concerning the duty of confidentiality as a constituent of the principle of respect for
autonomy, this chapter proceeds to discuss the role of autonomy and informed consent as a
means for patients to exercise control over the disposition of their secrets. It discusses the need
for physicians to avail themselves to their patient’s autonomous voice when considering the
scope of information necessary for a fully informed consent. It then shifts to the ethical dilemmas
confronted by clinicians as they are called to be confidants and guardians of secrets.
Specifically this chapter examines challenges to confidentiality that result from the
clinicians’ duty to protect secrets learned in the course of the psychotherapeutic practice.
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Adopting the assertion that mental health is a public good, it presents alternatives to absolute
confidentiality in the form of duty to warn third parties. This dual allegiance between protecting
the patient, and securing her secrets, and consideration for the welfare of others, presents a
dilemma that implicates both legal duties and ethical principles.
It then explores the duality of duty and the ethical dilemmas engendered through
advances in genomic medicine. Genomic medicine, which for purposes of this dissertation
includes references to genetic testing and whole genome sequencing, is pioneering promising
and unprecedented advances in human health that will help to better understand the qualities of
diseases.3 At the same time, its findings incidentally expand the common understanding of
secrets to include that which may never be known to anyone – including the patient. In addition,
this chapter illustrates how genomic medicine multiplies the breadth of third party stakeholders
who may or may not have an interest in obtaining these secrets, and the ethical justification for
disclosing them, or protecting and respecting their secrecy.
The focus of this chapter then shifts to the stakeholder expectation of privacy. It proceeds
by briefly exploring the evolution of privacy as an individual claim, providing the foundation for
current concepts articulated by several contemporary theorists Alan Westin, Daniel Solove,
Adam Moore, Julie Inness and Anita Allen. The sanctity of privacy as both an inviolable right
and a moral duty to respect intimacy, as manifest in contemporary healthcare, is also discussed;
in addition to the effects on patient privacy from the emergence of diverse stakeholders, the
transformation of American medicine, and technology. All of which implicate individual
privacy.
In consideration of the healthcare industry’s appetite for protected health information,
this chapter explores the relatively recent legislative and regulatory activities enabling the access,
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use and disclosure of individuals’ information. Protecting the privacy of patient stakeholders,
ensuring that they are able to maintain control over their sensitive information while
emancipating data through health information technologies is also discussed. Specifically, this
chapter explores interoperability of electronic medical records and the implications to the
historically binary relationship between the physician and patient.
The proliferation of digital information, the ubiquity of the Big Data phenomenon, and
the emergence of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and algorithmic decision-making not
only drive healthcare innovation, they weaken the control of the patient; endangering autonomy.
This chapter probes the opportunities and ethical complexities of Big Data and health data
dependent technologies. In demonstrating how accountable healthcare leaders must consider the
moral rights of their stakeholders, the chapter concludes with an exposition of an ethical
framework for data use that has at its heart a better respect for human dignity. 4
3. A.

Confidentiality and the Ethics of Secrecy
“Ask me no secrets, and I’ll tell you no lies: is a sardonic idiom that has been used by

poets and cynics alike to express the limits of man’s willingness to reveal certain truths about
himself. These truths, or secrets, live in the essential recesses of every person, and define aspects
of selfhood that intentionally remain hidden in order to preserve that which is uniquely human
and different.5 Much of human behavior is driven by the need to wall of others from access to
secrets that define human aspirations, experiences and desires. Fear of public disclosure of
private truths is a strong, but not exclusive, motivator for concealment and even deception. In
that vein, however, lying is not the only way to avoid undesirable consequences of disclosing of
secrets. Rather, the antidote for fear of public revelation is trust.
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Trust in others is a human value that enables intimacy. It is most needed when one is no
longer in control. 6 Surrendering control to a trusted other allows for the release of inhibitions that
can obstruct human growth and flourishing. It creates a tie that binds the one who reveals an
unknown to the recipient who now conceals, through the presumed inviolable bond of
confidentiality. In such confidential relations, the confidant assumes the obligation not to use
what has been revealed to harm the confider, or to share it with third parties, without the consent
of the confider. 7 The trust imbued in such confidential relations is what seals the commitment of
the various agents who have moral obligations and duties to preserve entrusted secrets.
Moral agents cloaked under the seal of confidentiality are found anywhere and
everywhere humans interact, including within families, businesses, friendships, and professions.
Particularly in the healthcare setting, the principle of confidentiality and the moral and legal
obligations emerging from it can be thought of as a kind of security blanket protecting the secrets
of a variety of stakeholders. However confidentiality in healthcare today is a porous obligation,
and it can be argued that the blanket is threadbare in many places. Medical secrecy in healthcare
is a controversial matter as confidentiality is frequently abdicated to advance the interests of
persons other than the patient. 8 Exploration into the ethical makeup of a secret and the moral
agency affecting its vitality is essential to justify the porosity of confidentiality.
3. A.1 Keeping Secrets
Insinuating that humans are incapable of committing to an unbreakable confidence,
Benjamin Franklin wittily warned that, “[t]hree may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.” 9
Franklin might be surprised to learn that according to some, if two of the three are dead, there are
no secrets at all. Because traditional conceptions of secrecy hold that without a person from
whom information is withheld, secrecy cannot occur. In essence, there is no secrecy at all when
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one is alone. 10 However, this paper adopts the perspectives advanced by Slepian, Chun and
Mason that “an individual has a secret from the moment he or she decides to withhold
information” often long before they are in the presence of the person from whom they are
concealing. 11 As such, respect for the virtue of secrets - those facts or things that people intend to
be “kept from the knowledge of others or shared only confidentially with a few” 12 is a
quintessential quality of humanness, because humans keep secrets.
Even though giving up control can be emancipating, collective and individual dignity is
enriched by the awareness that one can control their secrets. One’s thoughts, and the details
about their most intimate self that are not outwardly and openly expressed, are secrets. And it is
important to note that while all deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive. 13
Someone may keep secrets by omission – that is, intentionally withholding something about
themselves - in an attempt to avoid unpleasant or painful memories, without actively lying about
the subject.
For example, the intentional failure of a professional man to discuss, with his fiancé, the
firing from his job at a fast food restaurant when he was in high school because he is
embarrassed to discuss the underlying reason – his immature conduct - is not, prima facie,
deception. As Kelly suggests, “secrecy is a nearly universal phenomenon, and being able to keep
personal secrets may even be seen as a sign of maturation.” 14 It is self-control in the most literal
sense. Keeping secrets about oneself demonstrates respect for the demarcation line between
public and private life. It demonstrates respect for individual autonomy.
Sissela Bok’s concept of the ethics of secrecy points to the importance of secrets in
healthcare. She writes that humans are most comfortable and assured when they confront areas
of life that they know intimately, or belong to, and “within that area, what we keep secret
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requires our most intense and active attention.” 15 In contrast she contends that even amidst the
many areas of life about which we know little, “we also experience as secrets the spaces from
which we feel shut out.” 16 Such is the case for the patient seeking care from a physician. The
patient knows her body and her thoughts better than anyone, and has elected to keep certain
intimacies concealed; entrusting them to her physician. She similarly holds as secret that which
she does not know, but will soon be discovered and revealed by her physician.
Bok underscores that the sacred and the secret have been related through Latin etymology
since antiquity. 17 The secretum, as something set apart and hidden, and the arcanum as that
which is spiritually mysterious and secret are vestiges preserved in contemporary secret keeping.
Keeping secrets is particularly sacrosanct in the physician-patient relationship. The
confidentiality of secrets disclosed to physicians, either through direct communication or through
physical revelation, is a fundamental presupposition of every medical encounter. 18
Quality care depends upon mutual transparency and trust. This is relevant as it is widely
recognized that patients who lack trust in particular physicians, or healthcare generally, are less
likely to seek care or be compliant with treatment protocols. 19 As such, the willing patient
imparts the information to her physician in confidence and trust 20 and once a secret is revealed,
the physician’s duty of confidentiality – that is, the duty to keep her secret – is invoked. In this
regard, keeping secrets within the confines of the physician patient relationship has been long
considered binary. Since secrets involve the revelation of information, presumably known only
to the patient – at least initially - so too is the truth of the revelation.
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3. A .2. To Tell the Truth
People typically choose to conceal information about their health long before they see a
provider. Aches, pains, moods, and changes in a person’s body may all be things that people
keep secret; perhaps out of fear, indifference, independence, invincible ignorance, denial, or
some combination thereof. Remaining true to themselves however, the intimate relationship that
people enjoy with their own body and mind, according to Anita Allen, means that many diseases
and injuries are invisible to other people. Because health conditions often remain hidden, most of
what people learn about themselves and their conditions occur extra-professionally, through selfencounters. 21 For all that, in order for the clinician to serve the patient’s best interests, patients
must realize some sacrifices to secrecy, and willingness to tell the truth.
To that end, many norms of social interaction are interrupted in the clinical setting.
Questions are asked, and narratives are revealed in the course of care that do not typically
transpire in polite company. Discussing one’s body and its conditions transparently, and
revealing one’s experiences and emotions taps into the fragility of a patient’s self-esteem and
vulnerability; which “follow individuals into their doctors’ offices. 22 Considering all that is
exposed through the clinical encounter, and in recognition of the fact that information is the most
versatile resource in the healthcare setting, 23 the need for truthful disclosures is incontrovertible.
Both the clinician and the patient are keepers of secrets in a trust-based relationship that is
strictly dependent upon the moral imperative of veracity. 24
But, people lie in an effort to manage information. 25 Of the many domains of human life
where lying appears to be the most prevalent, the health care delivery setting calls for special
attention.26 It is widely acknowledged that most patients lie to their doctors to avoid negative
consequences, to escape embarrassment, and to be presented in a more favorable light. The most
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common are lies about diet, smoking and alcohol habits, as well as sexual activities and
preferences.27 Some lies are also rooted in the patient’s desire to achieve some economic gain
such as public welfare benefits, or other attempts to defraud the healthcare system. Regardless
of the motive, it is also understood within the context of secrecy in healthcare, that “lying is an
expression of a power relationship, whether it is used as a tactic to impose ones’ power, or, on
the contrary, to resist the other’s power.” 28
The moral imperative to tell the truth is incumbent upon both the patient and the
physician who have entered into a treating relationship.29 In addition, truthful conveyance of
information provides the greatest opportunity for successful care delivery and outcomes.
Intentionally providing inaccurate or untrustworthy facts that may skew the physician’s
assessment and diagnosis. At its extreme, people with factitious disorders, who deliberately
conjure up illnesses or act as if they have illnesses or symptoms, produce unique, though not
uncommon trials for the physician. 30 Although there is little formal guidance on the nature of the
physician’s duty to treat if the patient is knowingly untruthful, the physician-patient relationship
“is a reciprocal one, and if patients don’t meet their duty to be truthful, then doctors do not have
a responsibility to continue to care for them.” 31 Withholding the truth is dangerous. It is harmful
to the patient, and may justify the physician’s decision to discharge the patient from his care. 32
However, telling the truth has discordant meaning for the physician. Situations may
compel the physician to withhold certain truths from the patient. 33 Hence the failure to tell the
patient something about a particular aspect of their health, including a true statement of fact, may
be perceived as intentional deception, or lying. Later sections of this paper examine those
circumstances more fully. Nevertheless, the physician’s duty of confidentiality, while fraught
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with moral dilemmas, is derived from the ethical principle of patient autonomy as well as legal
obligations respecting the patient’s right of privacy. 34
3. B.

Professional Duty and Legal Obligation
Both mental health professionals and laypersons alike advance the notion that confessing

one’s secrets is good for the soul, and that revealing secrets that one withholds about themselves
is cathartic.35 In fact, relieving oneself of the burdens of their secrets is reported to have actual
health benefits. Ridding oneself of secrets has been shown to improve immunological
functioning, relieve stress, and even reduce the number of physician office visits.

36

While most

of the research on secrets has focused on secrets about the self, little work has been done on the
willingness and ability of those to whom secrets have been revealed to keep them confidential. 37
The effect of the secret on the confidant’s conscience and promise to keep the secret is fodder for
future research and further analysis.
However, since antiquity, respect for patient confidentiality has been a fundamental
moral precept and professional responsibility of physicians. The promise to “not divulge, as
reckoning that all such should be kept secret” 38 concerning things learned about a patient in the
course of the treating relationship resonates today. It can be argued that society’s confidence in
the sanctity of physician-patient communications is as essential as the confidence held by the
individual patient. However, the dynamics of modern healthcare, and the demands of civil
society to adjudicate the truth are disruptors to many of the traditional rules of confidentiality.
Thus creating ethical dilemmas for clinicians; leaving some to argue that confidentiality is
dead.39 Challenged by advanced data analytics, complex care management, patient datadependent technologies, clinical collaboration, as well as the rules of civil and criminal
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procedure, the mantle of confidentiality under which patient secrets are revealed to the physician
is ambiguous.
3. B. 1. The Duty of Confidentiality
A pledge of confidentiality not to divulge secrets that are made either implicitly or
explicitly,40 and a patient’s expectations of privacy, are often erroneously conflated and
confused. Their meanings are as distinct as they are similar. To understand the difference
between confidentiality and privacy requires a focus on the duties and rights of the confidant and
confider respectively. The physician’s duty of confidentiality is supported by collateral and
corresponding obligations to the patient. With the patient’s interest at the forefront of his
decisions, the physician has a duty to uphold the confidence in the physician/patient relationship
generally, and the patient’s legal right to privacy, specifically. 41
The legal right to privacy, which is in essence an expectation of confidentiality that is
enforceable by and rooted in law, is a preeminent concern in contemporary healthcare. The
intricacies and debates relating to the legal right to privacy are addressed later in this chapter. It
is enough for now to acknowledge that patients forfeit some, but not all, of their privacy rights
when they enter into treating relationships and share secrets with their physician. However, the
physician’s prima facie duty of confidentiality, rooted in principles of ethics, and codified in
professional codes, laws, and model rules of conduct, is what binds the physician to the
“warranty of silence.”42
Nevertheless, in some cases, confidentiality can be open-ended and must yield for the
greater good. However, departures from the expectation of confidentiality that is the hallmark of
the physician-patient relationship, should only occur in particular instances - when the severity of
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not disclosing, and the life and health of third parties would outmuscle patient confidentiality. 43
Additionally, it may be necessary for the sake of the patient that physicians share medical secrets
with other clinicians on the treatment team, or even unaffiliated physicians in furtherance of
population health, patient safety, or quality of care initiatives. Alas, because the duty of
confidentiality is no longer absolute, indiscretions and imprudent practices can also result in
breaches of patient confidentiality. Although this chapter concentrates on the ethical
justification for exceptions to confidentiality, a thorough discussion must include at least a brief
recognition of the inappropriate breaches of confidentiality that occur within clinical settings.
Such inappropriate incidents threaten to erode stakeholder trust, as well as corrode the integrity
of the healthcare system.
The intimacy of the physician-patient relationship enables physicians and other
healthcare professionals involved in patient care to form subjective impressions of the patient,
their habits, lifestyles and other tangential activities. When sensitive information becomes part of
these impressions and is shared with and expressed to others beyond the patient treatment
relationship, these disclosures can cause irreparable harm to patients, their reputations, and to
their personal dignity. 44 Medicine today is often practiced in teams comprised of more than just
the medical personnel involved in a patient’s care. As these teams interact, largely innocent yet
inappropriate disclosures of patient secrets as well as subjective impressions increasingly occur
in public areas of the hospital such as corridors, elevators, stairwells, and cafeterias. Research
demonstrates that breaches of confidentiality within the hospital care setting are a major problem
– occurring as frequently as once every 62 hours. 45 It concludes that physicians do not always
know how to reconcile the need to share information with the need for breach avoidance. 46
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There is tremendous uncertainty among physicians concerning when secrets can become public.
This is evident when considering the scope of privileged communications.
3. B. 2. The Evidentiary Privilege
Justice, according to principles of jurisprudence, refers to the restoration of balance by
ensuring that which is morally due is delivered. A just decision seeks to treat like cases alike, and
different cases differently. Principles of natural justice in America ensure that there are
“guarantees of impartiality or objectivity.” 47 For justice to be served, full and transparent
discovery and disclosure of relevant facts of a dispute are paramount. The failure to reveal that
which may influence the restoration of balance in society, either through lack of awareness, or
even perjury, can defile the delivery of justice. All too often, the need to discover and reveal
secrets through truthful testimony is the pivot point between justice and injustice. When
necessary facts are secrets that are shrouded in impenetrable confidentiality, the confidential
relationship can make for a precarious foundation where secrecy and legal equity collide.
Not all truthful evidence concerning a case or controversy is discoverable. The evidentiary
privilege – the right of one to refuse to testify about matters, or the right to prevent another from
doing so – permits the suppression of evidence obtained through certain confidential
relationships. 48 The physician-patient privilege, recognized alongside the attorney-client and
priest-penitent privileges, accompanies and sustains patient secrecy. This evidentiary privilege
protects the communications made by both the patient and the physician.
Statements made by the patient are protected from compelled disclosure in a legal
proceeding. As the holder of the privilege, she may waive the privilege and allow for testimony
that would make public the secrets she shared with her physician. However, the physician is not
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permitted to waive his privilege without her consent. With few exceptions, statements made by
the physician to the patient are also protected as privileged. The evidentiary privilege is critical.
It enshrouds and insulates the sacredness of physician-patient exchanges beyond the bounds of
mere confidentiality. It asserts that there can be a greater societal interest in protecting trust and
preserving secrecy than in revealing the information. 49 Reverence for the fiduciary relationship
between the physician and the patient can, and frequently does, outweigh the need to provide
testimony.
But the need for compelled disclosure of patient information to a third party -what is in
effect a breach of confidentiality - can override the fiduciary relationship. Many breaches of the
expectation of confidentiality are not unlawful or inappropriate at all but are essential to public
health and policy, despite the impact on patient privacy. 50 Health oversight activities such as
disclosures to public health authorities for infectious disease control, workers’ compensation
claims, and certain national priority disclosure are a few examples. In addition, physicians may
disclose patient secrets when defending themselves in a lawsuit brought by the patient. Other
mandated duties to disclose confidential patient information to third parties are outlined later in
this paper. But it must be noted that the lines between what is protected under the duty of
confidentiality, what is required to be disclosed by law, and what is necessary for the benefit of
society are obfuscated at best. In sum it can be said that trust protects secrets, and
“confidentiality protects trust.” 51 Trust invokes privacy, and the law protects privacy. But the gap
between what prevents breaches of trust from being violations privacy must be backfilled with
principles of ethics.
3. C.

Clinical Ethics
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Filling the gap between ethical principles and sound judgements in order to guide moral
decision making, demands that the principles be “specific to the needs of the particular
contexts.” 52 Nowhere in healthcare do ethical principles align with specific contextual needs
more than in direct clinical care settings. That is not to say that laboratory and theoretical
medical advances are devoid of ethical considerations. In fact, despite the widespread medical
ethics mandate requiring full disclosure of medical errors, very few pathologists personally
disclose pathology or lab errors to patients; often because they believe doing so would disrupt
the patient’s direct relationship with the physician. 53 As a further matter, patients are rarely even
aware of the role of the pathologist, and there is almost never a personal relationship with the
pathologist.54However, clinical care defines the humanness of medicine through direct physical
contact and observation, and has the most notable impact on respect for human dignity and wellbeing. The therapeutic relationships created within the clinical setting are supported by the core
principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. 55
Post, Bluestein and Dubler maintain that these core ethical principles cannot provide
sufficient moral analysis if they are merely applied mechanically, or in a vacuum, as they are
reliant on context and narrative. The clinical context is fertile with ethical influencers such as
power imbalances, access to care, decisions to forego treatment, and informed consent, to name
just a few.56 As an instrument for moral reasoning, core ethical principles inform and guide those
matters that resonate most profoundly with the gravitas of patient health. Specifically, this
section examines how patient secrets are obtained and shared in right relationship with ethical
principle of autonomy and its constituent principle of confidentiality; particularly when these
principles are in conflict.
3. C. 1.

Autonomy: The Patient’s Voice
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The duty of confidentiality, and the patient’s expectation of privacy in healthcare are
constituents of the respect for the principle of autonomy. 57 While a number of theories of
autonomy exist, individual autonomy is generally accepted to mean the freedom to make choices
without coercive and controlling influences. Those choices also include the patient’s right to
decide what, and to whom, personal information about them is to be used, disclosed and stored.
It also includes the patient’s right to refuse access to information they otherwise do not know
about themselves. Autonomy empowers patients with the tools to control decisions about their
own health and well-being generally. It allows the patient to have an active hand in their care.
Respect for patient autonomy is respect for the patient’s voice.
Autonomy is not enjoyed in a vacuum and is not a unilateral right. For it to sustain its
dignity as a principle of common morality, respect for the principle of autonomy imposes
obligations on those with a duty to protect the patient’s interests. The patient’s right to expect
freedom from constraints, coercion and influences impose what Beauchamp and Childress refer
to as “negative obligations” on the actions of physicians and other moral agents. Avoiding
paternalism, or the intentional countermanding of patient preferences by the physician because
he believes his judgement of what benefits or harms the patient 58 is best, is an example of a
negative obligation. Complementary positive obligations are also imposed on physicians and
other healthcare professionals. These prescribe that health care professionals provide sufficient
information and facts to enable the patient to make informed decisions about themselves and
their health.59
Eliminating constraints, and enabling transparency helps to achieve positive patient
outcomes, and reinforces the dignity preserved through unencumbered choice and unimpeded
human flourishing. Beauchamp and Childress maintain that these positive and negative
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obligations attributed to respect for autonomy are seminal for the moral principles of
veracity/truth-telling as well as informed consent - which insulates patient autonomy.” 60
Actualized respect for autonomy acknowledged through informed consent helps to ensure that
the patient’s voice is heard.
However, as this dissertation demonstrates, harmonizing autonomy, informed consent
and confidentiality is an endeavor that is rife with contradictions that can muffle the patient’s
voice. The patient’s voice, with respect to how her secrets are shared, competes with the voices
and concerns of other stakeholders including the physician, the community’s interest in the
health and safety of the population writ large, and the concern for justice. 61 It is often the case
that patient’s autonomous voice is drowned out, even when the contradictions are resolved
through ethical decision-making.
To that end Petronio, DiCorcia, and Duggan focus on enhancing the communication
process between physicians and patients in an attempt to reconcile the different assumptions each
have about the other, and help to magnify the autonomous voice. They posit that improved
communications between physicians and patients ought to be memorialized through what they
refer to as a confidentiality pledge. The pledge articulates the patient’s expectations, while
describing how confidential information may be disclosed and shared in the face of
contradictions and conflicts confronted by physician. 62 The pledge concept advocates open
discussion between the physician and patient about how secrets are treated. It represents a
meeting of the minds and additional support for effective and empowering informed consent.
3. C. 2.

Informed Consent: Telling It Like It Is?
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The original meaning of inform, from the Latin informare, meant to give form to
something, to give it shape or to modify it; and eventually came to be used more narrowly to
mean “instruct” or “educate.” 63 The concept of informed consent as applied to clinical ethics is,
in essence, an amalgamated byproduct of both the former and the latter meanings. As a
consequence of clinical care, patient secrets shared with physicians are reconstituted according to
the clinician’s understanding, clinical observations, and overall assessments. The secrets are
further morphed into personal health information that, along with data from collateral sources
such as lab and diagnostic information, consultative and other relevant longitudinal information,
become part of the patient’s medical record. For effective instruction and education to occur
enabling the patient to be fully informed, the information must be successfully communicated. 64
Informed consent for treatment, which also includes informed refusal, speaks to the right
to self-determination, and the power to exercise control over oneself, avoiding exploitation, and
especially making choices about how secrets are kept, shared and used. 65 Originally a legal
doctrine associated with any unwelcomed touching or battery, informed consent currently enjoys
standing as a critical expression of patient autonomy, and occupies a dominant role in healthcare.
As consumers of health services, which for most patients represents a blind item, meaningful
informed consent emboldens patients to unmask the unknown. Yet, despite its preeminence, the
physician’s ethical obligation to respect patient self-governance through informed consent is not
absolute. It competes with the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.
The intersection of these principles with informed consent raises questions relating to the
scope of the information provided to patients to adequately support their independent decision
making. Sawicki writes that legal and ethically-focused proponents choose concepts like
materiality and relevance of the information to define the scope of disclosure, despite the
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subjectivity of the measurements. 66 She further contends that patient’s consider factors beyond
medical efficacy when contemplating care decisions. Consideration for the burdens potentially
imposed on caregivers and other third parties, costs, and impacts to the quality of life also drive
patient decisions. Ultimately, however, it is the physician who decides the type of information
and the spectrum of issues disclosed during the informed consent conversation with the patient.
The extent to which this decision making authority over patient secrets is ethically justified,
implicates physician paternalism, violates confidentiality, or in the most extreme cases, creates
potential abuses of power 67 is a matter for further ethical discourse within specific clinical
settings.
Dissecting the legal elements of the duty of disclosure under informed consent law in the
United States is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to call attention to the
inherent limitations of the legal doctrine which Thaddeus Pope maintains impede patient
empowerment. Most relevant to its relationship to confidentiality, Pope asserts the physician’s
duty to disclose is too narrow in that considerations about the information disclosed to the patient
are measured only by what objective hypothetical patients would need to know, not his particular
patient.68 This hypothetical assumption fails to give credit to the patient’s ability to consider
other factors when contemplating treatment. As such, patient self-determination is compromised
when subjective considerations are not respected.
HCOs share in the ethical responsibility for providing sufficient information to patients.
To that end, policies and procedures addressing informed consent ought to be revisited and
strategically reconsidered with the patient’s voice in mind. Traditional views of informed
consent must shift from check-box procedures to systemic approaches designed to include
disclosures of patient quality measures, population health outcomes, health disparities, as well as
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the types of data used to arrive at these measures. Providing this information along with
participation in meaningful communication with physicians will redefine the physician-patient
dyad in order that patients can make truly informed decisions. 69
3. D.

Psychotherapy: Secrets Kept…Secrets Shared
Few areas of healthcare venture closer to the core of humanness than that of the

psychotherapeutic practice. Barriers to secrecy are whittled away as the patient reveals the
mosaic of her life; intimate pieces and parts of her past that may never otherwise be shared,
except for the therapeutic encounter with the mental health provider. Psychotherapeutic practice
has long respected the rule of confidentiality stating that information disclosed by the patient to
the therapist in the course of the therapy may not be shared with others without the patient’s
prior express written consent. 70 Freud considered the need to preserve confidentiality of
psychotherapy quintessential to successful treatment. So much so, that he encouraged patients
not to even reveal the fact that they were in treatment with anyone else, including intimates,
spouses and other family members. 71
Not surprisingly, concealing and even denying that one was in therapy in Freud’s time
did not require much persuasion. The centuries-old stigma associated with behavioral health and
mental illness descends from a dark time when ignorance about people with behavioral issues
was the norm. Mental illness has long been attributed to sin and the work of the devil, and those
who suffered from it were often deemed insane, and were locked away in asylums or
madhouses.72 The stigma of mental illness remains a problem today, and persons with such
conditions have encountered discrimination, even after laws were passed banning such
activities.73 To that end, the fear that privacy will be lost in psychotherapy is often a compelling
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reason why people forego treatment at all. The fear of laying bare the secrets of one’s
infallibility remains profound.
The rule of confidentiality protecting these secrets is an ethical principle, professional
obligation, and in many jurisdictions is supported by state law. 74 Despite these safeguards,
ethical and societal conflicts unique to behavioral health and psychotherapy arise when
breaching confidentiality is necessary to prevent imminent harms to others, or to deliver justice.
The tension between the principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence are vividly
illustrated in this moral dilemma.
3. D. 1.

Protecting a Public Good
United States Supreme Court associate justice John Paul Stevens, in his seminal opinion

Jaffee v. Redmond, opined that mental health for the citizenry was “a public good of transcendent
importance.” 75 It is indeed. It is widely acknowledged that good health is an integral part of a
good life, which includes, according to the World Health Organization, “a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being…” 76 Mental health for the citizenry presupposes that all
who need it will receive it.
Underscoring the gravity of the psychotherapist privilege, Stevens distinguished it from
the physician privilege according to the ability to obtain, and the need for personal information.
His insight noted that physicians are, in most cases, able to treat patients through physical
examination alone, or from limited objective information. This is most often the nature of
emergency care, when many patients are unable to speak, or to aid the physician in evaluating
symptoms. It must be noted, however, that despite the absence of oral communications between
the patient and physician, the information procured is still protected by federal privacy law. 77
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Nonetheless, although treating a nonverbal patient may result in redundant or avoidable
diagnostic testing and procedures, many diseases and conditions are treatable without the patient
speaking a word.
However, that is not the case in most areas of behavioral health. Psychotherapy requires
the disclosure of secrets that most often are not observable or discoverable unless and until they
are unleashed by the patient in probing exchanges with the therapist. People who keep secrets
from themselves without realizing their own censorship are said to be experiencing repression. In
contrast, self-concealment occurs when one knowingly keeps things that they consider
distressing or negative from others. 78 In both instances, successful treatment depends upon
transparency, which is enabled by ensuring that these secrets, many of which invoke feelings of
shame and guilt, are cloaked in privilege. Thus, the psychotherapist privilege, according to
Justice Stevens, serves the public good 79 by enabling paths to treatment for infirmities that would
otherwise remain hidden and unrealized.
Informed consent, as a path to treatment, is stringently upheld in the psychotherapeutic
setting. Derived from the mental health professional code of ethics as well as respect for
autonomy, informed consent is the patient’s right to voluntarily agree to participate in counseling
and other mental health services. Consent can only be granted after the scope of services and
counseling processes are described in terms sufficiently comprehensible to the patient. 80
However, an inherent irony concerning the efficacy of informed consent in the psychotherapeutic
setting is that much of what the patient agrees to disclose may not even be known by the patient
until the process of therapeutic self-discovery unleashes such inner secrets. 81 Successful therapy
reveals the unconscious. Therefore, according to Lear, confidentiality is constitutive of the
psychoanalytic process itself, and is not merely a value to consider. When the patient no longer
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keeps secrets from themselves, they transform their interests from being a secret-keeper to holder
of privacy rights. 82 The contents of those secrets also may subject the therapist to a dual
allegiance; that which they have to their patient, and that which they may now owe to society.
3. D. 2.

Protecting the Public
The moral dilemma, hardened out of that duality of allegiance which often forces the

therapist to become a double agent 83, is distinctively omnipresent in psychotherapy. And the
consequences from violations confidentiality are similarly distinct. Notwithstanding impacts to
the trust relationship that occur in the purely clinical setting, when a physician breaches the
confidentiality of her patient’s protected health information, the underlying medical condition
generally is not affected. That is to say, inadvertent disclosure of an image of a malignant organ
to an unauthorized third party is not likely to impact the cancer prognosis or the efficacy of the
treatment. That is not the case in psychoanalysis.
Consider for example, what happens when the patient who has been sexually abused tells
her story. Doing so is an exercise of her freedom, and an expression of her willingness to
surrender control to another whose judgement and discretion she trusts. The psychotherapist or
other behavioral health professional takes possession of her story. 84 And if, unbeknownst to the
patient, he uses her story to advance some purpose other than her treatment, the psychic harm to
the patient and the fragility of her emotional health could be compromised, and the future
efficacy of her therapy very likely compromised. In an extreme but very real example,
Kantrowitz richly describes the psychological trauma recorded by American author and novelist
Philip Roth. Roth famously wrote about his torment, describing “the anger…the hurt about being
viewed as a specimen, and reduced to a syndrome” 85 after learning his therapist had plagiarized
his sessions by publishing a 30-page article about their relationship.
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Notwithstanding such misappropriation, if the abuse patient, in telling her story,
expresses violence towards her offender, or confesses that she wishes to engage in actions
harmful to herself or others as a result, moral and legal obligations may change the undercurrent
of her narrative. The therapist must confront the moral dilemma that Moser and Berman warn of
when “unlocking one secret may require the creation of another.” 86 Those secondary secrets and
ancillary allegiances demonstrate that confidentiality is never absolute, 87 and that the therapist is
obligated by principles of beneficence, and non-maleficence to fulfill his duty to necessary third
parties as well.
The psychotherapeutic privilege – that which the Jaffee Court deemed worthy of
protecting the public good – is not an absolute privilege. Courts have decided and generated
volumes of precedent to support instances when the public is served at the sacrifice of patient
confidentiality through evidentiary disclosure and testimony. However, the case of Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California explored one of the most remarkable incidents in
psychotherapy. 88 It examined the duty of a psychiatrist who learned, through outpatient
counseling, that his client intended to, and eventually did, kill an unnamed, yet readily
identifiable girl. The Court in Tarasoff 89 decreed that therapists incur obligations to protect third
parties when the patient expresses a serious intent to harm themselves or an identifiable other,
and that harm is likely to occur in the present, or future.
This “duty to warn” obligation is an exception to the duty of confidentiality even when,
under common law, there is no legal duty to prevent one person from harming another. 90 It
bespeaks of the awareness of, and ethical justification for revealing patient secrets for the public
good – a good that is antithetical to the interests of the patient. This public beneficence which
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seeks to “pursue and secure public benefits and minimize personal and public harm” 91 is also at
the heart of debates surrounding genomic determinism and the disclosure of genomic secrets.
3. E. The Genomic Dilemma
The moral value of confidentiality, and the duty to respect secrets is no longer confined to
those belonging only to patients and research data subjects. When ethical conflicts and
competing obligations such as those exemplified in psychotherapy arise, principles of
beneficence and non-maleficence may override confidentiality for the sake of a non-patient third
party – thereby creating a moral dilemma. 92 Even when the third party benefit is imperative,
those principles may beget a moral predicament for the physician. Such predicaments must
reconcile not merely how much information to disclose to the unsuspecting and perhaps
disinterested patient or non-patient, but also what kind of information to disclose, and perhaps
most importantly, whether to disclose information at all. These dilemmas are traversing
unchartered terrain especially in the context of genomic mapping, genotyping, and genetic
testing information.
Secrets released from whole genome sequences provide “important insights into the
medical and related life prospects of individuals as well as their relatives - who most likely did
not consent to the sequencing procedure.” 93 Whole genomic sequencing unleashes a person’s
entire genome along with all of its genetic variations or changes in the DNA sequence. These
variants provide information about genetic traits, as well as disease carrier status, and
susceptibility to diseases including, but certainly not limited to diabetes, some cancers and late
onset diseases such as Alzheimer’s.94
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The expansive and predictive power of genomic medicine creates an infinite constellation
of health secrets belonging to identifiable patients, patients’ family, as well as indeterminate
groups of people. Even without the full sequence, many of these secrets are formed and
discovered from information obtained in the ordinary course of the delivery of care itself – not
from the patient herself. Discrete genetic tests examine specific genes among the more than
20,000 known human genes, in order to identify a particular disease variant; all without the
patient uttering a single word to her doctor. Consequently, the physician then holds the power to
disclose - to her patient or the patient’s family and relatives – information she has learned
through linked genomic information as well, even “when the individual has not shared any of his
or her genetic information directly.” 95 The duties of the physician and the rights of patients and
others to know, and not to know, predictive genomic information is a probing matter that defies
traditional understanding of the duty of confidentiality and the practice of medicine.
3. E. 1.

The Right to Know Oneself
Currently there are a variety of methods and justifications for knowing and understanding

one’s genomic information. It is widely held that patients can derive much benefit and
personalized health advice from their genomic information. Pharmacogenomics, for example,
can predict an individual’s drug responses merely from the appearance of certain genetic factors,
and nutrigenomics can determine potential adverse effects from food and specific food
ingredients. Both discoveries have the potential to result in optimal health. 96 While only
indirectly relevant to one’s health, obtaining genetic-based ancestry information through directto-consumer testing services can have far-reaching effects on the test taker’s sense-of-self and
identity.
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In addition, people are entitled to know their own genetic information obtained from tests
administered in the clinical setting; typically involving a physician. This is the traditional venue
for those who present with a medical indication, or symptom of a disease where genetic factors
have been shown to play an important role. 97 Initially concerned with disease pathology alone,
the idea of genomic information carries with it the preconception that it forecasts and foretells of
doom-filled preconditions, impending maladies, and dreadful life and death predictions.
However, Siddhartha Mukherjee reveals that “genetics has crossed over from the strand of
pathology to the strand of normalcy.” 98 That is to say that this new science can be applied in
order to better understand culture, history, language, memory and other characteristics of human
life and human destiny; 99 essentially evolving towards a science of normalcy from which
humankind can benefit.
In that vein, Prainsack aptly points out that advances in clinical genetic analyses often
disclose incidental findings of information relating to conditions beyond what was intended by
the test.100 It is presumed, however, that the testing and the desire to extract important
information from the genetic fingerprint is an expression of the person’s autonomy and free-will,
is validated by informed consent, and it serves the best interest of the test taker to receive the
unlocked secrets about themselves. When that information potentially concerns the health of
others such as monozygote siblings or other filial relationships, or when it reveals information
concerning paternity or ancestry, the ethical, social and psychological effects of knowing that
information on such stakeholders are not trivial. 101 Whether one’s autonomous right to obtain
their own genetic secrets should include preventing disclosures to family members who may
share that genetic link is at the center of the ethical dilemma. To that end, relational autonomy or
feminist ethics suggests people also have moral responsibilities to each other because they stand
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in relationship with each other; they have an interest in maintaining family and community
relations. In short, one person’s choices affect another person’s autonomy. 102
Consider how the duty to warn, which exempts hardline confidentiality in order to protect
third parties, is dependent upon the patient’s voluntary disclosure of her secrets and consent to
subsequent re-disclosure. This duty to warn balances the patient’s expectations of confidentiality
against harm to third parties. However, genomic analytic techniques provide insight into
unanticipated findings concerning potential health conditions that could affect and harm third
parties and family members; particularly if the predisposition to the condition remained
unrealized and unmanaged. 103 The moral predicament for the physician is exacerbated when the
patient refuses to share information concerning the risky hereditary condition.
While knowledge of the unanticipated predisposition to disease or disability may prevent
eventual harm to the third party or their offspring if acted upon, unsolicited disclosure of disease
susceptibility may also create more psychological harm to them than benefit. 104 Clearly, there
are legitimate beneficent reasons for disclosing such information to third parties. However, what
demands equal attention, in terms of assessing arguments from beneficence and nonmaleficence, is the family member who, because of the information learned, has been
unwittingly placed in a precarious state of mind. The bell cannot be un-rung.
3. E. 2. The Right to Be Forgotten
To that end, in a world where wearable devices and the Internet of Things gather and
store digital information on everyone, the increased aggregation of “the quantified self” portends
that people will know things about themselves that were never before contemplated. 105 The
ubiquity of the digital data environment means that a person’s genomic information may also be
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accessible outside of the HCO as well. Moreover, the commercialization of genomics, and the
explosive fetish for personal ancestry and do-it-yourself genomic testing information, suggests
that an unmet need to know more about one’s genomic profile, may have been satisfied. 106 It
may be argued, however, that persons may obtain information about themselves that they would
prefer not knowing, particularly if certain of their genetic factors produce characteristics
associated with unexpected groups of people. 107 Ross suggests that even though most of this
commercial genomic testing information provides a mere snapshot, and not the full genomic
sequencing, there is great potential for false worry and misinformation. 108
This potential for false worry is ever present with genetic analysis performed within
clinical settings as well. Consciously avoiding harms from worry and anxiety is the preeminent
ethical justification for a physician to withhold the truth from their patients. While veracity and
truth-telling are essential to respect autonomy, the matter of disclosing genomic information
brings to bear the distinction between telling the truth, and the right to the truth. And while the
right to be told the truth is a core component of informed consent, clinicians are confronted with
the moral dilemma to determine when it is right and just to be told something less. 109
Selective non-disclosure of certain information that, in the physician’s professional
judgment, may be detrimental to her patient, is not new. But Lunshof and Chadwick point out
that the therapeutic privilege may not be justified in an age of participatory healthcare where
stakeholders’ voices are encouraged. 110 Moreover, the therapeutic privilege does not address the
detriment to the non-patient; especially when they are a family member.
Much of the moral dilemma confronting the physician who straddles the duty of
confidentiality and the duty and obligation to disclose, or not to disclose genomic information,
lies in the fact that medicine has changed. Sheila Jasanoff contends that the primary mission of
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medicine, to make sick people well and to enable the apparently well, but at-risk, to remain
healthy is vexed by genetic science. “Knowing bodies in a new way, through a person’s genetic
code, opens up the prospects for unprecedented intrusions on cherished rights of liberty, equality
and privacy” 111 which the physician, and even the HCO leader, must now factor into their
decisions. The physician not only must consider these consequences as they relate to his patient,
but also through the lens of someone he may not know.
Frequently cited justifications for disclosing genetic information to family members
include the importance of conveying reproductive risks of inheritable conditions in order to
enable timely reproductive decisions. 112 In addition, it has been argued that genetic information
is familial rather than personal and therefore is communal in nature and, and to not share it with
at-risk family members would be selfish. 113 In either case, it is widely recognized that, at the
very least, the physician has an ethical obligation to attempt to persuade the patient to discuss the
hereditary risk with the affected family members. 114 The success of these persuasive attempts,
while difficult to assess, underscore the critical role that the physician plays in respecting the
ethics of secrecy hidden within the patient’s family tree; the roots of which encroach upon the
privacy of all of those identified.
3. F.

Privacy
Privacy is a timeless concept. Judith Decrew asserts that the earliest expressions of

privacy date back to antiquity, and beyond. 115 Shame and its association with good and evil has
been a consequence of privacy invasions since Adam and Eve took to wearing fig leaves. 116
Noah further exhibited shame, anger and a preference for decency over his bodily privacy, when
he discovered how his sons treated his unanticipated nakedness.117 Even the political divide
between the public and private spheres of life, espoused by Aristotle, bespeaks of a desire to
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shield citizens from unwarranted intrusions. And, of course, humans have been whispering what
they don’t want others to hear since they began communicating with words and sounds.
Notwithstanding its persistence for thousands of years, and despite the eager willingness of
people to decry violations to their individual privacy today, it is not a concept that is well defined
or understood. 118
As demonstrated through history, privacy evokes feeling, and is often defined by that
feeling; in the same way that ‘freedom’ and ‘peace’ are more emotive than precise in their
meanings. This contributes to the disarray that Solove contends is the state of play for privacy
today.119 There are as many definitions of privacy as there are occasions to evoke its feeling.
Considered the founding father of contemporary privacy, Alan Westin taught that privacy is an
“…[i]ndividual’s claim to determine what information about himself or herself should be known
to others…when such information will be communicated or obtained, and what uses will be
made of it by others.” 120 Despite this widely accepted meaning, what besets those who think
about privacy is the need to understand what is at its core, as sensitivities to privacy often go
beyond the act of communicating information. Whether respect for privacy is a moral claim, or
legal one; whether it is an individual, or collective condition, and even the degree to which it is a
societal issue are the ponderings of theorists and advocates.
3. F. 1. Concepts and Values
Westin argued that privacy is a set of expectations created from social values that are
defined by culture. And that it is both a psychological and physical condition originating from
choices and preferences, as well as a right that one has to assert an expectation for legal
protection.121 He believed that privacy debates are infinite, as they are tied to societal norms
supporting human conduct that is acceptable, neutral or advancing the public good. 122 Much of
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the disarray espoused by Solove is fueled by cultural variances driving privacy values and
expectations. Adam Moore takes culture’s influences on privacy a step beyond. He supports the
notion that culture exerts significant influence on privacy, but sees privacy itself as a cultural
universal that drives his compelling theory that privacy is about control.
According to Moore, as a societal value, privacy is a fundamental moral claim that
washes over the various privacy interests and concerns which are innately human, and provides a
necessary equilibrium to the examination of those interests. 123 He calls attention to the fact that
privacy interests speak necessarily to the human need to control one’s world. This includes the
right of control over property and one’s physical world, control over one’s body and its
capacities, the right to control decisions - often referred to as decisional privacy – as well as
control over informational privacy. 124
For Moore, “privacy…is a core human value – the right to control access to oneself is an
essential part of human well-being or flourishing.” 125 Control over what others know about
oneself does not necessarily presuppose an intent to deceive. To the contrary, privacy validates
the innately human need to protect those unique facts that help to construct uniquely human
lives. Moore’s theory is especially appealing in healthcare as its central mission is
complimentary to it - to promote human welfare. The intersection of Moore’s claim of control,
and the acknowledgement of respect for humans is the launching point for Julie Inness’s
intimacy theory of the concept and value of privacy.
Inness posits a non-consequentialist argument that the value of privacy is found in the
moral duty to respect individuals as loving, liking and caring, autonomous and rational beings
with the capacity to freely choose, and to form and develop close relationships. 126 She accepts
the notion that claims to privacy are moral claims to control aspects of life, as well as to separate
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oneself from certain life conditions. But she suggests that merely exercising control over access
to information, to oneself, or the intimate decisions of the person, are individually too narrow,
and collectively too broad. 127 Instead, she refines the moral claim to control over aspects of life
that involve “decisions about intimate information, intimate access and intimate action (emphasis
added).” 128
Intimacy claims, for Inness, are the core of privacy. Whether something is intimate
depends upon the role that the particular aspect of life plays for the individual in furtherance of
that which they love, like, or care about. 129 For example, a patient sharing private aspects of her
life with her physician in the course of treatment is intimate, according to Inness’s theory, in that
she wishes to exercise control while advancing that which she likes – her health – with someone
she has engaged in a caring relationship. The value of intimacy cannot be overstated, and is but
one installment in Anita Allen’s claim for self-directed accountability vis-à-vis personal privacy.
“Privacy,” admits Allen, “is purposely personal.” 130 Yet, privacy is also a foundational
good of our society that is required of freedom, dignity and the preservation of individual and
collective good character. This fundamental good demands of people, in addition to the moral
obligation to respect others’ privacy, “a moral or ethical obligation to protect their own
privacy.” 131 That is to say that while moral duties are typically other-oriented, Allen’s
accountability theory argues that a duty to self, while a second order duty, is necessary to support
the duty to others. 132 Bi-directional privacy accountability is especially cogent in healthcare as
the failure of someone to reasonably protect his own health information from unauthorized use
could foreseeably cause downstream harm to his intimates, or other close associations within his
community. This conflation of other and self-oriented moral agency reflects the importance of
stakeholder accountability in matters of personal privacy.
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3. F. 2. Privacy as a Healthcare Value
Whether the idea of privacy generates an emotional response, or a collective reaction to
specific legal doctrines – or the absence of any such doctrines - privacy remains an amorphous
concept.133 There are, however, applications of personal privacy that are clearly valued for the
ends they achieve. 134 Privacy for the sake of ensuring that people are protected from unwarranted
intrusions into their home, or to their physical person is rooted in the tenets of civilized society.
However, Solove underscores the reality that “the matters we consider private change over
time…because of changing attitudes, institutions, living conditions and technology” 135 and are
often contextual. Yet, few examples of the value of privacy are as controversial as in
contemporary healthcare. How much, and to what extent must stakeholder privacy be protected,
or even sacrificed to ensure that the healthcare organization (HCO) meets its obligations to
deliver care for the common good is an evolving moral dilemma.
Intimate details about a patient’s body, their mind, and all of their life experiences,
including those surreptitious trials that may affect their health and dignity, are bathed in privacy.
In healthcare, physical privacy is understandably limited, though not without reasonable
protections against unwarranted contact or exposure, as are aspects of decisional privacy, which
generally fall within the purview of informed consent. 136 Informational privacy is concerned with
the discipline around preventing unauthorized access, use and disclosure of a person’s protected
health information (PHI). This chapter is concerned with the legal and moral challenges created
by physical, decisional, and informational privacy; although as demonstrated throughout this
writing, the demarcation line between all three is blurring.
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There is great irony in the idea that individual privacy in healthcare is controversial. On
its face, the physician-patient encounter is steeped in privacy protections stemming from the duty
of confidentiality. Presumably, the physical environment also bespeaks of secrecy. As evidenced
by curtains separating patients in the emergency department, imbedded computer monitors
rendered unreadable by snoopers, and increased preference for private inpatient rooms.
“Patients’ privacy in hospital settings is widely recognized as important for patients’ well-being
and satisfaction” 137 In addition, healthcare privacy is heavily regulated in the United States, and
is subject to a wide array of state and federal laws and regulations restricting data use. 138
Nevertheless, the law cannot protect against all of the unintended consequences emanating from
use of health data, nor can compliance with it alone resolve the privacy challenges.
Technology and medical advances, and the insatiable hunger for more data, better data,
and faster access to it nearly always conflict with decades-old laws governing their use. Yet,
nothing can happen without access to data. Every aspect of the transformation of American
healthcare described hereunder is dependent upon better access to patient health information.
The introduction of evidenced-based medicine at the turn of 21 st century medicine, whereby
clinical decisions relied upon research evidence rather than clinician judgement alone, virtually
demanded access to aggregate and unmasked patient information. Eventually evidenced-based
alone gave way to value-based medicine. Value-based medicine is “the integration of best
research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values.” 139 As with the concept of privacy,
value in this sense is a relative term, and has evolved to mean decisions that yield increased life
expectancy and quality of life. 140 The transformation translates to an increased need for more and
more patient data. Accordingly, the shift in focus to a value-based enterprise means that health
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information is, all the more, dominating the list of organizational concerns from the boardrooms
to the operating rooms. 141
3. G. Protected Health Information and the Need to Know
Healthcare is predominantly an information business. Treatment, quality measures,
patient safety, efficacious clinical outcomes, clinical research, and reliance on advanced
technology are merely a handful of the healthcare objectives that depend upon the acquisition
and use of patient information. 142 But personal patient data has not always been the main course
in the information feeding frenzy that is the hallmark of healthcare today. Prior to the
introduction of computerized data in the 1970s, most data sets were created manually from the
individuals treating the patients. 143 As recently as twenty years ago, physician notes and the
mental impressions of his patient encounters were still written by hand, memorialized on paper
and treated with confidential reverence. All of that has changed.
Regardless of its form, patient healthcare information is rich with data that can serve
many purposes. Aside from its clinical attributes, it contains demographic insights, can provide
economic forecasts for the HCO, exposes a financial snapshot of the patient, and can even
include information about U.S. government agencies such as the Departments of Health and
Human Services, and Veteran’s Affairs. Many organizations not in the business of healthcare
collect and use health information from their customers as part of doing business with them;
insurance, financial institutions, education and real estate, to name a few. 144 To that end, the
body politic during the late 1990s, the mobilization of public policy wishing to insulate health
insurance for unwell employees, and even the motivations of the criminal element, whetted
appetites for what would amount to a far-reaching liberation of personal patient information.
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3. G. 1.

Access, Use and Disclosure: Stakeholder Expectations

HIPAA started it all. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996,145 was introduced as part of the Clinton Administration’s attempt to socialize healthcare in
the United States. It brought to light the need to ensure that workers would not lose their health
insurance if they changed jobs, or had pre-existing health conditions. Among the portability
provisions, HIPAA established administrative simplification requirements enabling insurance
claims and payments to process more efficiently between providers and insurance companies.
Establishment of uniform electronic transmittals of transaction code sets provided for greater
ease of sharing patient information. 146
Today, the acronym HIPAA is synonymous with healthcare privacy, yet the Act is not a
per se privacy regulation. In fact, establishing a privacy right was never part of the original
legislative intent. Rather, concern for the privacy of individual medical information was a
regulatory after-thought. As compliance with HIPAA required that volumes of medical
information be converted to rapid-pace electronic transmittals, Congress became increasingly
concerned with the privacy and security of the PHI. Through a series of legislative and executive
missteps, and political posturing, the Department of Health and Human Services promulgated the
HIPAA Privacy Rule (2002) and Security Rule (2005) to address the need for, and create the
individual’s codified right to privacy in their PHI. 147
Since then, controlling how protected health information is accessed, used, stored and
disclosed has become an imperative in contemporary healthcare. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
provides federally protected patient privacy rights to access, amend, restrict and account for
disclosures of their personal health information. 148 Many states also enacted statutes providing
civil and criminal protection against misuse of medical information; as well as laws that afford
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greater privacy protection for certain sensitive medical information such as HIV/AIDS, mental
health, and substance abuse treatment. 149 But policies and regulations don’t protect patient
privacy, or ensure that decisions rendered from data use are also fair and just, people do. Despite
the snarl of privacy regulations, healthcare as a politically-infused industry appears to have
emancipated volumes of patient information.
Although it is a restrictive regulation requiring patient authorization and consent for most
disclosures of PHI to third parties, the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows for a number of exceptions.
Health plans, most providers, and healthcare clearinghouses (“Covered Entities”), are permitted
to access, use and disclose the minimum necessary150 amount of their patient’s PHI without the
patient’s authorization. Specifically, if the disclosure of PHI is for treatment, payment, or any
one of a number of health care operations activities, there is no need to obtain any patient
consent at all. 151 The absence of consent does not itself mean that private information is shared
indiscriminately or without patient awareness, however. Patients are provided notice, have a
right to certain accountings, and in some limited instances may opt-out of the disclosure
altogether.152 Nevertheless, the exceptions to the need for a patient consent in many ways have
swallowed the Rule entirely, thereby unleashing what often appears as an unconstrained flood of
personal health information into the wild. As such, the role of health information, the case for
expanded physician access, and the proliferation of technology that is dependent upon digital
data, are in palpable tension with patient stakeholder privacy preferences, their exercise of
control, and their expectations. 153
3. G. 2. Health Information Technologies
In 2004, the Bush Administration pronounced through Executive Order, that every
American would have an electronic health record by 2014. This Executive Order was motivated
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by the need to improve quality of care and reduce healthcare costs through enhanced clinical
decision making made possible by expanded access to information. In addition it recognized the
need to reduce errors of omission and commission from illegible and poorly handwritten
physician notes and prescription drug orders. All of these digital data sparks ignited and fueled
the world of the electronic health record. 154
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) was
spawned from this Executive Order, and was formally mandated in 2009 through the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). HITECH was
enacted as part of the Obama Administration’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA). Under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services, the ONC has
been charged with constructing and implementing a nationwide health information system
comprised of a variety of information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ONC’s goal
is to have an interoperable health information ecosystem stood up by 2024. 155
ICTs focusing on healthcare including patient registries, adverse-event databases and
data-mining tools156 are being designed, tested and implemented at a pace that is nearly
impossible to accurately gauge in real-time. Personal health records (PHRs), patient portals,
telemedicine delivery channels, and health information exchanges (HIEs) are a few of the most
recognized technologies that rely on acquiring, aggregating and analyzing patient health data to
extract value for a diverse set of stakeholders. The eHealth Exchange™ is an example of a
private sector HIE which transitioned from the ONC in 2012. It is a network of hospitals,
pharmacies, federal agencies, medical groups and dialysis centers spanning all 50 states that
links health data belonging to approximately 100 million patients. 157 Except for the patients,
whose information is automatically pushed to HIE unless they opt-out, all participants mutually
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agree to certain data sharing standards and specifications. The intent is to send and access patient
information in order to reduce costs and improve clinical outcomes, improve patient safety and
facilitate business planning.
The most ubiquitous ICT by far, and the darling of several presidential administrations is
the electronic health record, or EHR. EHRs are anticipated to be longitudinal, comprehensive
and interoperable. That is, they contain PHI attributed to identifiable individuals from cradle to
grave, they include all clinical encounters with wide ranges of providers, and are accessible
electronically by any EHR user to whom access is granted. 158 While each objective of the EHR
carries privacy concerns, the interoperability of technology sought by the ONC, presents the
greatest opportunity for threats to privacy values.
Interoperable technology allows providers who use different electronic health records to
communicate with each other directly through an integrated single EHR. 159 The interoperability
of medical records means that the physician-patient relationship is no longer binary. Nearly all
information conveyed in the course of the treating relationship, presumed to be confidential, will
now be accessed and used by hundreds, if not thousands of entities; many of whom will be
unknown to the patient. Just as important, they will likely only know the patient as an
identifiable data set, and never as a unique and distinct person. And, because of Big Data, the
number of those unknown end users grows exponentially. This should elevate concerns over
stakeholder privacy to a place of prominence within the ethically accountable HCO.
3. H.

Big Data, Big Opportunities
Evidence and value-based approaches to healthcare management, and provider payment

incentives made on the basis of good health outcomes rather than merely the volume of services

134

provided, necessitates analysis of considerable volumes of stakeholder clinical data. Preventive
medicine, public health initiatives, and innovations in biomedical technology similarly rely upon
analysis of health information. Accordingly, Big Data is, in measurable ways, an instrumental
disruptor in healthcare today. 160 It exerts tremendous influence on advances in medicine and care
delivery, how healthcare stakeholders wield power, the unavoidable privacy tradeoffs, and the
limitations of existing laws to address those tradeoffs. Big Data is widely understood to mean
“large, diverse, complex, longitudinal and/or distributed data sets” that are generated from a wide
variety of digital sources such as email, Internet transactions, sensors and connected devices. 161
However, what really matters about Big Data is not so much what it is, but rather how it is
used.162 The panoply of uses are limited only by the innovations of the human mind.
Very few, if any, of the downstream uses of healthcare Big Data are contemplated or
understood at the time the patient grants her informed consent for treatment. Assume for the sake
of argument that the patient sufficiently understood the cornucopia of purported Big Data health
benefits and attendant uses of her information. To be fully informed, she must also understand
that her data could potentially reside in a repository that can be accessed, ingested, interpreted
and even identified by any researcher anywhere in the world, for any number of downstream
uses.163 Moreover, even data that is publicly available through social media and other Big Data
digital environments can reveal personal traits that patients may not have intended to be public
when sophisticated computational techniques are applied to it. 164 Yet, these menaces to privacy
cannot eclipse the reality that Big Data use can benefit important facets of human life in
innumerable ways.
3. H. 1.

Big Data: Defined, Connected, and Exposed
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Big Data is often defined contextually according to how it is used. In such instances the
term is used synonymously with ‘Big Data analytics’ to describe the practice of combining
“volumes of diversely sourced information” which are then analyzed using algorithms to assist
decision making. 165 And, there is virtually no limit to the diversity of the data that populates the
Big Data environment; and it is not all attributed to natural persons. That is, sensors that track
the weather, the timing of streetlights, and home security systems share a commingled data
community with information from EHRs, smartphones, and motor vehicle global positioning
systems, to name just a very few.
Nearly everything about the way that we acquire data, and the knowledge produced from
it in the 21st century has changed. The Internet of Things (IoT), the relatively familiar term used
to describe, “…[t]he ability of devices to communicate with each other using embedded sensors
that are linked through wired and wireless networks” 166 further increased the exponential
explosion of digitized data. According to Alec Ross, approximately ninety percent of the
world’s digital data has been created in just the few years since 2014. 167 Being connected is
ubiquitous, and getting connected has never been easier. The Internet, social media, tens of
thousands of mobile applications, commercial and government databases, and nearly every
modern convenience is Internet-enabled – from coffee pots to condoms - and dumps digital
information into to the universe of Big Data. Big Data is obese; and it is gaining weight by the
nanosecond.
According to European Data Protection Supervisor, Giovanni Buttarelli, “By 2020
connectivity is predicted to become a standard feature, with 25 billion connected objects…They
will be able to detect blood clots and monitor fitness and wound healing” 168 among other things.
The permeation of healthcare data into the Internet connected universe, in tandem with
136

government’s appetite for “interoperative and electronic access to data across a myriad of
information systems” 169 offers societal benefits unmatched through any other means. By
amassing large quantities of data, valuable health insights will be gained from granular data
points. In other words, by having a haystack, data scientists can find the needle they seek. 170 Yet,
without a framework for balancing Big Data’s societal benefits against the individual and
community stakeholder, and societal harms from misguided and malevolent use,171 the Big Data
haystack could function more like a hornet’s nest.
For example, the ubiquity of cloud computing – storing data on connected networks via
the Internet – is appealing to the HCO. However, the fact that many cloud providers provide
multitenancy data storage, that is, many clients sharing data space on the same pieces of
hardware (public cloud), rather than solely occupied (private) storage 172 is hardly if ever,
understood by the patient. Cloud providers frequently store patient data in countries outside the
United States, where they can be further accessed by sources unknown to the patient.
In addition, big datasets stored on mobile computing devices are susceptible to accidental
loss or theft. 173 As Verizon unveiled in its 2017 report, healthcare was distinguished as a top
industry for data loss in 2016.174 The risk of loss of aggregated and identifiable patient data from
Big Data sources adversely affects more than the HCO and the impacted patients directly. It
impacts the physician-patient relationship particularly, and the integrity of healthcare’s
reputation generally. The mere threat of a loss is sufficient to reshape the patient’s willingness to
share sensitive information with their physician. 175
3. H. 2. The Big Data Haystack
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Recording data about the world is nothing new. Since earliest man painted his
experiences on cave walls, humans have kept records. But never before has recorded
information been thrust upon humankind with such unprecedented volume, with such a diverse
variety, and with such velocity as in the present digital information age. 176 The nearly continuous
generation of data from limitless connected sources offers society theory-free objective sources
of knowledge largely because “data can offer connections that radiate in all directions.” 177 As the
availability of clinical data connections expand, clinical decisions can be made based upon
inferential connections, as well as the experiences reported by colleagues with similarly situated
patients in real-time.178 The direct and indirect health benefits to patients from this new way of
creating knowledge are unquantifiable. And, in many ways, so are the harms.
Not all health information is subject to protection from unauthorized disclosure under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule. HIPAA only protects PHI created, used and disclosed by and between
Covered Entities. Medical information websites, health chat rooms, medical apps and online
genetic testing sites may be subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consumer protection,
but are not necessarily subject to use restrictions. 179 What this means is that health and wellness
data sets that were uploaded from personal connected devices, that were not intended to be used
to make inferential medical decisions, are vulnerable to such uses.
Maintaining good health means more than disease management. More than ever it
includes a focus on preventive health and disease avoidance, which looks to personal lifestyle
choices and preferences, family ancestry and other social determinants, to predict and address
health issues and outcomes. 180 As such, data from Internet-enabled activity trackers that measure
how much a person walks, eats, sleeps, and sits idle can be aggregated and accessible to that
person’s physician. He can then make wellness-related assumptions about his patient, even when
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she is not seeking treatment from him. In addition, Internet-enabled household items, such as the
‘smart’ refrigerator, can alert a person when they are out of a particular item such as their
favorite ice cream, or triple-cheese pizza. With access to accurate data logs, health insurance
companies may be able to assess the healthiness of their members’ diets and perhaps correlate
the size of their grocery list to the size of their insurance premiums. 181
Although nearly all privacy laws require some form of individual notice and consent, or
authorization when those who acquire data seek to use it for a particular purpose, the sheer
number of data users renders consent impracticable and unmanageable in the Big Data
context.182 The Big Data universe is not an individual-centered environment. Moreover,
individual data subjects who consent to having their data digitally connected through their
Internet-enabled ‘smart’ devices typically are not afforded the opportunity to question the
secondary or tertiary third-party uses of their data once they are connected.
Nor would they necessarily contemplate how much of their personal identity, and their
closely held secrets could be revealed through manipulation of their unstructured and even
anonymized data. Cynthia Dwork illustrates the power of linkage attacks – the ability to connect
auxiliary information from one privately connected source, to data from other databases – in
order to identify individuals and their sensitive information; including their personal health
records.183 In short, current privacy laws are not likely to resolve the phenomenon of Big Data
vis-à-vis the patient expectation of privacy dilemma. 184 The laws and ethical practices must first
be recalibrated in order to coexist with algorithmic decision making and artificial intelligence.
3. I.

Algorithmic Decisions
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What are likely the most appealing attributes of Big Data for business and governments
are its ability to monitor human behavior individually and collectively, in addition to its
predictive capability. It is important to recognize that the bigness of Big Data is not so much that
data is massively amalgamated for anyone to remove pieces and chunks as desired. Rather, the
bigness refers to its nearly irrepressible capabilities. Capabilities which “connect disparate
datasets through algorithmic analysis” that cobble together unpredictable relationships from data
collected at various times and places, in various forms and formats, drawing inferences for a
myriad of purposes. 185
Algorithms draw from and feed off of an ever-expanding universe of data about persons
and weigh them against prescribed metrics, in order to arrive at computer-generated, rather than
human-contemplated decision making. Within healthcare, predictive algorithms provide
decision-support tools for physicians whenever they face uncertainty or clinical ambiguity.
There are unlimited algorithmic possibilities. For example, algorithms can predict the risk of
patient readmission in patients with heart failure. They can also predict the risk of neonatal
infection which could influence the physician’s decision whether or not to prescribe costly and
potentially unnecessary antibiotics. 186 Predictive algorithms are also highly effective in
expediting research and development of new drugs and related clinical treatment pathways by
eliminating time constraints, and human-induced delays. These results can run through a
database, and algorithms will identify relevant trials for cancer patients with particular types of
tumors.187 As more and more mathematical algorithms replace human discernment and
contemplation, humans will move away from making their own decisions, and move towards
“tools that make decisions without a person in the loop.” 188
3. I. 1. Real Data…Artificial Intelligence
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“Data is not information, information is not knowledge, knowledge is not understanding,
and understanding is not wisdom.” 189 By describing the world of information according to what
it is not, Clifford Stoll illustrates that knowledge obtained from information requires a process of
applied learning and continual improvement, and refinement of data. All with the goal of
achieving some great outcome. 190 The evolutionary progression from raw data to knowledge and
then to action is typically the purview of the data scientists whose job it is to pour over and tease
through terabytes of data in order to interpret and analyze presumably for some anticipated good
of the organization and its stakeholders. Today, algorithmic decision making is an inflection
point in information processing and provides the means for decisions that were once made by
data scientists to be made by computer systems. 191
An algorithm, in computer science, refers to a well-defined set of facts or rules that are to
be followed in order to accomplish a particular goal or calculation. The rules themselves are
resident within a system’s source code which provide the fuel for what is recognized today as
machine learning, 192 or the ability to perform activities based solely on recognition of data
patterns. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, machine learning (ML) and
artificial intelligence (AI) are not the same.
Artificial intelligence is a broad concept that describes the ability for a device to act
‘smart’ or intelligently, as a human would. 193 It is an area of computer science that seemingly
gives machines the ability to mimic cognitive functions normally attributed only to the human
mind; essentially imitating human intelligence. 194 Generalized artificial intelligence is a type of
AI that includes ML. Machine learning gets its education from continually correcting and
improving upon the accuracy of the probabilities and predictions it makes, thereby refining its
decision making capabilities. For example, smartphone technology becomes obsolete almost
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immediately as its decision making and task-performing functionality becomes refined through
enhanced ML. Applied artificial intelligence refers to the application of machine learning to
perform specific acts, such as autonomous driving vehicles or drone navigation, to name only a
few.195 As more information about physical interactions and private facts are digitized, digital
records of these facts and whereabouts procreate and propagate, and artificial intelligence tells
humans what do and how to do it, humans will make decisions according to direction provided
by a machine. Not only will machines make decisions, they will also perform activities that were
once solely within the province of humans.
Artificial intelligence is the single most important tool in the delivery of healthcare today.
Unleashing algorithms to identify patterns within haystacks of data is accelerating the science
and practice of medicine. By accelerating delivery times beyond that which human intervention
alone demands, machine learning and artificial intelligence have revolutionized healthcare.
Consider how the now notorious collaboration between Google’s artificial intelligence subsidiary
DeepMind and the Royal Free London National Health Service Trust, defined a “national
algorithm” to detect acute kidney injury (AKI) and transmit suspected AKI to a clinician’s
mobile device. 196 In addition, one of the most ballyhooed artificial intelligence tools to enter the
physician’s world was IBM’s signature brand – Watson.
Through its collaborative partnerships with medical laboratories, oncologists, hospitals
and elite cancer institutes, IBM amassed and procured massive amounts of data for ingestion into
its Watson supercomputer. Watson’s artificial intelligence was initially a boon to healthcare. It
was purportedly designed to offer genomic sequencing and diagnostic analysis to oncologists in
order to make advanced diagnosis, precision medicine and treatments accessible to patients who
may not otherwise have access to such exclusive care. 197 In reported test cases on 1000 cancer
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diagnosis, Watson’s treatment plans matched those of the oncologists. In cases where Watson
recommended treatments that physicians missed, it was because Watson had ingested research
papers that the oncologists had not yet read. 198 As a critical tool, artificial intelligence provides
incalculable good to healthcare. As an unchecked weapon, it can do great harm.
3. I. 2. Ceding Control…Enabling Discrimination
Throughout the history and evolution of humankind, the authority to choose for oneself,
and the respect for free will has been cherished as the most revered source of human authority. 199
Such humanism also undergirds healthcare, as autonomy and the control over one’s body, as well
as the private information about oneself is inextricably attributed to respect for human dignity.
Yet, as Schneier asserts, civil society often requires that people cede power and control over
themselves to others, despite the inherent risk in doing so. 200
As dataism, which sees the world and its decision making power as a series of data flows,
dominates the universe, it argues that humans will no longer be able to see clear of all of the
information available to make decisions. Dataists argue that at some point, the algorithms will
know a person better than they know themselves. Therefore control over decision making will be
ceded to artificial intelligence. 201 While this insurgent view has not been fully actualized, it is
fair to say that in healthcare, a large part of decision making control has been ceded to
algorithmic analysis; but such relinquishment is not necessarily done at the will of the patient.
With the advent of the interoperable electronic health record, many HCOs use risk
engines to apply algorithms across all forms of medical information about their patients. Health
information is combined internally with other data points. Data points, commonly referred to as
social determinants of health, include environmental and lifestyle factors that can be used to
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determine health outcomes for individuals and populations. 202 When coupled with data from
medical interventions, they create a neatly packaged predictive profiles of the probable diseases
and other maladies that could affect the patient based on the algorithmic output. There is also a
lucrative commercial market for ancestry related data that is similarly reconstituted and sold to
physicians who then use the predictive dashboards to help their patients. 203 Big Data analytics
can not only open predictive doors that can help people live longer and flourish, it can
discriminate.
Paul Ohm contends that “Although we have banned discrimination based on race, Big
Data helps companies find a reasonable proxy for race.” 204 There are enough unregulated data
elements available today that even if a data source did not specifically contain protected
information about a person, sufficient quantities of unregulated data elements about that person
can make it possible to derive the protected information. Moreover, despite its near-perfect
machine translation, the algorithmic thought process is subject to spurious correlations that could
have adverse consequences for the patient. 205 As such, algorithmic inferences can incite the
weaponization of data. Unchecked inferences and unsubstantiated data insights can be
powerfully and permanently destructive to the human being who exists on the other side of the
algorithm.
These big-data inspired inferences fuel decision-making from which actions are taken
that may help as well as harm the person. Barocas and Nissenbaum aptly argue that Big Data
analytical insights from tracked and recorded details of human behavior present threats to
fundamental values such as, fairness, due process, and perhaps most importantly, privacy. 206
Ironically, those values, the very ones compromised by certain analytical insights, are the precise
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principles that will ensure that collectively, data can benefit society while protecting
individuality.
When considering data-driven discrimination, what is conspicuous by its absence from
the Big Data haystack, algorithmically driven innovation and machine inspired decisions is
human moral judgment. The ethical challenge for algorithmic decisions is to inculcate moral
judgment – that uniquely human capability - into the Big Data universe. For according to
Purves, Jenkins and Strawser, “[h]uman moral judgment is not codifiable, i.e., it cannot be
captured by a set of rules. Moral judgment requires…the ability to perceive certain facts as moral
considerations.” 207 Such is the impetus for establishing and implementing an ethical framework
for Big Data use generally, and healthcare information particularly.
3. J.

Ethical Guidance
The fear of intrusive technology and the nosiness of the press plagued the minds of

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis little more than a century ago. Their prescient paranoia
argued for one of the most fundamentally human rights in American jurisprudence – the right to
be let alone. 208 Intrusive and invasive technology, and the nosiness of governments, scientists,
clinicians, hospital executives, marketers, and actuaries ought to invoke similar healthy paranoia
in stakeholders of today. The future of privacy in healthcare is being transformed from the
maturation of a legal right, to the respect for human flourishing in a digitally networked world.
The erosion of individual control exacerbated by artificial intelligence and robotics, facial
recognition, undetected wearable technology, augmented realities and even transhumanism
threatens to invade and alter the sanctity of privacy. It is apparent, more so than ever, that the
ethical commitment to privacy as an indivisible constituent of human dignity is a constant that,
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as yet, cannot be digitalized. Ethical decisions and moral judgment requires human influence. So
much so, that privacy is revitalizing the field of ethics. According to Forrester Research, “ethical
privacy practices will be the next consumer-driven, values-based source of differentiation” 209
between HCOs and other derivative stakeholders or competitors.
There is an acute and urgent demand for a practical and comprehensive ethical
framework for accountable leaders to follow in order to harmonize the voracious hunger to
understand infinite points of healthcare data, with patient autonomy, dignity and personhood.
Yet, there is currently little consensus on how to approach applied ethics in this new age. What is
clear, however, is that this data-driven world that is devoid of moral judgment must regain
human accountability. To do that, according to Martin Abrams, “it will be necessary to depend
on people to build ethics into the objectives for the systems through accountable data
governance…that ensures the outcomes are legal, fair and just to the various stakeholders.” 210
3. J. 1. Accountability and Data Ethics
The data that is created for and about patients every second of every day will continue to
persist under the control of others211 whose relationship to the HCO and to its patient
stakeholders is increasingly distanced and attenuated. This attenuated control threatens patient
stakeholder autonomy; a central principle of privacy, as well as of common morality illustrated
through healthcare ethics. The threat to patient autonomy is but one of the ethical dilemmas that
accountable HCO leadership must solve for when they seek to harness the power of Big Data for
the benefit of many stakeholder interests.
As illustrated, the ethical justification for recognizing individual privacy as a moral duty,
a social value espoused for the common good, and a core human desire to control access to
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oneself in order to catalyze human flourishing rests upon respect for individual dignity. As such,
ensuring that data is used and managed ethically on behalf of stakeholder interests necessitates
the creation of an ethical framework that considers what is legal, fair, and just. In support of this
assertion, Buttarelli contends that objectification – using a person or their information as a tool to
serve someone else’s purposes – which is the undercurrent of Big Data analytics - is a violation
of privacy and human dignity. 212 His position, of course, is representative of the view espoused
by the European Union, and numerous other countries, which considers privacy a fundamental
right of all humans, in contrast to the United States’ patchwork of privacy laws. Nevertheless,
Big Data analytics and algorithmic decision making is a global phenomenon. And as such, the
appreciation for principles of fairness and justice must transcend jurisdictional and geographic
limitations thereby encouraging an international commitment to ethical principles of accountable
data stewardship.
Despite the inherent limitations of regulations as a mechanism for protecting privacy,
there is a basis in law, both domestically and internationally, for principles of fairness and
justice. Originally promulgated in 1973 by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(now the Department of Health and Human Services – DHHS) the Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPS) became the cornerstone set of principles for personal data collection and
creation of record keeping systems. 213 Concerned with individual rights, the FIPPs evolved and
became the prime influencer of a number of standards adopted by the ONC, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the ONC, and the FTC, to name just a few.
However, the FIPPS were designed to empower consumers with the limited ability to control
information through notice and choice, but do little to ensure information disclosed is not used in
unfair or harmful ways. 214
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What is fair or unfair is often as difficult to define as any of the other concepts advanced
throughout this chapter thus far. For behavior to be unfair according the FTC, the practice must
cause substantial injury that cannot be reasonably avoided by the individual and is not
outweighed by the benefits. 215 Proving legal injury in Big Data misuse is tenuous at best, as the
customary litmus test is most often economic harm. In other contexts, fairness also presupposes
that the benefits inured are outweighed by the risks and do not create biases that disadvantage the
benefactor or beneficiary.
However, in the Big Data space, Solove argues that the harm from unfair data use is a
dehumanizing effect on people. Because data emanating from aggregated databases “fails to
capture the texture of our lives. Rather than provide a nuanced portrait of our personalities, they
capture the stereotypes and the brute facts without the reasons.” 216 Accordingly, to preserve the
cherished texture of their patients’ lives and to ensure fairness in the use of their data,
accountable healthcare leaders must consider the privacy rights and interests of this stakeholder
group when setting data use and strategy policies. Such reflective consideration must include any
adverse consequences that are readily foreseeable, as well as those less so. Ethical principles
respecting autonomy, fairness and justice, as well as assimilation of the norms driving these
principles, must be baked into data policies that afford such consequential reflection.
One way accountable HCOs can transform their ethical approach to using patient data in
the digital information age is to reframe their overall data strategy through implementation of an
enterprise-wide code of data ethics. Adherence to ethical codes is a marker of accountability in
many professions, and is most profoundly present in healthcare. Accordingly, a code of data
ethics would create a “forum to translate identified ethical principles into defined ethical actions
and practices in their organizations as part of their information governance model.” 217 As
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illustrated in earlier chapters, the ethical character and culture of an HCO reflects its most
significant norms and values. Similarly, according to O’Keefe and O’Brien, “[a]n ethical
framework in the context of modern information management will need to consider
organizational values, processes and development of technology in the context of fundamental
ethical principles such as human rights and dignity.” 218 This presupposes that such code would
provision ethical reviews and consultations of particular data uses, processes, and activities.
Ethical data reviews may result particular uses deemed necessarily off limits 219 for the sake of
patient dignity, and alignment with institutional norms and values.
3. J. 2 Recalibration: Reshaping Our Norms
Westin wrote that the norms of privacy in society depend upon political, sociocultural
and personal settings. 220 Schneier’s perspective similarly contends that norms of personal privacy
are cultural and situational – changing across generations. 221 This observation is well-grounded
and validated as witnessed by society’s undaunted reliance on and ubiquity of the smartphone
camera today, in contrast to Warren and Brandeis’ virulent distrust of the Kodak ‘snap camera’
in 1890. This dissertation suggests that privacy norms are contextual, too. As such, the privacy
offenses in healthcare data are likely to have a greater gravitational pull on one’s senses than
exposure to political thoughts, online shopping habits, and vacation spots might. The
vulnerability and fragility of human dignity that is constituent of the healthcare experience
context is sufficient to ignite deep emotional responses to violations of that dignity.
Nevertheless, the constellation of digital data footprints that are left everywhere, by
virtually everyone, seems to suggest that few people are likely to ponder, or even consider where
their data is, where it is going, or how it is used today. As a consequence, expectations of privacy
have been reoriented such that most people believe they have less privacy today, instead of
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more.222 What matters most about this reorientation, aside from the danger of privacy apathy, is
the need to recalibrate today’s privacy norms, rather than dismiss them as meaningless. We may,
in fact, have less privacy today, but there has hardly been a time in in history when we need it
more than now.
Inviolate respect for privacy engenders patient trust in the HCO, and its leadership. At the
heart of trust generally is the act of surrendering control to another. In addition to surrender,
Malhotra’s view that it is the willingness to be “vulnerable to the discretionary behavior of
others…based upon the positive expectations regarding the other person’s motivations and/or
behavior.” 223 Human beings trust with their hearts and their heads, and that is particularly
important as privacy is both a feeling as well as a right. Patient trust also relies mightily up the
hearts and heads of the clinicians and executive leadership. However, algorithms, which are
emerging as dominant decision makers, and machine learning tools, predict and inform without
human feeling or thinking.
Going forward in an age of Big Data, artificial and machine-driven decision-making, and
continuously innovative advanced analytics means that normative conceptions of privacy and
trust, must change. Patient stakeholders may eventually be expected to accept that they are
vulnerable to the discretions and indiscretions of algorithmic-generated intelligence. And while
surrendering control to an algorithm cannot replace trust in another human being, patients ought
to begin to recognize that machine learning is, at the very least, a derivative stakeholder to the
contemporary HCO. Realistically, artificial intelligence and machine learning are not going to
replace physicians, but they will most definitely modify what a physician needs to know, as well
as what will occupy their time. 224
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Humankind’s necessary coexistence with Big Data vis-à-vis those aspects of life which
are entitled to privacy protection will necessarily entail a shift in norms. Alec Ross boldly warns
that as information about our fallibilities, flaws, fantasies and foibles becomes accessible and
indelibly preserved in Big Data, the greater the likelihood that the things we prize as novel or
even scandalous will eventually be neither. 225 Nothing is likely to surprise anyone anymore –
including those unique aspects of being human which are most cherished. He further observes
that even “serendipity fades with everything we hand over to algorithms.” 226 Cohabitation in
harmony with Big Data will mean that humans must fill the moral gaps left by algorithmic
decision making. Decision makers must realize the need to exercise their moral judgments in
place of that which artificial and machine interventions cannot do. When that happens, patient
privacy will embrace a world of artificial intelligence that affords humankind the opportunity to
be more authentically human.
3. K. Conclusion
Keeping secrets is innately human. Secrets afford individuals the opportunity to control
aspects of their life and to establish necessary boundaries between themselves and society. 227 If
Franklin’s cynical observations were true, the unconditional inability to keep secrets would
pervert trust and confidence in healthcare, and would create an impenetrable barrier to necessary
transparency. Such a barrier would degrade if not destroy the quality of the relationship between
the physician and patient and the resulting care.
Nevertheless, many secrets are no longer binary between the patient and her physician.
Many features of modern medicine present challenges to patient confidentiality. Among those
features, the contemporary healthcare environment is both enriched and complicated by a data-
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driven hunger supported by advances in digital technology such that, “secrets get exposed sooner
than they used to…making them harder to keep.” 228
Of the many challenges that the information age imposes on healthcare stakeholders, the
ability to maintain the seal of confidentiality concerning patient secrets is paramount. It is
supported, in many cases, by law, ethical principles, and by the seal of privileged
communications which protect against arbitrary disclosure. The universal principles of respect
for autonomy, beneficence, and non-maleficence are the primary justification for confidentiality
based upon what is best of the person 229 and considered in concert with the specific contexts of
the clinical setting.
With few exceptions, most stakeholders are autonomous, and they require sufficient
information to make sound decisions. 230 Informed consent necessitates that the physician
understand the autonomous voice of his patient when determining what she needs to know in
order to consent to treatment, and to the sharing of her secrets. For the most part, the duty of
confidentiality, the expectation of the patient, and the sufficiency of information necessary to
confer informed consent, are formulated and executed on behalf of the patient. However, third
party stakeholder interests often present compelling and legitimate threats to the principle of
confidentiality.
From its earliest days, the secrets shared in the psychotherapeutic setting were sacrosanct.
Many of the truths revealed through the therapist/patient relationship may not even have been
recognized or known by the patient at the time that informed consent was given, as
psychotherapy is in many ways a deliberate process of mining for secrets. The duty to protect
these secrets are derived from professional codes, ethical principles, as well as by sources of law.
The duty to warn – resulting from the seminal Tarasoff rule – considers public beneficence as
152

compelling justification sufficient to override patient confidentiality; imposing a mental health
professional’s duty to potentially unknown third parties, in addition to that which he owes to his
patient.
As such, the tension between the clinician’s allegiance to his patient, and the third-party
interests of other stakeholders, is central to the ethical justification for sharing genomic
secrets.231 Advances in genomic medicine present another set of ethical dilemmas for the
healthcare stakeholder – specifically the physician – with respect to the duty of confidentiality.
For the all the good that genomic medicine promises, the secrets discovered and disclosed place
the physician and the patient in an unprecedented predicament. A predicament that must rely
upon the ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence to determine who has a right to
know those secrets, how much should they know, and to what extent they may elect to forego
knowing the secrets at all. Healthcare is barely approaching the threshold of this new frontier in
medicine and the ethical considerations relating to the confidentiality afforded to these secrets
will emerge along with the science. The ethical obligations to these varied stakeholders will rely
upon deliberate moral decision making; which includes respect for the ethics of secrecy.
The relationship between the patient and her doctor is crowded. They are no longer a
pair. Rather, their encounters are part of a complex constellation of data sharing potentially
exposing the secrets exchanged that were once presumed sacred. Impugning the presumption
that the law and common morality alone would prevent such intrusion into a patient’s most
intimate matters, privacy as an inviolable legal as well as moral claim in healthcare is close to
extinction.
There is a powerful push for interoperable everything, and ubiquitous digital technologies
that force patient data into environments that are not individual-centered and lack the capacity to
153

respect the patient need for autonomy and individual control. Flooded with Big Data from
incalculable sources, healthcare decisions that once were the province of human beings are
subordinated to technologies powered by algorithms, artificial intelligence, and machine learned
tools. Thus, there is a rapid erosion of the time-held demarcation lines between a patient’s
physical, decisional and informational privacy rights and entitlements. The absence of clear
boundaries presents moral challenges and conflicts for the healthcare professional, the HCO, and
stakeholders who entrust their secrets to them.
The ethically accountable HCO has a moral duty to its stakeholders to invest in a data
strategy that advances, at its core, principles of data ethics to reflect respect for the human rights
and dignity of its normative stakeholders. These principles of data ethics are to be embedded
within and throughout the HCO to undergird ethical review and analysis of data uses across the
enterprise. This code of data ethics ought to represent the norms and values of the HCO, as well
as those belonging to its stakeholders. As norms, values and expectations surrounding privacy in
healthcare continue to evolve, ethically accountable leaders must reconcile the tension between
technology and algorithmic decision-making with the recognition that moral judgement is the
province of humans, not machines.
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Chapter 4 – Community Stakeholders in Healthcare: Pediatric Populations
4.

Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is concerned with the HCO’s duty to respond to its

stakeholders and is a continuing commitment to look beyond its core business to the externalities
that affect all its stakeholders and constituents. Pointedly, the morally responsible organization
must realize, understand, and harmonize its decisions amidst the complex interconnectedness
between social and economic forces pressing on its stakeholders. To do otherwise would, as
Freeman predicts, “fail to describe and predict the business world as it really is.” 1 For the sake of
its stakeholders, the HCO cannot afford such a miscalculation.
As such, ethical accountability to stakeholders in healthcare requires a moral commitment
from HCOs to the sustained well-being of the communities they serve. To do so, they must
create opportunities for their normative stakeholders, and most especially the most vulnerable
amongst them, to flourish. As this dissertation argues, providing for the common good is both a
human right inured to the members of society, and a duty to provide for those so empowered.
Since healthcare is a common good of a moral and civil society, 2 principles of stewardship and
the duty to provide for the common good requires a commitment from HCOs to disrupt the status
quo and mobilize change for the good of at-risk stakeholders. To that end, the remainder of this
dissertation explores the HCO’s ethical accountability to ensure access to clinical advances, and
respect for the dignity of stakeholder groups who are the most vulnerable and disempowered
across the life continuum. This chapter is dedicated to the second of the three dissertation
stakeholder categories: the treatment of pediatric populations.
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With a focus specifically at the beginning of the life continuum, this chapter centers its
attention on children and their attendant vulnerability. It commences with an ethical justification
for transcending risk and upholding the moral obligation to promote the engagement of children
in clinical and social research studies. To undergird the ethical arguments advanced, it opens
with an explication of the concept of vulnerability as a condition of humanity 3 as interpreted by
several moral theorists, including Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds. Expanding upon its moral
significance, it then provides a view into the grim history of exploitation surrounding human
subject research, and its evolution into modern day clinical research. It then proceeds through
the development of ethical principles, and regulatory codes and guidelines as they apply to
human subject research generally, and then to children specifically.
Within the context of clinical research, physicians and researchers are often the same
person. They confront moral predicaments when their commitments as treating physicians run
counter to those expected of researchers engaged in scientific inquiry. To illustrate, when
referring to those who participate in research as “subjects,” there is the risk that they will be
become dehumanized somehow; causing researchers to forget humanity and impose less than
ethical procedures. 4 In addition, as moral agents, they must navigate ethical challenges specific
to the clinical, cultural, social, and contextual considerations that are unique to their patients and
subjects, and influence their decisions. These specific research considerations and risks, as well
as an examination of the moral duty of HCOs and their agents to expand opportunities for ethical
research participation5 are explored throughout this chapter. Particularly, it aligns its focus on the
most vulnerable pediatric communities: children and adolescents with HIV, abused and
maltreated children, and those with cognitive disabilities.

163

Recognizing that none of these risks can be completely eliminated, this chapter concludes
that the risks to these children as participants in HIV, child abuse, and cognitive disability
research can be managed and even mitigated. Adoption of the goodness-of-fit model espoused by
leading theorists, including Cecilia Fisher, 6 underscores the moral obligation of the ethically
accountable HCO and its clinician leaders to advocate inclusion and research that respects
human dignity and promotes empowerment. The goodness-of-fit model and ethical commitment
to this community of stakeholders is further explored throughout the remainder of this chapter. It
considers the ethical challenges of pediatric HIV status, as well as strategies for accountable
leaders to mitigate and even prevent the life-threatening adverse effects of abuse, and pediatric
obesity on children.
As a multi-factor condition, pediatric obesity is a public health threat. The second half of
this chapter examines this population through the lens of societal, socio-cultural and
environmental influences. It addresses the ethical and legal strategies for managing pediatric
obesity by describing the problems and societal impacts of the disease generally. It then
considers the various obesogenic environments and community influences that support, enable
and propagate these environments, and the resulting obesity-related medical conditions that can
threaten the life of a child.
While the long-term medical consequences of pediatric obesity are incontrovertible, this
chapter delves deeply into the psychosocial as well as physiological effects of this condition;
particularly in light of Western culture’s obsession with thinness. For many children, being
labeled obese often subjects them to humiliating stigma, prejudice and suffering – coupled with
their medical conditions. 7 These psychosocial consequences most often persist throughout the
child’s life; traversing into adulthood. Since they are socially constructed, these psychosocial
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harms result in social costs that warrant community intervention in executing remediation
strategies.
Because the HCO’s ethical accountability extends beyond its internal stakeholders, it
oftentimes has a moral duty to protect those who cannot yet fully protect themselves. As such,
this dissertation develops and sets forth an argument for principled communitarianism combining
the principles of the duty to do what is good, and to avoid harm, with the individual’s right to be
left alone, and the community’s duty to advance its best interests. To that end, this dissertation
introduces the legal theory of parens patriae to cases of persistent obesogenic environments
engendering medical neglect. It further argues that, as a social parent, 8 the HCO’s moral duty to
protect its pediatric stakeholders involves intervention, and cooperation with its full community.
4. A.

Transcending Risks to Serve the Vulnerable
Centuries before the Information Age, the Enlightenment period triggered humankind’s

desire to discover and uncover the answers to life’s mysteries through inquiry and scientific
thought. One of hallmarks of this historic time was the notion that knowledge is power. It was
believed that knowledge and understanding endowed people with power and control over their
own lives. It was in thinking about the world that humankind recognized its humanness. 9 The
more knowledge humankind acquired and the more it learned about its world, the more apparent
it became that the absence of knowledge precipitated vulnerability, disadvantage, and
disempowerment. Control, manifested through self-determination and autonomy, permitted
enlightened people to rise above oppressive rulers to take dominion over their own lives and
destinies. In many ways, knowledge and power defeated death, and translated into survival.
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Towards the end of this era, survival began to mean more than prevailing against
domination. The same motivation to control and take dominion over human life sparked the
quest to understand the cause and prevention of disease; and “to stamp out or radically limit
death or disease.” 10 Because of its success as a scientific endeavor, the use of human subjects in
clinical and social research initially garnered tremendous enthusiasm and public support.
However, the pursuit of knowledge of the world does not come without risks. While it can help
and heal, the pursuit of knowledge from human research can also bring with it infinite harms that
may disempower specific populations if not obtained ethically. This is particularly true when the
research subjects are members of a highly vulnerable class such as children, and doubly-so when
the children have special needs, diseases, or are victims of abuse.
In addition, society’s long-held preconception that women and children were weak
cloaked them under layers of protections and safeguards that excluded them from involvement in
clinical research trials. Such exclusions resulted in an overall dearth of research on women and
children, and a general lack of clinical understanding of these stakeholder groups; thereby
exposing them to health risks from the absence of meaningful prevention and treatment. Overinclusive protectionist policies also have the effect of expanding determinations of vulnerability
to entire populations of people with such granularity that few potential research candidates are
not classified as vulnerable. Such broad labeling risks rendering the notion of vulnerability
meaningless, or worse, exacerbating the negative consequences of stereotyping and
discrimination. 11 Balancing the rights of vulnerable children to participate in research, providing
sufficient information to them, and protecting them from unreasonable risks and harms are the
principle challenges for conducting this kind of research ethically. 12 This is the charge of morally
accountable leadership.
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4. A. 1.

Understanding Vulnerability and Moral Duty
First appearing in the late 17 th century, the etymology of ‘vulnerable’ stems from the

Latin vulnerare meaning ‘to wound’, and vulnus meaning ‘wound.’ Vulnerability then, is having
the ability or capability to be wounded, and is the meaning adopted throughout this dissertation.
From this perspective, it can be argued that all HCO stakeholders are vulnerable given the nature
of healthcare generally and the power imbalances inherent in its relational contexts. Yet, the
concept of vulnerability in bioethics, and particularly research ethics, has been, and remains the
object of great moral debate. 13 As Ganguli-Mitra and Biller-Andorno point out, “With the
changing face of healthcare and biomedical research in a globalized world, the term ‘vulnerable’
as well as an adequate definition and scope have increasingly come under close scrutiny.” 14
Despite the debate, for purposes of ethical discourse, the concept of vulnerability must appeal to
the protection of all human life broadly, and not just a concern for the human condition.
According to Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, as embodied, social beings with material
and physical dependencies that are both susceptible to and dependent upon environmental and
internal influences, vulnerability is a condition of human life. As such, “within bioethics
vulnerability is variably viewed as an ontological condition of all human existence and as a
marker to identify those who require extra care, where the especially vulnerable are those whose
autonomy, or dignity or integrity are capable of being threatened.” 15 Although humans are
ontologically susceptible to vulnerability, there are contextual considerations that shape various
other theories and characteristics of human vulnerability that extend beyond the aforementioned
threats.
Contingent susceptibility theory suggests that vulnerability is relational. That is to say
that “[i]nequalities of power, dependency, capacity or need render some agents vulnerable to
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exploitation by others.” 16 Such exploitation is enabled precisely because humans are inherently
dependent upon others for care and support in satisfying those needs, and largely exist within
interdependent, relational communities. According to Mullin, “It is our needs that make us
vulnerable...We are therefore, vulnerable to others not only because they may attack or wound
us, but also because our neediness and limited ability to meet our own needs makes us dependent
on others for care…” 17 Children are supreme examples of a population predisposed to contingent
vulnerability theory in this context.
Rogers similarly argues that vulnerability involves two concepts. She contends that the
first concept of universal vulnerability is inherent and inevitable as part of the human condition.
And the second concept of contextual vulnerability “is associated with contextual factors, which
signifies precariousness or greater risks of harms for particular individuals.” 18 Much of what is
understood as vulnerability within healthcare today contemplates this precariousness and looks at
“the social, cultural or economic context the individual finds themselves in, rather than a
stringent categorization measured against the ability to give consent or to make an autonomous
choice.” 19 As Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds suggest, both concepts of vulnerability ought to be
incorporated into ethics of vulnerability discussions. The remainder of this dissertation, through
its arguments for ethical accountability of HCO leadership to its stakeholders, adopts and
advances this blended perspective of vulnerability.
A predominant challenge with contextual vulnerability is that it establishes and attempts
to understand an almost infinite number of characteristics and conditions that comprise and are
unique to vulnerable subgroups. To illustrate, the Belmont Report, the Declaration of Helsinki,
and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Science, all described more fully
hereunder, identify as many as 19 specific populations deemed particularly vulnerable because of
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contingent forms of vulnerability. 20 From the conspicuous continuum of populations such as
children, the elderly, and patients with incurable diseases, to less visible groups of poor people,
nomads or displaced persons, and subordinate members of hierarchical groups, suggests that
there is a layering of conditions. Solbakk suggests that such layered conditions overlap each
other and are both persistent (universal) and variable (accidental or ‘fallen victim’) conditions of
vulnerability; the differentiation signaling the kinds of protection or remediation necessary, and
the rights to which the vulnerable are entitled. 21 Providing for the vulnerable necessitates
identifying the appropriate parties who bear responsibility for them.
Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds contend that two theories undergird the moral obligations
engendered by vulnerability. The first suggests that the vulnerability itself is the source of a
moral obligation, while the second perspective argues that the vulnerability is more akin to a
signal pointing to other moral obligations such as providing for an unmet need, or mitigating or
avoiding harm. 22 Accordingly, it is both the inherent nature of human vulnerability as well as the
situational conditions that give rise to the moral obligation and ethical duty to mitigate threats
and protect the vulnerable. By illuminating Goodlin’s proposition, Mackenzie, Rogers and
Dodds maintain that this duty inures to “anyone who is in a position to assist but most especially
on those to whom a person is most vulnerable. Thus persons who are in positions of power and
authority have special responsibilities…” 23 To understand this within the context of vulnerable
pediatric populations – particularly pediatric research - it is necessary to look at the effects of all
authoritative relationships on the child; primarily HCO leadership which includes clinicians,
researchers, and institutional review boards (IRBs). The remainder of this dissertation
appropriates this theory of moral duty to ethically accountable HCO leadership.
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4. A. 2.

Expanding Medicine through Research, or Exploitation?
In preserving the ancient principle that medicine should do no harm, the practice of

medicine has historically been a patient-centric endeavor supporting the physician’s commitment
to promote health and protect – one patient at a time. The quest for knowledge per se, was rarely
the objective of good medicine. It was a relational and largely paternalistic endeavor. It was the
physician, who in seeking to the protect life and the dignity of her patient, often made decisions
for her on the basis of the best individualized therapy. 24 As the practice of medicine sought to
cure the sick and relieve pain and suffering, research looked to expand knowledge in an effort
eliminate disease globally, understand treatment, and delay or even prevent death. 25 The need
for biomedical research emerged since progress and survival necessitated a broader and more
utilitarian understanding of disease.
Biomedical research came to be defined as those interactions which tested hypotheses
and sought generalizable knowledge about diseases to sustain and enhance the good of society
and humanity by improving the practice of medicine. 26 Although the terms biomedical research
and clinical research are often used interchangeably, the majority of biomedical research is
conducted on animals and their tissue; not human subjects. The outputs of biomedical research
typically support medicine generally. Clinical research, on the other hand, involves humans and
is designed to enhance therapeutic interventions. 27

As such, medical advancements are often

realized from the knowledge obtained from clinical research on human subjects. Unless
otherwise stated, all references to research throughout this chapter shall mean clinical research.
This history of clinical research illustrates how disencumbered desires for such advancements
often created unintended adverse consequences.
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Much of the quest for research-based knowledge throughout the 19th and 20th centuries,
and the medical discoveries made during this period were the collateral effects of wars, military
conflicts, and attempts to understand the casualties associated with them. Although
understanding therapeutic interventions and disease management was indispensable during
military conflict, it was significant in the postwar period as well. Despite the valuable
contributions to medicine that emerged during this time, the crimes against humanity from
unspeakable human experiences occurring behind the front lines remain the hallmark of this
period. Incalculable numbers of human beings were involuntarily selected and exposed to
physical and emotional experimentation designed to test the limits of human tolerance and
biology. Prisoners of war were involuntarily immersed in tanks of ice water to observe the
boundaries of hypothermia, and pressure-chamber experiments were performed on children to
induce epileptic seizures. 28 Dissection and organ extraction of live persons, and the intentional
wounding of women prisoners’ legs in order to understand the efficacy of injected sulphonamide
were but a few of the ghastly and macabre tortures performed in the name of research during
World War II.29 These inceptive days of human subject research drew attention to and
illuminated the fundamental truth that respect for human life could not be forfeited by treating
participants as a means to an end. 30
These fundamental truths provided the backdrop for the groundbreaking Nuremberg
Code, promulgated by U.S. judges following the Nazi trials of World War II. As a foundational
document, it is based upon natural law and human rights, and sets forth basic moral, ethical and
legal concepts undergirding research involving human subjects. 31 A 10-point statement of
principles outlining professional ethics for medical researchers, the Code influenced all
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subsequent standards of conduct for human participant research. 32 A central, and most celebrated
tenant of the Code punctuated the need for participants’ voluntary informed consent.
Notwithstanding the positive influence of the Code, exploitation of humans participating
in research proliferated for decades under the guise of ethical research. As late as the 1970s,
many of these inhumane experiments were discovered and disclosed; revealing questionable
procedures surrounding selection of participants and volunteers as well as deficient or
nonexistent informed consent processes. For example, the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment
remains an example of an indelible moral failing within the United States. Treatment to an
identified population of American black men infected with advanced syphilis was intentionally
withheld in order to gauge progression of the untreated disease. 33 National and international
codes were developed in an attempt to supplement the full and universal adoption of the Code.
Regulations and codified principles defining ethical research, justice in selection, and protocols
to ensure bi-directional flow of information between the researcher and the vulnerable research
subject ensued. 34
4. A. 3.

Rules, Regulations, and Rights
The paternalistic presumption that women and children were vulnerable and therefore

required greater protections, historically excluded them from participation in human research
trials.35 While the desire to protect was laudable on its face, the consequences of exclusion were
that women and healthy children were under-researched and therefore little was known about
them medically. Since the view of ethical human research was largely concerned with
distributing the risk to the sturdiest and most resilient, opportunities to provide needed services
were often missed, as were prospects to avoid harmful ones. Effective treatments, understanding
drug reactions and interactions, the pathology of disease, and safe dosages of medications for
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women and children were virtually unknown 36 while men between the ages of 16-60 were the
most tested. The dearth of information and understanding left them to become therapeutic
orphans.37
However, children who were institutionalized or otherwise deemed defective were not
always orphaned in this way. To the contrary, they were often so dehumanized as to be
considered expendable resources, and victimized as subjects for over-utilization of
nontherapeutic research; research which is not likely to have any direct benefit to the participant
child.38 The horror discovered within the walls of the Willowbrook State School for persons with
intellectual disabilities is an example of the most atrocious abuse of non-therapeutic research on
children since World War II. Resident children were intentionally given the hepatitis virus in
order to understand the effects of gamma globulin on them. 39 Defenders claimed that because the
hepatitis virus was already present throughout the institution, the virus was likely to infect the
children anyway. In many ways, the children became the human experiment. From this flagrant
disregard for human dignity, nontherapeutic research brought to light the notion that a person
could be wronged without necessarily being harmed. Rising public awareness of the exploitation
of these vulnerable children and the sentiments at that time, induced debate and a push for
legislation and guidelines. Such pronouncements shifted the mindset from excluding children
from research as a risk avoidance tool, to one that permitted research but sought fairness in the
distribution of the benefit.40
Following the Nuremberg Code were a series of promulgations which sought to respect
autonomy and human rights while balancing the harm and benefit to protect human research
participants; including children. 41 For example, the Belmont Report, published in 1979 by the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects Biomedical and Behavioral
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Research, codified the moral principles of respect for persons through autonomy, beneficence
and justice, into the bedrock principles of research ethics. 42 This principled approach established
strict criteria for ethical human subject research. For its time, the Report powered a moral stir by
illuminating the practice of selecting children for nontherapeutic research which had no relation
to the child’s own health. This lead to the National Institute of Health and other agencies’ push
for regulations. Acknowledging the need for research with children, but cognizant of their
vulnerability and history of exploitation, these regulations landed within the purview of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. That agency – which is now the Department of
Health and Human Services – addressed the acceptability of research involving children in the
form of the Federal Policy for the protection of Human Subjects; specifically Subpart D of the
Common Rule.”43
Published in 1991 and effectively revised in 2017, The Common Rule amplified the
Belmont Report and further set forth ethical provisions and parameters. These included the
establishment of the institutional review Board, or IRB. The IRB ensured that research protocols
and plans were sufficiently vetted, risks to research subjects were minimized, and that they
received the protections they were owed. IRBs continue to occupy a central role in human
subject research. 44
Subpart D of the Common Rule sanctions research with all children according to nine
statutory provisions which parallel the principles of the Belmont Report. Subpart D provisions
range from the assessment of risk and prospect of benefit to the role of the IRBs, the requirement
of parental consent and child’s assent, protections for highly vulnerable children, as well as
processes for conducting unapproved research with children. 45 In 1998 the National Institutes of
Health published policies and guidelines supporting inclusion of children as research
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participants, and in 2002 Congress adopted legislation promoting increased drug trials involving
children.46
4. B.

Applying the Principles to Pediatric Research
Because they differ from adults, research with children is essential to understand the

pathology of disease and disorders involving them. Some diseases are unique to children and
because they are not little adults, nor are they non-adult beings, their physiology and psychology
must be understood within the pediatric context. Although including children in clinical research
is critically essential to understanding child health, this species of research remains a source of
controversy. 47
Respecting the humanness of children demands first that they be accepted as fully human.
Early 19th century biology and philosophy viewed children as human becoming who were precompetent and although they were developing into full humans, they were essentially biology-inprogress. Because they were considered incomplete, their completeness was thought to impair
the quality of the research data, and their developmental level was considered short of the
requisite capacity necessary to consent to research. 48 Their completeness and competence was
measured against an adult world rather than the everyday world of a child.
Research with children, and particularly research involving those who are contextually
vulnerable, discussed more fully hereunder, often involves reliance on knowledge obtained from
children’s subjective experiences in natural contexts, which is fraught with potential
misinterpretations and misunderstandings of their experiences. Even the meaning of the word
children is subjective in that it includes a broad spectrum of meanings. It includes infants and
teenagers; girls and boys; and varied social, ethnic and religious backgrounds; including able-
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bodies and those with physical and sensory impairments. 49 The Belmont Report provides a
widely accepted definition of the term children. It holds that children are persons who have not
attained the age of legal consent to medical care according to the law of the jurisdiction in which
the research is conducted. 50 But children are more than their defined legal status. They are
inherently and conditionally vulnerable, as they cohabitate with others in a world of complex
relationships, cultural contexts and unique experiences.
Accepting and understanding children’s experiences as they understand them and their
world, will help to reinforce the notion that they are competent human beings, rather than
deficient adults with no opinion, expressions and thoughts. 51 However, it is the differentiated
quality of children, rather than their perceived incompleteness, which challenges the ability to
consistently apply the ethical principles espoused by the Belmont Report and related guidance.
Notwithstanding the degree to which they are perceived complete or incomplete, the matter of
vulnerability and defenselessness against harm undergirds the ethics of pediatric research and
drives the debate surrounding this species of research and the associated risk of harm. Despite
the challenges, execution of clinical research demands a moral commitment to adhere to
fundamental ethical principles.
4. B. 1.

Foundations of Ethical Research: Inclusion and Choosing Justly
Understanding which children should participate in research is essential to understanding

how to serve all children sufficiently and fairly so that every child, including those belonging to
highly vulnerable subpopulations, can benefit from the outcomes, or at least not be harmed.
Highly vulnerable children, such as those with special cognitive needs, have been the object and
subject of unethical and unjust research practices since the 18 th century, but it was the
Willowbrook State School case which stirred worldwide controversy. 52 The aftermath of
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Willowbrook marked, once again, a movement away from including children in research in an
effort to protect them from harmful experimentation.
Becoming therapeutic orphans by default, statistics from the post-Willowbrook period
demonstrate that children were disempowered and vulnerable as both research subjects and
patients; particularly in the area of drug safety. Infant deaths from diethylene glycol poisoning,
and birth defects from exposure to thalidomide during pregnancy are a few tragic examples. At
that time, most drugs prescribed for children were not tested in children; only about 20 percent of
FDA-approved drugs were cleared for pediatric use. 53 In fact, it was not until the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 that pediatric clinical trial infrastructure began to take
shape.54 Henceforth, legislation such as the Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003 (PREA) and
the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act if 2002 (BPCA) helped facilitate pediatric drug
studies as well as the approval of more than 730 labeling changes for drugs prescribed to
children.55 Similarly in Europe during this time, most drugs prescribed for children were done so
off label due to insufficient safety, and efficacy information. Beyond drug studies, the burden of
proof for pediatric researchers today has shifted from the need to demonstrate why children
should be included in research to whether or not there are ethical reasons why they should not be
included. The welfare of children in pediatric research must be balanced against the need to
protect them from harm. In pursuit of that balance, it is necessary to examine whether justice in
the participation process implies a moral duty to participate in research in the first instance.
As a principle of morality, Rosamond Rhodes submits that to the extent humankind
demands more out of science “we should each see the need to participate in studies by
contributing and sacrificing some of our time, energy, comfort, blood, bodies, and privacy.” 56 To
that end she argues that research amounts to a collaborative necessity to include people of every
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sort from infants and adolescents to pregnant women, the elderly and persons with diseases and
conditions of every type. This collaborative necessity is a moral duty, according to Rhodes, that
is fair and just since biomedical science is for the common good, and the benefits of research
inure to the broader society. It is further dramatically amplified to impose duties on clinicians,
researchers, and IRB protocol reviewers to consider their own willingness to enroll in studies
when reviewing potential study participants. 57
In contrast, Yarborough asserts that supporting common good of healthcare through
participation in clinical research, either tacitly or expressly, is not a moral duty even though the
societal benefits of research can inure to anyone who has occasion to access the fruits of
healthcare.58 His sentiments suggest that those who do not participate in or advocate for support
of clinical trials are not guilty of a moral failing because much of clinical research is itself a
failure. Citing that much of research is wasteful, he points to the statistically high fail rate of
many forms of clinical research to rebut the obligation of individuals “to take on risks for the
sake of clinical research.”

59

According to Yarborough, approximately half of completed trials

never get published in full, and that many of the drug trials published in high-impact journals
appear to have been designed for marketing purpose. 60 He further contends that much of preclinical research is fraught with software coding error, mislabeled cell lines, and inaccurate data
that adversely affect quality and safety of the finalized clinical trial. For Yarborough, such
inaccuracies diminish the societal benefits and increase the likelihood of adverse consequences,
and risks of harm.
With respect to children, Fleishman and Collagan contend that placing some children at
risk for the sake of all is acceptable on condition that there are necessary and sufficient methods
in place to protect the children enrolled in the research. These safeguards are important to ensure
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that they are not exposed to undue risk, without any direct benefit. 61 This seemingly
straightforward solution to inclusion has not been met with universal acceptance. The debate
surrounding pediatric research is fueled nationally and internationally by divisive theological and
philosophical opinions; from staunch conservative to radically liberal.
Protestant theologian, Paul Ramsey, argued against research involving children
contending that doing so was only justified if it furthered the medical interests of the child. He
further posited that nontherapeutic research ought never to be performed without the consent of
the child subject. For Ramsey, the argument that the children who do not benefit directly from
research would develop moral character from the altruistic act of participation was fallacious.
According to Ramsey, the child could not develop moral character from performing acts that
were unwilled by them. 62
On the other hand, Roman Catholic theologian Richard McCormick, argued that research
with children was necessary to improve the health and well-being of this population collectively.
As such, parental consent would sufficiently protect their interests since parents know their
children best, and are perfectly suited to make sound decisions on their behalf. He further
asserted, with a rather broad assumption, that most children if they were able to consent, would
want to participate in experiments that contribute to generalizable knowledge for the common
good.63 Throughout the world, policies and political undercurrents concerning pediatric research
experience similarly divergent views.
Both the U.S. and international communities attempted to harmonize the perspectives
within their policy positions and related codes/regulations, to justify research with children.
Despite the effort, it is not surprising that there is not a clear, universally adopted position. The
Belmont Report recognized that research involving children is justified to cure childhood
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diseases and to improve well-being provided that their vulnerabilities were recognized, and
protections for them prevailed. 64 The Report underscored that the concept of equitable selection,
as a matter of social justice, established an order of preference in the selection of certain classes
of research subjects; ensuring that protections prevailed. To that end, research ought to take place
first on animals, then on adults, and then on older children, prior to infants. 65
The Declaration of Helsinki contains two preconditions supporting research with
children. The research must be indispensable to promote pediatric health, and it cannot otherwise
be conducted on populations who are able to give their own consent. Refining the Declaration’s
position, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine set parameters around research with
vulnerable persons, but did not expressly advocate research with children. However, the Council
for International Organizations of Medical Science (CIOMS) does support children in research in
order to avoid dangerous reliance on drugs and treatments that have only been tested on adults.
Accordingly, it supports pediatric research only in those instances where the knowledge sought
cannot be obtained by research carried out on adults. 66
The European Union recognizes the need to protect children in pediatric research. To
maintain consistency throughout the EU, it published a number of directives outlining good
clinical practices. The primary objective of these directives is to provide guidance on the use of
informed consent involving parents and guardians, as well as on procuring assent of the child.
Understanding which children should participate in research is critical to understanding how to
comprehensively and fairly serve children so that every child, especially those belonging to
vulnerable subpopulations, can benefit from the outcomes. Harmonizing regulations and
practices relating to ethical clinical research for vulnerable populations is a global aspiration. 67
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The pursuit of knowledge of children through pediatric research has pendulously evolved.
From periods marked by exploitation, to over-protection and orphaning, reverting back to
exploitation, to what is now a presumption that research with children is conditionally desirable.
This escalates the significance of informed consent, the assent and competency of the child, and
the assessment of risks and benefits as vital ethical considerations. Respect for the autonomy of
the person requires that legally competent, as well as legally incompetent persons be given the
chance to choose whether or not to participate in research; to the extent they are able. 68
4. B. 2.

Foundations of Ethical Research: Respect for Autonomy and Informed Consent
The Belmont Report’s conviction that respect for persons entails respect for their

autonomy is what drives informed consent. Ensuring that human research subjects validly grant
their consent prior to commencing participation helps to preserve autonomy; the respect for the
person’s ability to make informed decisions about their health that is free from interference and
limitations that may obstruct their decision-making.69 Truly informed decision-making is
predicated on the notion that sufficient information is available. To promote self-determination,
the 2017 revised Common Rule (effective in 2019) approached informed decisions through the
enactment of a key provisions invoking the reasonable person standard. 70 Prospective
participants, or their legal representatives must receive “information that a reasonable person
would want to have in order to make an informed decision about whether to participate, and an
opportunity to discuss that information. 71
The reasonable person standard exists in the common law to determine what is fair and
just when determining and measuring the legal responsibility and accountability of a party to a
particular matter. Its application to medical disclosure law vis-à-vis the revised Common Rule
reflects for the first time an explicit need for investigators, and physicians, to be aware of and
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address what information a reasonable person would need to know; not merely what the
researchers and IRBs consider relevant. 72 This further helps to ensure that research subjects or
their surrogate, especially children who may have diminished autonomy and special needs, have
adequate understanding of the circumstances and conditions in order to maintain control over
their lives.73 Respect for autonomy and informed consent does not guarantee the safety of the
therapy or procedure, but it does help to provide reasonable assurance that people participating in
human research are able to exercise their free-will. The ability to sufficiently and validly
exercise control and free-will, including the ability to assent to take part in a research study,
requires that people be fully informed of the facts necessary to give consent.
As such, the principle of informed consent consists of three primary considerations.
Consent requires firstly, the competence of the of the research participant to make a rational
decision; secondly, whether the participant is able to comprehend the relevant information
provided as well as the consequences of their decision, and finally the extent to which that
individual’s consent decisions are voluntary. 74 Voluntariness necessitates that the decisions are
free from significant or undue controlling influences of coercion, persuasion, and manipulation. 75
Dynamic variables can also legitimately influence and impact the informed consent process
without invalidating the consent. These influences are most notably observed in vulnerable,
pediatric populations.
While the legal and ethical underpinnings of valid consent are critical components of
research, the intrinsic value of consent in the pediatric context is what enables children to project
their voices and views throughout the research experience. Valid informed consent helps to
empower the vulnerable. It gives them a voice. Respect for the autonomy of a child and her
ability to make decisions for herself necessitates that the researcher endeavor to understand the
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child’s voice, viewpoint, perspective and wishes. Given that children organize their thoughts
differently than adults and do not always express their viewpoints in ways that adult investigators
instinctively understand, a child’s true intent may not be known. 76 Moreover, the child may not
even comprehend the information provided, or may be influenced by factors that are unknown to
the investigator. Balancing the respect for autonomy and these ambiguities against the need to
procure legally valid consent supports the need for parental or other third-party intercession and
consent.77
Accordingly, “informed consent in pediatric research means the permission of parents,
(biological or adoptive) or other legal representatives or ‘guardians’ (individuals authorized
under state or federal law to consent on behalf of the child).” 78 The rudiments of informed
consent are not controversial; rather, it is the administration and effectiveness that present ethical
issues. If there is a direct benefit to the child, or there is minimal risk to them from participation
in the research study, then an IRB may determine that consent of only one parent is sufficient. In
the case of non-therapeutic research that involves more than minimal risk, both parents must
consent. However, parental permission and assent of the child may be waived entirely if the
minimal risk research could not be carried out without the waiver, the child subjects will be
provided with relevant information following the research, and the waiver itself does not impact
the rights or well-being of the subjects. In addition, unless an IRB determines that the capacity of
the child is so limited that they cannot be consulted concerning the research, the Common Rule
provides that the assent of the child, or affirmative agreement to participate ought to be
solicited.79 It is worth noting the important distinction between capacity and competence. The
terms capacity and impaired capacity refer to results of clinical evaluation, while competence
and incompetence refer to the legal status of someone to make their own decisions.80
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Competency, capacity to understand, voluntariness, and having enough information are
so interdependent upon one another that they should not be uncoupled and treated as independent
from one another. Informed consent should be assessed and valued as an indivisible continuum
of processes to uphold the autonomy and dignity of the research subject, rather than a
compliance checkbox item that more closely resembles an exchange of executed permission
slips.81 Arnason, Li, and Cong defend the idea that informed consent is a communicative process
involving mutual listening, sharing and timely response. 82 Underscoring the importance of
communication, Nancy E. Kass, of Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics contends that
informed consent documentation and the process for procuring it ought to prompt and guide
further conversation about the research. To that end, “looking someone in the eye, getting sense
of whether they’re with you, and even asking them to repeat back what they understand is the
most likely strategy to achieve meaningful understanding.” 83 The sufficiency of this process is
subjective and largely stakeholder specific, beginning with an assessment of the quality of
information, an examination of the likelihood that it has been understood, and ensuring that
coercion or unreasonable external manipulations were not exerted to influence consent. This
subjectivity is exceedingly important when examining the sufficiency of and processes for
obtaining informed consent when the research subject is a child.
4. B. 3.

Foundations of Ethical Research: Benefit, Harm, and Assessing Risk
In addition to respect for autonomy through informed consent and justice through

equitable selection, the Belmont Report obligates the researchers to adhere to the principle of
beneficence by maximizing benefits, while minimizing harms to the research subjects. 84 For
purposes of this discussion, a benefit is defined as something of positive value related to health
and welfare. Harms can be physical, psychological, legal, social or financial injuries, and must
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be evaluated from the perspective of the research subject. In the case of a child, the harm must be
evaluated from their perspective and perception; not the adult researcher or parent. The concept
of risk considers the potential harm to the research subject as well as their family, or
community.85 In short, beneficence obligates researchers and all involved in human research to
acknowledge and support the best interest of the child subject, and help to ensure that their wellbeing is promoted wherever possible.
As set forth in Subpart D of the Common Rule, research involving children is permissible
if it offers the prospect of direct benefit to the child, and is aligned with appropriate risk
stratifications. The regulation, however, does not define what is meant by direct benefit, and
there is little agreement on the ambitious definitions offered by a variety of researchers. The
concepts of direct and indirect benefits were introduced by the National Commission to bolster
protections for those who could not provide their own, independent informed consent. Because it
feared exposing vulnerable groups of people to heightened risks in pursuit of benefits that may
be speculative, or realized in the distant future, the National Commission espoused the position
that direct benefits must be “fairly immediate.” 86 Others like Keyserlingk, Glass and Gauthier
argue that research must afford vulnerable research subjects benefits of significant magnitude.87
And other views consider the degree of ‘tangible positive outcome’ such as pain relief and
increased mobility. 88
Useful for this discussion, Nancy King proffers three types of benefits. Direct benefits,
according to King, are therapeutic benefits that inure to the child directly from the intervention or
experiment. Collateral benefits are those arising merely from being a research subject even if the
child did not receive the intervention or participate in the study. Examples of collateral benefits
include receiving a free medical exam, or the altruistic benefit resulting from involvement with
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the study. And, aspirational benefits provide social value, and are benefits that inure to the
broader society, as well as future patients. 89
The consequences of such inconsistent and even conflicting perspectives on what
constitutes a direct benefit can subvert confidence in the protections necessary for those who
cannot exercise their autonomy and informed consent.90 Particularly for children who are unable
to assess and appreciate the gravity of risk and benefit to themselves, and especially for those
who serve as their surrogate decision-maker, risk benefit calculations are difficult. To that end,
Friedman, Robbins and Wendler suggest that when considering the degree of accompanying
risks vis-à-vis the potential direct benefits, not all benefits are created equal. 91 Notably, in cases
of nontherapeutic research – or research with no prospect of direct benefit - it is necessary to
assess the risk of harm according to a thorough balancing, and non-arbitrary analysis, 92 prior to
seeking informed consent.
In establishing the strict criteria for research involving children, the National Commission
classified risk into three categories according to its probability: minimal risk, a minor increase
over minimal risk, and more than a minor increase over minimal risk. 93 Accordingly, with
respect to children, it defined minimal risk, as “the probability and magnitude of physical or
psychological harm that is normally encountered in the daily lives, or in the routine medical or
psychological examination of healthy children.” 94 It is important to note that the Common Rule
definition of minimal risk, which does not appear in Subpart D involving children, but rather
Subpart A, makes no reference to healthy children. Rather, it considers the daily lives of the
general population. For the sake of particularly vulnerable children, some argue that the risk
standard ought to be relative to the individual child who is the subject of the proposed research –
not the healthy child. Probability and severity of harm can be influenced by the condition of the
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child entering the study. That is to say that a child with a disorder may be vulnerable to greater
harm from a research procedure than a child who is healthy. Conversely, some argue that
children who are healthy out to remain so and are therefore entitled to greater protection. These
relative positions are part of the ongoing conversation surrounding risk of harm assessments. 95
The idea of avoiding harm, proffering benefit, and minimizing risk to children in clinical
research has many dimensions. Harms are wide-ranging and dynamic. They range from the
physiological, to unanticipated intrusions into privacy and embarrassment, to offenses to
personal dignity and self-respect. All of which must be balanced against the interests of active
participants, and those who may benefit in the future. 96 Benefits are not always known and are
often not detected until long after the study closes, and may not even inure to the study
participants themselves. Further, they may be misinterpreted altogether if the informed consent
process failed to counter a therapeutic misconception, or if any potential benefits were
misconstrued as cures or something more than collateral. 97 Risk assessments look at probability
and severity of harm through the lens of what is reasonably foreseeable or what is already known
to have occurred. Evaluating the likelihood of harm to a child requires unique insight into the
experiential as well as conjectural understanding of what it means to be a child; which, in the
absence of meaningful clinical research, remains unknown. Despite this conundrum,
understanding the vulnerability of children relies upon knowledge obtained through ethical
clinical research.
4. C.

Pediatric Vulnerability in Three Contexts
This thesis demonstrates that ethically accountable healthcare organizations have a moral

duty to address the needs of its community of stakeholders. Vulnerable populations and
subpopulations of stakeholders are within the purview of an HCO, and they are dependent upon
187

it to satisfy many of their physical and emotional needs. Since vulnerability is both a source of
moral obligation, and an indicator of conditions that give rise to such obligations, HCOs have an
incontrovertible duty to its vulnerable stakeholders. Power and authority demand moral
responsibility, and the HCO is a wellspring of both. Children are inherently and conditionally
vulnerable. “They need care not only to survive but also to develop their basic physical,
intellectual and emotional capacities,” 98 and are entirely dependent, albeit often temporally, upon
the authority and power of others to decide most matters for them.
The most common metric of vulnerability within healthcare is the autonomy of the
individual; specifically, assessing the competence and capacity to give informed consent. 99
However, an autonomy-based understanding of vulnerability alone is too limiting because
vulnerability is contextual. The taxonomy of contextual vulnerability looks to the types of
vulnerability according to the circumstances, surroundings, environments and other related
factors affecting the individual. Representative factors include institutional vulnerabilities, such
as those experienced by prisoners. Deferential vulnerability, which considers gender, race or
socioeconomic contexts, as well as medical, cognitive and communicative vulnerability. 100
Contextual vulnerability considers more than the intrinsic characteristics of the individual; it
considers the contexts in which they find themselves. 101 This section explores, through the lens
of pediatric research as a contingent vulnerability, the contextual vulnerability unique to children
with HIV, victims of abuse and maltreatment, and children with special cognitive and
developmental disorders. Because healthcare and clinical research are relational, the
significance of interpersonal and social relationships and the influences of authority figures such
physicians, researchers and IRBs, legal proxies and other caregivers, underscore the need for
relational ethics.
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4. C. 1.

Children with HIV
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is a virus spread through the exchange of certain

body fluids that attack CD4 cells, also known as T-cells, which support the body’s immune
system and help it to fight off infections. Unlike other viruses, the human body cannot fully rid
itself of HIV; therefore, once a person acquires the virus, they have it for life. Over time, if left
untreated, HIV outnumbers and destroys the CD4 cells, rendering the body susceptible to other
infections; particularly opportunistic infection-based cancers. When these infections overpower
the immune system, it is an indication of their progression towards the final stage of HIV, or
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome – AIDS.102
Although there is no cure, antiretroviral therapy (ART) can significantly reduce the viral
load – amount of HIV present in the body’s blood – to amounts that are virtually undetectable
thereby preventing further transmission of HIV. Although ART has greatly reduced HIV
prevention and management and has contributed to a 48% reduction in AIDS-related deaths, it
“does not remove replicative HIV from the body and is not a cure” 103 In order to maintain the
reduction in viral load and transmission prevention, ART must be administered for the life of the
patient with HIV. In the absence of cure, HIV remains a chronic disease carrying a devastating
prognosis in its active stages.
Approximately 37.9 million people worldwide live with HIV; 104 including 1.8 million
children under 15 years-of-age. Children and youth can acquire HIV through perinatal, or
mother-to-child transmission (MTCT), through sexual contact, or through other nonvertical/nonsexual encounters such as unsafe intravenous drug use, 105 and blood transfusions.
Ninety-percent of pediatric HIV cases occur from MTCT either in utero, during labor and
delivery, or postnatally through breast-feeding.106 ART administered during pregnancy has
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resulted in significant reductions in rates of perinatal transmissions, and has improved morbidity
and mortality rates. Despite the significance of ART, HIV is a chronic infectious disease in need
of a cure. HIV cure research seeks therapeutic interventions to control or eliminate HIV such that
further medical interventions are unnecessary to maintain health. 107
HIV-infected children are contextually vulnerable. At one time, they were not expected to
live past childhood. However, with longer lifespans today, children and young people growing
up with HIV face considerable challenges to their physical and mental health as well as
developmental processes. 108 Although adolescence is a time of high risk generally, those with
HIV can be particularly susceptible to psychosocial challenges as they face not only
developmental vulnerability, also HIV-related stressors. 109 Whether HIV was acquired prenatally
or behaviorally, distinctive features characterize the experience of learning to make sense of and
live with a communicable and highly stigmatized infection during childhood and
adolescence.” 110 The stigma associated with HIV infection also raises one of the most
controversial matters in pediatric HIV; that is, determining if and when to disclose the HIV status
to the affected child.
The presence of HIV is most often attributed to stigmatized behavior such as high-risk
sexual activity, intravenous drug use, and same-sex sexual behavior. Because the majority of
HIV-infected children acquire the virus through MTCT, disclosing the infection often unveils
other family secrets such as paternity, socioeconomic status, patterns of parental sexual behavior,
and drug use.111 These consequences compete with the public health risks of non-disclosure.
Children who are unaware of their HIV serostatus can unwittingly engage in behaviors that
create risks. Risks from non-compliance with medication – the purpose of which they don’t
understand, to risky sexual behavior and substance use, to the potential for transmitting ART190

resistance strains of the virus as a result of such behavior. Notably for this dissertation, children
who do not know they are infected are unable to participate in HIV cure research studies.
Failing to disclose their perinatal HIV infection to them exacerbates the child’s
vulnerability. Currently there is very little published research to evaluate the most appropriate
time and the psychosocial effects of HIV disclosure or non-disclosure on the child. However,
practitioners confront disclosure issues with great frequency, and there is some clinical
consensus on recommended guidelines. 112 Although, Sabharwal, Mitchell and Fan contend that
recommendations alone are not enough to encourage disclosure. Considering their emotional,
psychological and cognitive development, HIV-infected youth must be aware of their serostatus,
regardless of parental desire to delay disclosure. 113
To that end, HIV-infected children are subordinate to the authority, power, and
competing interests of caregivers upon whom they are dependent. Their power, and this
dependency mandates that parents, caregivers and providers have a moral duty to provide
physically and emotionally supportive environments for children and adolescents with HIV.
Such duty entails comprehensive consideration of the dynamic cultural, social, familial and
emotional contexts these children experience, as well as the context of their relationships with
these authority figures. Accordingly, Marhefku, Turner, and Chenneville advocate for research to
better understand “[t]he antecedents, processes and outcomes of disclosure to children. 114
Ethically enabling all appropriate species of research on these contextually vulnerable children
must be reconciled within their unique environments. Relational ethics recognizes the
interpersonal contexts; its application is essential to addressing the contingent vulnerability of
this distinct pediatric population, and the research involving them.
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According to the goodness-of-fit (GFE) model of relational ethics, the vulnerability of the
child is considered beyond just her age and capacity. Ethical procedures assess the goodness-offit between clinical context of treatment and research, and the child’s development, which
includes caregiver and parental comprehension, their personal values, and cultural norms. 115 The
GFE model focuses on collaboration between the clinician, the investigator, the families and the
child, and is relevant to all aspect of clinical treatment and research, including informed consent
and considerations of capacity to understand. GFE shifts the judgement “[a]way from an
exclusive focus on assumed child or guardian vulnerabilities to an examination of the clinical or
experimental setting that can reduce or facilitate informed choice.” 116 It requires an awareness of
cultural values, as well as “[h]ow HIV stigma is differentially distributed across social
groups.” 117
Because of dearth of available research on HIV-infected children, the goodness-of-fit
framework necessitates an independent effort on the part of the ethically accountable physician
and researcher to understand the relational dynamics of this vulnerable stakeholder group. Rahill,
Joshi and Lescano prescribe professional and cultural training and education to help the
healthcare professional understand the impact of culture and personal values on the child and
their caregivers. In addition, “Education and training can also help clinicians and researchers
develop a clearer understanding of their own cultural beliefs and values in relation to the
multiple identities that a racial, religious, ethnic, disabled or sexual minority youth who is also
HIV positive may be experiencing.” 118 Such cultural humility is an essential component of
moral accountability vis-à-vis the needs of vulnerable children, as further illustrated by those
who are victims of abuse.
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4. C. 2.

Child Maltreatment
Intentional harm to children is not a modern day phenomenon. Evidence of infanticide,

abandonment, beatings, terrorization, and child sexual abuse is seen as far back as the 9 th century
B.C. Children typically occupied the lowest social strata in ancient times, and their maltreatment
was considered rather unremarkable. The perception that children were impediments whose
existence placed strains on society extended into Elizabethan England. Social policies were
designed to protect society from vagrancy, idleness and other delinquencies attributed to
children.119
It wasn’t until the late 19th century that the consequential story of Mary Ellen Wilson
brought the reality of child abuse into the public arena. Because there were no relevant laws
protecting children, 8-year-old Mary was rescued, according to animal cruelty laws, from
horrendous physical abuse at the hands of her foster parents. Her suffering helped illuminate the
need for public attention and legislation. 120 Over the next several decades, child abuse centers as
well as state and federal child abuse advisory boards emerged, establishing the basis for a child
protection system in the U.S. 121 Albeit imperfect, the system established civil and criminal
protections for maltreated children. As the evolution of child abuse protection efforts intersected
with the expansion of medical research, hyper-protective concerns for children isolated them
from meaningful research. Despite the general dearth of research, studies that were conducted
introduced compelling evidence of the short- and long-term effects of maltreatment on children.
Although legal definitions of child maltreatment and abuse generally align with the
specific provisions of individual state penal codes and statutes, this dissertation adopts the
definition provided by The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); because it is
comprehensive and universally recognized. Throughout this dissertation it is used
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interchangeably with the term child abuse. The CDC defines child maltreatment as “[a]ny act or
series of acts of commission or omission by a parent or other caregiver that results in harm,
potential for harm, or threat of harm to a child.” 122 Child maltreatment recognizes four main
types of abusive acts: physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional or psychological abuse, and
neglect.123 Each type identifies specific harms such as beating, shaking, abusive head trauma,
scalding and poisoning, sexual contact and exploitation, blaming, intimidating, degrading and
isolating, and failure to provide for or supervise a child – to name just a few. 124 According to the
CDC definition, and consistent with most statutory frameworks, only a caregiver can perpetrate
maltreatment. Acts and injuries by all others are considered criminal assaults and/or batteries. 125
Findings from early research on child and adolescent development revealed that girls who
were sexually abused reported having more instances of gynecological problems, persistent sleep
issues, obesity, cognitive challenges, HIV risk, and early puberty, than non-maltreated girls. 126
“Neglect, the most prevalent type of child maltreatment, is associated with restricted growth of
the corpus callosum, dental disease, failure to thrive, and a variety of mental, emotional and
behavioral impairments among children.” 127 “Adults who were mistreated in childhood are at
significantly greater risk of experiencing serious illness and premature mortality from a variety
of conditions, including drug/alcohol addiction, cancer, lung disease, severe obesity, heart
disease, asthma and liver disease.” 128 The consequences of child maltreatment trauma can
develop across the child’s lifespan. However, not all children who experience maltreatment
necessarily develop physiological and mental health problems. A child’s resiliency to such
problems can be enriched through protective factors such as familial and social support
mechanisms.129
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Child maltreatment is a serious public health matter, and “[t]he consequences…are
pervasive, spanning multiple domains of functioning. 130 According to CDC reporting, in 2015
there were 4 million reports of child maltreatment involving 7.2 million children in the United
States. As this rate increases, its prevalence and recognition as a childhood illness requires
research to improve its diagnosis, treatment and prevention. 131 To that end, Guttman, Shouldice
and Levin aptly contend that “there is a moral duty for researchers to be active in this area.” 132
The ethical and legal considerations, however, associated with child maltreatment research, are
challenging, arduous and present multiple unique dimensions because of the nature of the illness.
The depth of ethical issues ascribed to child maltreatment research is well beyond the scope and
limits of this chapter. Rather, it calls attention to the moral duty of the HCO, through its
accountable physicians and other professionals to recognize the necessity and value of child
maltreatment research as multi-stakeholder concern, and the methods to address the challenges.
Most of the research in child abuse will result in a benefit to the common good of society, rather
than to the child participant. In fact, the mere disclosure of the abuse could result in more harm
to the child. Therefore, not unlike risks from disclosure of HIV-infected children, moral
accountability requires that “studies be designed to protect against and avoid further harm and
trauma” from the disclosure of abuse. 133
Ethical research practices preclude intentionally inducing injury or illness without valid
consent, and generally require examining the illness in its naturally occurring setting. The nature
of child maltreatment research, which is in effect injury research involving children who are
contextually vulnerable, presents risks that are per se sufficiently high. Although injury research
typically involves children who have been identified through case reports, studies on prevention
and intervention strategies may reveal undetected incidents of prior, current or imminent
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abuse.134 Child maltreatment is trauma that is unique because it is non-accidental. The
intentionality of the parent or caregiver perpetrator, who is most often the logical proxy for
informed consent based on the presumption that they have the best interest of the child in mind
despite abusive evidence to the contrary, is an ethical paradox. 135
Even if the informed consent requirement is waived in an attempt to protect the
maltreated child from additional trauma, child maltreatment research presents ethical challenges
to the researcher and clinician. The risk of causing distress to a child during an interview process,
appropriately handling the discovery of abuse that was never reported, and identification of
perpetrators136 are just a few of the unique challenges of this species of research. The relational
ethics model of pediatric research may palliate these challenges. One way is for healthcare
professionals to recognize the centrality of culture, cultural influences and rights to cultural
autonomy in their work with this vulnerable population. 137
Just as it applies to the goodness-of-fit approach to HIV research, culture is important in
all aspects of detection, prevention, intervention and treatment of child maltreatment. 138 Because
culture influences all dimensions of child-rearing as well as child development, and maturation
into adolescence and adulthood, it is an essential component of relational ethics in child
maltreatment research. Cultural considerations will help to determine how resilient the child is to
potential harm, how the child’s family setting may influence the abuse as well as the
interventions employed, and the extent to which culturally influenced social systems may
protect, or expose the child to greater vulnerability.” 139 Thus, researchers and clinicians working
with abused children must possess cultural competence as well as cultural literacy – an
understanding of the perspectives and experiences of the victims and their parents/caregivers - in
order to adapt the research and practices accordingly.” 140 An ethically accountable HCO is duty
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bound to provide methods for understanding the role of culture within the child’s ecosystemic
framework to its researchers, clinicians, caregivers and children. The moral duty of the HCO to
mitigate risks to vulnerable children in research is further examined through the lens of those
with special cognitive needs.
4. C. 3.

Children with Intellectual and Cognitive Disabilities
Developmental disability is a term that broadly describes intellectual, or physical

impairment, or a combination of the two that generally manifests before the individual reaches
age 22. A developmental disability likely continues indefinitely and results in substantial
limitation of life activities such as self-care, receptive-expressive language, self-direction,
learning, and capacity for independent living. 141 “Intellectual disability (ID) encompasses the
“cognitive” part of this definition, that is, a disability that is broadly related to thought
processes…It is characterized by significant limitations in intellectual functioning (reasoning,
learning and problem-solving), and in adaptive behavior.” 142
Intellectual disability includes those congenital cognitive disorders that are likely to be
diagnosed in early childhood such as Down syndrome, Fragile X syndrome, and autism. 143
Today, the term intellectual disability is often used independent from the other disorders to
replace the condition previously known as mental retardation. Nevertheless, unless otherwise
specified, references to intellectual disability used throughout this chapter will mean cognitive
disabilities and related impairments.
As Leslie Francis aptly asserts, intellectual disabilities are complex and multi-faceted and
their attendant impairments vary significantly from person to person.144 Some children with
intellectual disabilities may have difficulty with abstract reasoning and impulse control.
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Intellectual disability challenges the child’s ability to make right judgment. They often
experience problems with social adaptation rendering them gullible and naïve, placing them at
risk for victimization, and increasing their dependency on others. 145 Because many intellectual
disabilities lack physical manifestations, the child’s vulnerability may be invisible. The
presumption of ‘normalness’ can compound the risk of victimization.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the prevalence of children
diagnosed with any form of developmental disability increased between 2014 and 2016 from
5.76% to 6.99% 146 respectively; ranging from mild speech and language impairment to more
severe intellectual disability and autism. Specifically, diagnoses of autism, or autism spectrum
disorder (ASD), have appreciably increased since 2000; such that today, 1 in 59 children will be
diagnosed with one or more of autism’s spectrum of pervasive disorders. 147 “The most recent
Global Burden of Disease data estimate that in 2015, there were 3.6 million children aged 1 -9
years living with autism and more than 15 million living with idiopathic developmental
intellectual disability.” 148 In addition to learning the reasons why more children than ever are
being diagnosed with ASD, there is much more to discover about this complicated disorder
specifically, and intellectual disabilities generally. Aside from understanding the causes and risk
factors, early and accurate identification and diagnosis of a child’s impairment can help to
mitigate adverse effects to the child as well as those experienced by family and caregiver
stakeholders.
In the wake of Willowbrook, much attention has been paid to protecting children with
intellectual disabilities because of their vulnerability. 149 However, bioethicists, researchers, and
disability advocates, have argued that excluding persons with intellectual disabilities from
research is unfair, may be too stringent, and may be equally harmful to them. For instance, it is
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widely understood that early detection and evidence-based interventions provide the best
opportunities for children with ASD to develop and flourish. 150 Interventions such as speech and
occupational therapy, as well as emotional adaptation training allow the plasticity of the young
child’s brain to change and have a better chance of developing enhanced potential. Denying
evidenced-based research opportunities designed to discover effective and customized
interventional therapies can thwart these chances. Also, precluding children with intellectual
disabilities from participation in research denies family members and caregivers, broader insight
and understanding into treatments and interventions that provide assistance to them, and aid to
the child.151
Children with cognitive disabilities are contingently vulnerable in that they are dependent
upon the authority and control of others. They are also contextually vulnerable to the
environment, conditions, and relational experiences unique to them vis-à-vis their disorder.
Understanding the contextual world of a child with a cognitive disability is frequently obfuscated
by communication and other sensory barriers. As such, ethical research entails enlisting the
perspectives of the child in understanding their world, and the influences which shape it.
According to Cuskelly, most research literature is devoid of the child’s perspective. Participatory
research, however, goes beyond merely including children. It contends that to fully understand
the contextual nature of a child’s vulnerability, the child ought to participate in the actual design
and execution of the research. There is growing evidence and acceptance of the participatory
approach to research with children with intellectual disabilities. 152
Unpacking this further, participatory research illuminates the goodness-of-fit model of
relational ethics. Through collaboration and engagement with the child and their authority
figures, healthcare professionals can identify and acknowledge how the child’s perspectives are
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tied to and shaped by their relationship with others. For example, although expectations of
reciprocity and dependence are important in nearly all human interactions, those expectations are
indispensable cornerstones in the life and experiences of a person with an intellectual
disability.153 Moreover, unlike children with HIV, or those who are maltreated, the dependencies
of the child with intellectual disability do not evolve gradually from the onset of the disorder.
Rather, most children with intellectual disability, especially autism, have never experienced any
other way of being, 154 or understanding of themselves. Therefore, the way these children see the
world and themselves in relation to it, are attitudes and frames of reference that must be
understood and appreciated in order to effectuate ethical research on them. In addition, it will
help to ensure necessary clinical advances exist to address the population health of this
stakeholder community.
4. D.

Ethical and Legal Strategies for Managing Pediatric Obesity: A Moral Duty
The concept of population health refers to an “understanding of the epidemiology of a

particular population and aligning a community’s healthcare resources to not only treat illnesses
…but to keep the population healthy.” 155 Managing population health, particularly with respect
to vulnerable populations, requires accountable leadership who possess a moral commitment to
the sustained health and lifelong fulfillment of patients and communities served by the HCO. 156
Principles of stewardship, normative stakeholder theories, community-oriented health programs,
and the duty to provide for the common good dictate an urgent commitment from HCOs,
providers and even policymakers to disrupt this environment and act to protect this at-risk
population. The remainder of this chapter addresses a specific slice of this population health
sphere. It considers with some depth, the ethical and legal strategies for accountable leaders to
prevent and mitigate the psychosocial and physiological effects of pediatric obesity on children.
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Fifty years ago, the sentiment that big girls don’t cry was intended to depict the fortitude
and mettle associated with strong, resilient women. 157 This image of indefatigable women who
were too big in spirit to be injured or reduced to tears is rarely uttered in polite society today.
Reason being, that today big girls do cry, and so do big boys particularly when they are obese.
The 21st century is shaped by its cultural obsession with obesity. For that reason and a number of
others, children cannot sustain a relationship with obesity. Rendering them vulnerable, obesity
affects a child’s emotional, social, physical, academic and psychological functioning; providing
them every justified reason to cry.
These factors uphold childhood obesity as a critical public health threat. It is positioned
between the need for regulated behavior modification, and the respect for the child’s individual
self-determination. It also sits amidst the competing interests of government and physician
intervention, and respect for parental sovereignty in determining what is best for their child
physically and psychologically. When obesity creates a degree of harm to a child that is
disproportionate to the benefit conferred by the competing interests, and actions or inactions
exacerbate and negative consequences of obesity, ethical concerns arise. 158 Something or
someone must intercede on the child’s behalf. This chapter addresses the moral duty of the
ethically accountable HCO to this public health threat and its vulnerable stakeholder group. It
outlines the ethical justification for HCO intervention to address the disproportionate
psychosocial and physiological harms of childhood obesity through care ethics, and the
invocation of a modified common law doctrine of parens patriae.
4. D. 1.

Pediatric Obesity as a Public Health Threat
Even though one-third of the world’s population goes to bed hungry each night, over-

nutrition – that which occurs when too many calories and excess nutrients and food components
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are consumed vis-à-vis suboptimal energy expenditures – is rampant in the United States.
Barring some intervening metabolic disorder, over-nutrition nearly always results in excess
levels of fat tissue and bodyweight. Calculated against an individuals’ height, the resulting body
mass index (BMI) is the standardized yardstick used to determine whether an individual is obese.
American’s are among the top ten fattest people in the world, and its children are among the
largest.159 Although there is some dispute as to the outer limits of bodyweight or BMI necessary
to constitute obesity, it recognized that childhood obesity is a biological reality that has wideranging societal implications. 160
The current state of the obesity crisis in the United States is most obviously measured in
raw statistics. Since 1980, childhood obesity rates have tripled to the point that close to one-third
of children over age 2 are overweight or are obese. 161 Approximately 4% of U.S. children are
considered extremely obese; a figure which outpaces the number of children with cancer, HIV,
cystic fibrosis and juvenile diabetes combined. 162 Even though the numbers associated with
childhood obesity can be calculated in various ways, all available data shows a dramatic and
accelerated rise. More than a mere descriptive word associated with a BMI calculation, obesity is
a multi-factoral disease. 163 It has wide-ranging genetic, societal and behavioral causes that
begin in childhood and left unabated can continue into adulthood. This characteristic renders it a
two-stage disease. 164
One of the most pressing, and least obvious concerns of this very visible disease to
emerge is the impact that continual rises in childhood obesity will have on the adult disease rate
going forward. U.S. statistics show that a child who was obese during the first and second year
of life stands an 8% chance of becoming and obese adult, while a child who is obese between the
ages of 10 and 14 has a 70% chance. The rates are even higher if the child has at least one obese
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parent.165 Because it is a two-stage disease, not only does the physicality of obesity accompany
the adult, the adverse medical and psychosocial health outcomes also negatively impact adult
lives.
All of this presupposes that the child can even expect to live to adulthood. For the first
time since the 1900s, when public health initiatives first began to make significant and
measurable improvements in pediatric health, life expectancy for children is eroding because of
obesity. According to recent statistics, children can no longer expect to live longer than their
parents, due to the effects of adult diseases such as Type II diabetes and other diseases that are
tied to childhood obesity. 166 Childhood obesity has been shown to lead to higher death rates in
middle age due to, for example, the 3 to 4 time increase in risk of heart attack, doubling the risk
rate from cancer, and 2.5 times the risk of death from respiratory disease.167 Moreover, roughly
36 percent of adults in the United States who are twenty years or older are obese, and 6.3 percent
of them are considered extremely obese. It is estimated that 300,000 deaths annually are linked
to obesity.168
The societal costs of this obesity explosion are both real and indirect. The real costs are
often the most startling and attract wider audience interest because they represent
comprehensible dollars and cents. Lifetime medical costs attributed to normal weight children
are approximately $12,900 per child however they are reported to exceed $19,000 in the case of
an obese child.169 Many of the direct medical costs are associated with excessive doctor’s visits
and medication. According to recent study estimates, lifetime medical costs can exceed $14
billion when they are multiplied by the present number of obese 10-year-olds in the United
States. A number of these additional real costs won’t be realized until much later when the child
begins to experience health and behavioral conditions that are tied to childhood obesity.
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Although more inexact in its calculation than direct costs, indirect costs can also have farreaching impacts in terms of child absenteeism. Children who experience increased absenteeism
from school due to obesity related medical conditions can also disrupt the parent’s life through
their own absenteeism from, and lost productivity while at work. 170 As such, obesity’s impact is
so diverse and dramatic that the World Health Organization Consultation on Obesity’s prescient
report in 1997 determined it to be a highly neglected public health problem with a potential
impact as great as that of smoking. 171 Since this conclusion was drawn, obesity as a public
health threat has gained the same recognition as anti-tobacco and related legislation, especially
with respect to its influence on children’s behavior. These ground-breaking interventions were
fueled by, among other things, vocal appeals to change the influences that sustained such
harmful behavior. 172
4. D. 2.

Children Are What They Eat?
There are at least 200 genes known to factor into a person’s weight, and although

genetics do play a limited role in obesity, researchers and experts adhere to the position that
obesity is largely controlled through behavior. With the exception of certain known metabolic
conditions for which obesity is a consequence, along with certain inheritable statures and body
shapes, the fundamental causes for the obesity epidemic are behaviors and lifestyles, especially
diets.173 Current research suggests that as much as 80% of children in the United States have
diets that are considered poor or in drastic need of improvement, amplified by behaviors which
are strongly dominated by negative societal influences. 174 As a behavior-induced disease, there
are also a number of environmental factors that influence not only the behaviors, but the
environmental changes within which those behaviors thrive.
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One demonstrable way in which negative behaviors thrive in response to their
environment is in the super-sizing and over-consumption of unhealthy processed foods. Up to a
certain age, children will only eat what they are given, and the growing phenomenon of food
deserts – places where healthy food options are not readily available – leave little if any healthy,
obesity-resistant alternatives. 175 In addition to food deserts, Western culture is programmed to
consume unhealthy food quickly, cheaply and in mega quantities with scale-shattering
consequences. 176
Further, Warren and Smalley aptly suggest that decreased levels of physical activity have
led to a ‘lazy-fication’ of children. Studies have shown that nearly three-quarters of children
have a sedentary lifestyle and do not get the recommended daily amount of exercise. Lazyfication is amplified by the fact that physical education in public school systems – once an
important component of learning – is no longer valued as such. 177As an obesogenic influence, an
inactive child’s basic caloric needs have gotten lower without offsetting a corresponding
decrease in caloric intake.178 Notwithstanding the tie to obesity, such inactivity is also linked to
many other chronic health conditions.
Technology and new societal concerns have fortified the lazy-fication and fattening of
children. Nielson recently reported that children aged 2 to 5 spend an average of 32 hours per
week – the equivalent of a work week – watching television or playing video games. Children
are essentially plugged-into inactivity. 179 Prolonged television viewing impacts numerous health
outcomes through its cumulative impact on diet and exercise including obesity and diabetes. For
every extra 2 hours of television watching per day, there are 176 more cases of Type 2
diabetes.180 Simply put, most children don’t move around much anymore. They live in a society
that largely does everything for them.
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Childhood recreation has shifted from that which used to include sustained physical
activity, to sedentary computerized technology and social media providing instant gratification.
Add to this the fact that, as a means to protect children from predatory threats, abduction and
other forms of neighborhood violence, parents no longer encourage unsupervised outside play.
Eating used to be a way for children to recharge their batteries. Today however, children no
longer have to spend calories to get them. 181 To promote movement away from lazy-fication, it is
first necessary to understand whether these influences are due to environmental factors,
individual choices, or a combination of the two.
4. D. 3.

Obesogenic Influences
It is well understood that the socio-cultural environment influences body-size

preferences, as well as eating and activity patterns. In the United States in particular, much
emphasis is placed on possessing an attractive body. An attractive body in that particular
societal context equates to thinness. As such, the role that culture and social values assume with
respect to childhood obesity cannot be overstated. Cultural influences shape food-related
practices in families and broader community settings. Not only is the notion of a well-nurtured
body a notion that is culturally shaped, children are exposed to a wide continuum of values and
expectations from parents and their sibling/peer groups that effect their ideal of body-size as well
as appropriate eating and activity practices. 182 These cultural groups and their values undergird
the eating choices that result from individual and environmental constructs.
The causal network of factors leading to obesity is complex and spans many sectors of
society including the family, the education system, the food industry, the media, the transport
sector, and of course, the government. 183 The presence of multiple factors encourages the
dangerous temptation to find fault with one or many of these factors and to assign blame to either
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the individual and their choices, or the environment in which these factors reside. Because of
their complexity, or perhaps in spite of it, it is not possible to correctly assign blame to any single
causal factor to the pediatric obesity problem.
Eating is a social behavior which most often takes place where people spend the most
amount of time. At least for children, that place is traditionally the home. And especially for
children, who are particularly susceptible to behavioral influences, observing the eating habits of
others within the home is a powerful influence on their own preferences and behavior. It is wellestablished that the home and the activities that take place within it and the family unit, tend to
define the child and his or her behaviors and their preferences. Children learn what they live.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the nutrition behaviors and preferences of children and
adolescents are closely associated with those of their parents and others within the family unit.184
Statistics demonstrate that half of the children with at least one obese parent will become obese
themselves, and if both parents are obese, there is an 80% chance that the child will be obese. 185
With respect to the family, the emotional climate of the home and the family unit,
regardless of its composition, is typically measured by levels of conflict and cohesion. Research
indicates that children who experience a family-centered and emotionally supportive home life
tend to engage in healthier behaviors and eating habits. “A common family value is a shared
meal time.”186 Children who experience structured mealtimes tend to consume a healthier diet
and are less-likely to be overweight. Mealtime becomes a family-centered activity where eating
choices and portion sizes are predetermined, controlled and supported. 187
In contrast, there is some evidence that parents of overweight children were more likely
to use maladaptive control strategies and less-supportive behaviors than those who parent nonoverweight children. Admittedly there is, however, relatively little documented information
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concerning parenting practices of overweight children. And it is difficult to know whether the
parental behavior or the obesity came first. Nevertheless, family conflict and lower levels of
parental warmth and engagement are often associated with poorer adherence to treatments for
other pediatric chronic medical conditions; therefore it is not unreasonable to draw a nexus to
childhood obesity. 188 Still, additional environmental, societal, and individual factors bear directly
upon obesity in children.
For example, “The timeline for the accelerated rates of childhood obesity coincides with
increased numbers of both, or single parents, participating in the workforce.” 189 Two-thirds of
children under the age of 6 in the United States spend some time in child care and are likely to
experience some if not most of their daily calorie consumption and expenditure in that setting. 190
Child care centers influence nutrition and eating practices. But as a regulated industry, child care
services are the purview of the state, and recommendations to create positive nutritional
environments are largely a matter for the legislators. Nevertheless day care centers and schools
are responsible for children outside of the home and family, and represent another place where
children spend a significant portion of their time.
Peer influences emerge as another factor in the prevalence and prevention of obesity,
“and the school setting is where children learn many social behaviors.” 191 What is taught and
offered to children in these venues plays a demonstrable role in influencing obesity and can
similarly champion an anti-obesity environment. It is critical that obesogenic environments
continue to be identified and attempts to create and sustain such anti-obese environments, and
the promotion of healthy behavioral influences push on. Such attempts must be fueled by a
comprehensive understanding of the long-term consequences of pediatric obesity.
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4. E.

Obesogenic Vulnerability
It is widely understood and accepted that untreated obesity-related medical conditions

will threaten the life of a child if they are sufficiently severe; particularly when the conditions are
in the later stages of deterioration. Physical manifestations such as Type II diabetes,
hypertension, asthma and sleep apnea can have devastating and debilitating effects well into
adulthood. It is important to note that even if the child’s physical health is never directly in
danger, the restrictions on mobility and other normal childhood activities may negatively impact
the child’s psyche. As such, while long-term medical consequences of pediatric obesity are wellrecognized, the less obvious but highly destructive and indelible consequences of pediatric
obesity, and clearly the most pervasive ones in Western societies, are its psychosocial costs. 192
Because of the stigma, shame and isolation of obesity that often follow the child into adulthood
the psychosocial costs of pediatric obesity are more chronic over a child’s lifetime than the
physiological. 193 Still, the physiological effects of childhood obesity are often irreversible and
can, not only shorten a child’s life expectancy, but interfere with their ability to flourish; thereby
punctuating the significance of contingent vulnerability, and underscoring the moral duty of the
HCO to intervene.
4. E. 1.

Physiological Harms
With the possible exception of Type I diabetes mellitus, children are presenting with

many obesity-related adult diseases that have never been seen in children before. Because of a
paucity of pediatric research generally, adult diseases present in children are difficult to manage
and equally difficult to detract from accompanying the child to adulthood. Moreover, many
pediatricians are not adequately trained nor prepared to treat children for some of these adult-
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oriented conditions such as cardiovascular disease, sleep apnea, and hypertension. 194 Type II
diabetes mellitus – which is often referred to as adult onset – presents another such example.
There is no known cure for Type I, or juvenile diabetes. It is an autoimmune disease in
which the body no longer produces insulin, and survival depends upon a lifetime commitment to
strict diet control and insulin dependence. Causes have been attributed to genetic predisposition
as well as exposure to certain viruses, and while a child with Type I diabetes may become
overweight during the course of the disease, obesity is not typically a precursor to the disease.
On the other hand, there are many factors that contribute to and increase someone’s risk for Type
II diabetes, with obesity representing such a significant factor that they have been described as
“twin epidemics.” 195
The more fatty tissue a person has, the more resistant the person’s cells are to the sugar
controlling effects of insulin. 196 A team of researchers from the Institute of Molecular and Cell
Biology recently revealed that an important protein responsible for regulating insulin in the cells
is lacking in obese individuals. The gene code for the NUKE protein is inactive in individuals
who have high-fat, calorie dense diets. The absence of NUKE leads to insulin resistance which
impedes the body’s ability to regulate glucose effectively which increases blood sugar levels and
leads to diabetes. The NUKE protein reappears when high-fat diets are eliminated. 197
Because of the high rates of obese children, many children are being diagnosed with
Type II diabetes rather than Type I. Because Type II diabetes will often go into remission when
body weight is brought into normal range, and losing weight can completely prevent its onset,
Type II diabetes is most often both curable and preventable. To that end, with an emphasis on
diet and exercise, many pediatricians must adopt new treatment protocols for their young patients
with diabetes. 198
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Similarly, obese children often experience cardiovascular adaptation, which means that
the heart has to adjust to the differences in body weight, oftentimes by working harder, thereby
impacting the way it functions. Pericardial fat can build up around the heart. As such, overweight
adolescents have reported decreased heart function because their increased body mass places so
much strain on their heart. 199 As the heart is pushed to function harder, high blood pressure
places compounding strain on the circulatory system which forces it to work harder thereby
adding strain to the body’s blood vessels. Plaque builds up in the arteries of overweight children
by the time they reach their 20s. The body gradually accumulates all of the exposure to the
harmful cardiac influences which then sets into motion a cascade of bodily processes and
reactions that lead to the development of cardiovascular disease. 200 Because of the omnipresence
of these trigger points, being an overweight child with an overburdened cardiovascular system is
practically a guarantee of irreversible cardiac disease. As science examines the reasons why
more than a half million people in the United States die each year from heart disease, it is
necessary to examine what was behind the curtain that really killed them. Losing weight and
perhaps more importantly, preventing obesity in the first place, is shown to dramatically reverse
conditions such as Type II diabetes, hypertension and certain heart malfunctions.
Given the emphasis on weight loss, requests for weight-loss surgeries for children are
increasing. And since the average age of a typical bariatric surgery patient is 40-years, these
physicians face the same dilemmas as the pediatrician. “Physicians trust that morbidly obese
adult patients can put all known risks and complications into perspective before agreeing to a
bariatric operation. It is not clear that pediatric patients and their families have the same
perspective.” 201 Bariatric surgeons are not always trained and adequately prepared for the
pediatric patient. Additionally, the long-term consequences of bariatric surgery on young
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children, such as the need for postoperative lifelong compliance with diet and behavioral
modifications, are not well understood.
Understanding the linkage between obesogenic influences and behaviors that are quite
literally killing children and imposing changes to those factors is the charge of parents and other
sources of authority who are able to mandate change through control of the environments. This
charge gives them unprecedented power to reverse or prevent illnesses that could impact the
child for the rest of their life. These changes can not only prevent obesity-related illness but can
help the child’s mind consciously or unconsciously adapt, in a healthy way, its body to its social
environment. This psychosocial balance is often threatened by obesity-related consequences such
as bullying, victimization, damaged self-esteem and even depression. To successfully change
these environments, these psychosocial factors must be understood first within the family and
peer environments and then more closely within the individual’s settings. 202
4. E. 2.

Psychosocial Harms
Peer relations are central to a child’s healthy social and emotional development. Most

everyone wants to be liked by those within their social circle. Peer acceptance and popularity are
more often than not the litmus tests for a child’s healthy self-perception. Children who are a
typical weight and body size are most often the most popular. Therefore, all children, regardless
of their weight and size, are abundantly aware of the importance of bodyweight and are
introduced to that preference practically from the moment peer socialization begins; as early as
age 5. They see it, discuss it, and ridicule it. They may try to hide their own body if they are at
all overweight, and draw attention to the size of others’ if they are not. But obesity, unlike many
other diseases, is impossible to hide. Size is one of the most salient features of a person and is
often the basis for premature judgment and dislike. 203
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Not unlike their adult counterparts, non-obese children often view overweight peers as
less-disciplined, lazy, self-indulgent and inherently less popular. Research reveals that one of the
most immediate consequences of being overweight is the differential treatment overweight
children report receiving from their peers and society at large. 204 These consequences are the
result of weight bias, or “the inclination to form unreasonable judgements based on a person’s
weight…and stem from negative attitudes and beliefs.” 205 Simply stated, the peer environment is
not accepting of obesity. 206 Problematic peer interactions are one of the most notable hallmarks
of the psychosocial correlate of pediatric obesity. Name-calling, teasing, bullying and other
forms of victimization are significant social problems affecting obese children. They rarely
concern non-obese children or adolescents. Differential treatment is both damaging and
devastating to a child’s self-perception. However bullying can be the cruelest and most tragic
obesity-related consequence.
The act of bullying is associated with the intentional harassment, aggression or threats
towards someone perceived to be weak, vulnerable or defenseless. There are as many forms of
bullying as there are bullies. And the incidences of bullying range from physical abuse to
assaultive verbal humiliation to detrimental gossip. 207 Cyberbullying and social networking
provide a practically infinite audience that exponentially expands the reach of a bully ensuring
that the brutality is unending. 208 Regardless of its form, all bullying evokes overwhelming and
often paralyzing fear and intimidation.
Nearly 25% of boys and 17% of girls are bullied. These statistics have been tied to
increases in victim substance abuse and suicide. In fact a recent meta-analysis demonstrated that
children who are bulled are more than twice as likely to have suicidal ideations and to make
suicide attempts as their peers who are not bullied. 209 The most common motivator for bullying
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is physical appearance – dominated by body size. Overweight children are 50% more likely to be
bullied than typical-weight children. Sadly, many children report being harassed about their
weight from their own families.
Bullying generally is a long-term and consistent issue. If a child is bullied once, their
chance of continual bullying increases, and the damaging consequences of bullying are
compounded and intensified. This unrelenting harm to a child helps to explain why victims of
bullying have higher rates of anxiety, bed-wetting, depression, psychosomatic symptoms, eating
disorders, lower academic achievement, 210 and of course, fewer friends and more relationship
issues.211 Withdrawal and disassociation are common traits of a bullying victim. As such,
children who have been bullied because they are obese suffer harm from the general effects of
being overweight compounded by the humiliation of being bullied. Because of its two-staged
characteristic, the duality of consequences associated with persistent obesity-related bullying can
lead to life-long struggles with mental illness.
In response to this pervasive treatment, and in the absence of contrary evidence, many, if
not all overweight children begin to believe the differential descriptors and preconceptions about
themselves. And, although longitudinal studies are necessary, evidence shows that the negative
attitudes that obese children hold about themselves and their physical appearance cyclically
invite further stigmatization and rejection. 212 The obese child who is bullied perceives
themselves as diminished and unworthy, thereby reinforcing the preconception that they are
weak and unworthy, which invites and encourages more abuse. Cumulatively, this lays the
groundwork for pediatric psychological disorders, and further increases the risk for additional
psychological challenges into adulthood.
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4. E. 3.

Perception Becomes Reality: Internalizing the External
Health-related quality of life ratings, or HRQOL, are assigned to the physical, emotional

and social well-being of a person based on their own internal perspectives. Largely because they
come to believe and accept the stigma attributed to them through their obesity, children with low
HRQOL tend to be those with the highest body weight. Children with low HRQOL most often
exhibit internalized symptoms such as depression. Conversely and further validating the
argument that obesity is a 2-stage disease, obese adolescents who had the highest level of
depressive symptoms were shown to persist in their obesity over time. 213 It is tempting to
presume that an obese child would seek to escape the negative internalizing that accompanies
obesity by modifying their environment, escaping the damaging influences, and losing weight.
However, it is never that simple.
The relationship between obesity and psychiatric conditions, the current treatments and
related studies point to higher rates of somatoform disorders – those disorders which convert
emotional distress into the physical symptoms of an illness. It is now widely held that
psychosomatic conditions such as undiagnosed pain and mood and anxiety disorders are
attributable to obesity. In addition, most anxiety symptoms are believed to be related to the
corrosive negative impact obesity has on a child’s self-esteem; another demonstration of the
correlation between poor body image and psychiatric comorbidity. 214
The cyclical characteristic of obesity in which psychosocial and psychosomatic
conditions are actually bolstered and sustained by the obese child’s self-image and perception
leads to speculation as to whether or not obesity may actually result from other currently
classified psychiatric disorders. However, many of the psychiatric disorders associated with
obesity appear as adaptive responses. That is to say, negative coping strategies such as substance
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abuse, avoiding exercise out of shame or embarrassment and eating in private are mental health
consequences closely tied to being overweight. 215 In other words, depressed children and
adolescents may eat in response to stress, and those eating patterns and depression-induced
inactivity may lead to overconsumption. This overconsumption typically continues long after the
depressive disorder has remitted. 216
Moreover, children with psychiatric conditions are more vulnerable to other social factors
that contribute to obesity such as abuse, neglect and non-family centered home life. Research has
shown that neglected children are nine times more likely to be obese that children who are
properly cared for. 217 For children who have suffered some form of trauma or neglect, eating
serves as a means of self-affectation and also as compensatory mechanism to cope with neglect
and feelings of low self-worth and self-esteem resulting from automatic thoughts about
themselves.
Schemas are mental codifications about the way the world works based upon repeated
personal experiences beginning with childhood, and they form experiential rule books of life.
Schemas result in automatic thoughts that are extensions of the rule book that become so
engrained that those who form them don’t even realize they have them. Negative schemas are
called upon whenever critical events take place. For example, a child who is continually
frightened by a neighbor’s ferocious barking dog will likely associate fear with all dogs of that
particular breed, without considering evidence to the contrary. As such, the schemas of
overweight children about how the world works may be formed at time when they are being
ridiculed and ostracized. 218 An obese child’s negative automatic thoughts can trigger selfdeprecating beliefs that they are ugly, unworthy and un-loveable. These beliefs can trigger
harmful coping strategies such as turning to food or harmful substances, thereby renewing the
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cycle again and again. 219 And, because they are automatic thoughts and beliefs, they do not end
after the person loses weight. Negative schemas live on – often it the form of pervasive
psychological disorders.
Not all self-esteem issues that befall obese children have such destructive effects. But,
there are equally pervasive aspects of a child’s personality that are negatively affected by being
overweight, or having been overweight. Shyness, oversensitivity, and becoming easily
discouraged when faced with adversity are common personality impacts. Phlegmatic tendencies
and adoption of other defensive personality traits such as developing a protective comedic
personality – becoming the “jolly fat person” as a protective shield against weight bias – are also
common adaptations to the stigma of being obese. 220
As yet, there is insufficient empirical evidence to understand exactly how growing up
obese implicates future personality disorders because obese children have not been
longitudinally tracked, and should be for 15 or 20 years to produce a meaningful measure. The
psychological distresses of childhood obesity continue as the child matures, and overweight
adults are more likely to end up somewhere in the mental health system than non-overweight
adults. In addition, it is not surprising that mental health professions actually expect that their
overweight adult patients will have more psychological problems than their typical weight
patients. Accordingly, more negative outcomes are attributed to overweight patients. 221
Differential treatment and discrimination continue to accompany many obese people. At
this writing, there are no anti-discrimination laws protecting obese children or adults from
mistreatment and stigma. 222 For some obese victims of stigma and discrimination, recourse may
be sought in the United States by pursuing claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA); even though obesity itself is not a disability, many of the diseases’ secondary
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conditions are. Aggressively defending obese victims, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has successful filed and settled claims against employers. 223 However, the
biases that plague obese persons’ internal and external personas will most likely continue
unabated and proliferate as the numbers of obese children continue to climb. Legal recourse
alone will only serve to placate the offense and won’t effectuate the root cause – the obesity
itself. It is clear that effects of obesity-related victimization and bullying, and the negative
attitudes and beliefs are so compelling as to demand ethical intervention strategies to protect the
vulnerable.
4. F.

Parens Patriae: Parenting the Community
“The determination of who bears specific responsibility for the care of vulnerable others

thus needs to be informed by a careful understanding of the ways relationships of vulnerability,
dependence, and obligation are socially constituted nationally and transnationally.” 224As a
relational notion, vulnerability, according to Mullin means that people are “vulnerable to others,
both to their actions and their inaction when we need their help. 225 She further asserts that
children “are particularly vulnerable to acts and omissions of caregivers charged with significant
responsibility for keeping them safe and healthy and for aiding in their physical, emotional,
intellectual, and moral development.” 226 Somebody must take care of those who cannot yet fully
take care of themselves in the face of such vulnerability.
It is from the notion of relational care that the authority to act as a parent emerges. With
respect to children, a social parent is, according to Mullin, “anyone who is charged with such
responsibility, whether a child’s biological parent or not, whether paid or not…it is understood in
the context of their relationship.” 227 The social parent is the embodiment of the relationship
between the vulnerable child and the one upon whom they depend. Throughout the remainder of
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this chapter, Mullins’ social parent theory is in interstitial concept in establishing ethical
accountability to those most affected by pediatric obesity and alleviating their harms.
Merely establishing causation is not dispositive to reversing the harms from current
obesity trends. As demonstrated throughout this chapter, the psychosocial harms to be avoided
include the damaging stigma, permanent emotional harm, and the social rejection resulting from
being obese. These are socially constructed harms. As such, these profound social costs along
with discrimination of all sorts are significant public health risks that warrant community
intervention in executing remediation strategies. As an interdependent unit, it is incumbent upon
the community – as a social parent - to consider its impact on obese children in the face of
obesogenic influences, and its duty to protect them. The strategies employed must take into
account the cultural influences and community values that affect obesity trends. 228
4. F. 1.

Private Lives Publically Held
Individualism and individual choice and the freedoms associated with them undergird the

prevailing ideology in the United States. In conformance with societal norms and generally
accepted values, it is widely recognized that a person should be allowed to choose what is best
for them. Consequently the ideology of individual responsibility is further reflected in the
pervasive view of obesity generally – that the individual and their choices are to blame for their
obesity. A person is believed to be what they eat. Despite this belief, because of the social and
economic forces which have contributed to and enabled the obesity problem to thrive, an
effective solution will not come from the obese individuals’ efforts alone. Intervention of a
higher sort, directly involving the pediatrician on many levels, must occur. 229
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Childhood obesity is not an example of a personal choice that is worthy of respect or
criticism, but rather a public health and societal problem. However, balancing the autonomy of
the parent and their right to raise their children their own way, according to their views and
values is paramount. Parents have a right to raise their children according to their perceived best
interests, and interference against their will is highly controlled and limited to only the most
serious cases.230 However, where the best interests of the child is threatened, and where the
choices of the parent endanger a child’s life or, in the case of public health, the lives of obese
children generally, third-party intervention can be ethically justified.
The polarity between the individual and the collective, or the private and the public view
of health is the quintessential tension in public health ethics. Particularly as applied to childhood
obesity, it requires a balance between the individual rights and freedoms of the child and their
caregivers and the collective needs of the government to promote and sustain a healthy
community.231 This balancing must consider the risks of harm to members of society with and
without the intervention, as well as the threat to fundamental rights of people to choose to live
unhealthy lifestyles, and the potential for unwarranted intrusion into private lives. Public health
ethics must also look beyond the individuals, governments and communities and consider the
unique ethical issues that arise from interventions into obesogenic environments - specifically the
family unit, and schools.
Understanding and balancing these rights and ethical issues of the child is further
nuanced by the considerations of agency and responsibility. Not only must public health
advocates and practitioners who are concerned with childhood obesity consider the child, they
must determine who has ultimate responsibility for execution of the intervention. Public health
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ethics considers the moral duties the government owes to the child and their caregivers, and the
community.232
A number of theories dominate discourse in public health ethics. But because public
health and childhood obesity are value-laden and subject to various social contexts, public health
ethical justification cannot rely upon one single dominant theory. It requires a framework from
which the principles of the duty to do good and avoid harm, intersect with the individual rights to
be left alone, and the state and HCO’s responsibilities to advance the stakeholder community’s
best interests. This dissertation suggests that a theory of principled communitarianism applies the
best of all three objectives.
Communitarianism emphasizes the social and interdependent nature of life and
undergirds the notion that what is best for the community ought to determine society’s moral
thinking and it attributes responsibility of execution to the community. 233 The harm principle –
which compels forbearance of conduct or behavior that would harm someone other than the actor
- is distinctive in that it does not permit mandatory interventions unless the intervention will
prevent harm to vulnerable third parties. 234 As applied to public health, the notion of principled
communitarianism extracts the best of the values of the harm principle and communitarianism in
order to adopt the idea that public health interventions are a shared enterprise. A principled
communitarian theory should look at, among other factors, quality of life of obese children and
determine whether or not the psychosocial, physiological and psychological implications are so
severe as to impact the child’s ability to enjoy a healthy life thereby justifying the intervention. 235
Moral justification alone does not guarantee successful interventions, however. Obesecentered public health intervention, like most public health initiatives, will further require that
people modify their behavior and lifestyles to comport with the intervention, and in many cases
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abandon previously held beliefs about obesity’s causes and effects. The need to educate and
sensitize, and reconsider preconceptions about the dignity of the person is essential in order to
reshape the culture and societal contexts of obesity; 236 and help the population of obese children
reshape views of themselves. The failure to implement and comply with these interventions will
allow the harm from obesogenic influences to survive and thrive. When the community, which
includes the children’s family and caregivers, fail the child, the state and other social parents
must act within their proper authority.
4. F. 2.

Moral Authority: Social Parents and Care Ethics
With an emphasis on communal goods and services 237 communitarianism provides entrée

into to the world of socio-cultural influences which are the building blocks of an obesogenic
environment. The focus is on the communities within which the different environments co-exist.
Folding in the harm principle’s concern for intervention for the sake of avoiding harm, the
interdependent community and its constituents are responsible for and accountable to its children
who are vulnerable to obesity.
But where the community, including the parents and legal guardians, fail to provide
necessary and adequate protection for the child, and are negligent by their actions or inactions,
the state as a sovereign may become a de facto parent. 238 The fact is that no parental authority,
regardless of its intrinsic character, exists independent of the sovereign. In the United States, the
federal government has a supreme duty to all of its subjects, and the sovereign states have
inalienable duties to protect its children. 239 By analogy, this dissertation argues that Mullins’
social parent, empowered by its contextual relationships to its vulnerable children, has a moral
and legal duty to its obese pediatric populations. The moral authority of the social parent in
healthcare defines the ethical accountability to this stakeholder community.
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Mullins’ care theory, from which the social parent stems, attends to the social
arrangements that either generate or mitigate vulnerability, and considers “how attention to the
different domains of children’s relationship with their caregivers” can identify solutions. 240
Although her work is largely directed to the emotional maltreatment of children and its
consequences, the multi-factor nature of obesity and its concomitant physical and emotional
harms justifies its applicability as an appropriate care theory. By understanding the relational
contexts, Mullins’ care theory “directs attention to the needs that are the source of children’s
vulnerability and the role of the caring relationships in meeting those needs.” 241 Of the different
relational domains responsible for the satisfaction of certain needs, the domain concerned for the
child’s protection and security most prominently undergird the social parent’s moral duty. This
moral duty further presumes that the child’s best interest is paramount when considering the
autonomy and exclusivity of parental responsibility vis-a-vis the best interests of their child.
The best interests of the child is the current legal standard in most jurisdictions, however,
care theory looks at the relational interests of social parents as well as the child. This potentially
puts disproportionate emphasis on the presumed parental love for the child. To that end, Mullins
aptly argues that “any version of care theory that attends to vulnerability cannot simply trust
parents or assume they will seek help” and must recognize the need for increased state
intervention242 when necessary and appropriate.
Under the common law, states’ attorneys general may bring actions against parties who
directly or indirectly harm the health or well-being of the citizens of their state. The source of
this legal authority is the doctrine of parens patriae. Translated literally, it means “parent of the
country” and was originally promulgated by the British Crown to protect minors and
incompetents; later evolving into a broad sweeping common law theory. 243 To assert parens
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patriae, the state must first have an interest that is separate and apart from the individual interests
of those impacted by the harm or threat. It must also have a quasi-sovereign interest in the health,
well-being and economic life of its residents. An example of the exercise of parens patriae
authority in the United States is the recent litigation brought by attorneys general against the
tobacco industry for the inherent harms to the citizens of its states caused by its products.
Applying the same precedent against the food industry for its role in the obesity epidemic
may not be as straightforward as tobacco litigation; although consumer groups concerned with
obesity are projecting increasingly active voices against this industry. 244 There is not an easily
traceable chain of causation between the conduct of the food industry, the food itself, and
obesity, as there is in tobacco-induced health risks. 245 Nevertheless, that disconnect did not deter
William Sorrell, during his tenure as Vermont’s attorney general, from convening more than 100
food industry stakeholders over a two-year period to successfully focus on obesity prevention
legislation and policy changes. 246
Regulating the food industry, nonetheless, is most appropriately the province of state and
federal legislators. However, it is a well-settled law that the state is permitted to intervene in
order to protect child’s mental and physical health as in cases of medical neglect. As obesity is a
medical and psychologically-affected condition with far reaching implications, it logically flows
that the state would have similar parens patriae legal authority to act in cases of obesity-related
neglect of minors. 247
It is incontrovertible that the community has a legal duty to protect its vulnerable and is
particularly responsible to protect its children from harm. Situations of child abuse and medical
neglect are most often the purview of state laws addressing domestic relations and child
protective services. Pennsylvania law, for example, provides that all persons and agencies that
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are responsible for a child’s welfare have a duty to protect against abuses, report known or
suspected abuse, and consider the child’s best interests at all times. 248 This includes mandatory
reporting obligations of pediatricians and other clinicians. This duty to protect against abuse is
clearly articulated within the statutory definition of medical neglect, and is expressly conferred
upon parents and those who provide care and supervision, and/or control of a child in lieu of
parental care.
Medical neglect and abuse is the failure to provide medical or psychological care
necessary to prevent, or to treat serious physical or emotional injury or illness by someone who
is required to provide such care. Such neglect occurs when a parent or other responsible party
fails to act249 or to provide care in an emergency, or to address an acute illness that results in
harm or injury to the child. But it also occurs when a parent fails to respond to medical
recommendations for conditions that are treatable or when such treatment would prevent a lifethreatening condition. Determining whether or not the presence of persistent obesogenic
environments and the failure to remove obesogenic influences constitutes medical neglect on the
part of the family or other responsible party requires an intense balancing of interests, harms,
benefits and duties.
Because the family is considered the center of family life for most Americans, its
decisions are rarely subject to state challenges except for the most special circumstances which
threaten the physical and emotional health of its children. 250 In the instant matter, invoking the
doctrine of parens patriae can be morally and legally justified when obesity-related conditions
are exacerbated by medical neglect. In exercising parens patriae through application of medical
neglect statues, the state is essentially challenging the parents’ failure to prevent or remediate the
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physiological and psychosocial harms from obesity. The circumstances warranting state
intervention and the gravity of those interventions each fall into three general categories.
U.S. courts have typically held that interventions addressing medical neglect under the
doctrine of parens patriae look at the degree to which the neglected medical treatment is lifesaving, life-prolonging, or quality-of-life enhancing. State intervention is most strongly
advocated when the treatment is life-saving. Because childhood obesity is often a two-stage
disease, interventions that either reverse or prevent obesity before a child reaches adulthood can
also be life-prolonging. Courts have also upheld interventions which neither save nor prolong
life, but instead improve the quality of the child’s life. Proponents of state intervention in such
cases argue that it is necessary to protect the child’s psychological health and the right to a live a
normal life.251
It has long been held that treatments and interventions intended to improve or enhance
quality-of-life or degree of flourishing, are difficult to weigh and measure. Because these
objectives are subjective, the state’s ability to intervene based upon inconsistent values and
competing interests is a challenging task. For example, morbidly obese parents of a moderately
obese child may consider her quality-of-life superior to that which they experienced at her age.
On the other hand, their present condition may be all that is needed to invigorate the desire to
reverse her condition and free her from obesity-related constraints. In either event principled
communitarianism looks at the balance between the harms and benefits of the intervention in
harmony with the values unique to the community.
Principled communitarianism would consider obesity-related medical neglect as an
abrogation of the parents’ duty to provide a child with a quality-of-life based upon the minimum
quality-of-life threshold that the community’s values will tolerate. In other words, most
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communities would agree that intervention is necessary and appropriate when a child’s life is in
imminent danger. However, the majority of obese children face consequences that are less
imminent. The principled communitarian would take into account the risk that such a low
standard might create if intrusion into family life were to occur where a child suffers from minor
to moderate obesity. In these cases that the community must counter-balance the long-range
consequences created by stigma, discrimination and other factors described throughout this
chapter against the continuity of family relations. In addition to its values, the community’s
appetite for intervention must be respected vis-à-vis its state negligence statutes. Some statutes
clearly articulate the degree of harm necessary, but many do not. As such, the state and its
communities have a duty to rescue its children from the clutches of known and unknown
dangers.252 As members of the community of stakeholders, the HCO and its pediatricians share
in this moral and legal duty. This dissertation submits that, because of the relational dynamics,
and consistent with care ethics, the HCO and its clinicians and pediatricians are social parents to
their pediatric patients struggling with obesity. Therefore pediatricians and HCOs, in addition to
the state, have the moral authority to intervene on behalf of the child, when conditions warrant,
through the doctrine of parens patriae.
4. F. 3.

Intervention as a Shared Moral Duty
Although litigation, as well as the mere threat of it can be a powerful motivator for

legislative and public policy changes, some opponents to state intervention aptly argue that
coercion alone does not create a strong enough foundation for permanent change. 253 In fact, the
fear of a nanny state - a government that is perceived as having excessive interest in controlling
the welfare of its citizens particularly in the enforcement of public health and safety 254 – can be a
formidable adversary to state intervention. However, commentary from the Johns Hopkins
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Berman Institute of Bioethics underscores that government interference into obesity control and
prevention does not amount to a nanny state interference. It contends that the health implications
for being overweight and the obesity-related disparities create a government duty in the name of
social justice.255 With that, social justice in accordance with principled communitarianism,
supports parens patriae interventions incorporating notions of fairness, respect for the values of
the community and the individuals, and adoption of community-based approaches to policy. 256
True community-based initiatives presuppose collaboration across the various stakeholder and
social parent relational groups.
Interventions represent different degrees of intrusion and must be weighed against the
community’s interests, responsibilities, and convictions. Interventions must respect the parents’
interests, as well as the concerns of pediatricians and other healthcare providers, the state, and
the children. Interventions range from benign mandates such as public education in order to
increase interest in healthier lifestyles, to interference with family eating habits.257 Whether they
impact legislation, public policy or social norms, all obesity-related interventions will involve
some degree of modifying and even restricting, individuals and community behavior.
Although they are not the only target for change, parental behavior and habits play a
significant role in childhood obesity. Parents will receive a citation if their child is not snapped
into a seatbelt while they drive, but there is, to date, no penalty for feeding kids to death.
Children have a right to be protected against unhealthy influences, and even the most caring
families may be letting their children down in that regard. 258 Nevertheless, in accordance with
principled communitarianism, the chosen method of intervention must be in proportion to the
gravity of the obesity in harmony with community values. For example, a child with a BMI of 28
should not be removed from the parents’ home in the absence of another more threatening
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situation. In addition, when introducing interventions that modify parental behavior, the
community must guard against the slippery slope suggesting that if one intrusive measure is
good, more must be better. Increasingly intrusive measures may infringe upon larger principles
of autonomy eventually resulting total government control.259
Consider how, in 2000, the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department
(CYFD) exercised parens patriae authority, and removed three-year-old Anamarie MartinezRegino from her home and the custody of her parents. She was taken from her parents on the
grounds that they repeatedly failed to comply with medical orders to correct the present and
long-term health effects of her morbid obesity. 260 At the age of three, Anamarie stood less than
four-feet tall and weighed 131 pounds. She was hospitalized several times for extended periods
and for various obesity-related conditions – losing weight during each hospital stay – but
experiencing significant weight gain soon after returning home. The family physician was
alarmed and took his concerns to the CYFD. The state held that they had probable cause to
remove the child – a clear victim of medical neglect.
This case gained notoriety and created a ground-swell of divisive camps within the
community; many believed the government had overstepped its authority. The medical
community supported intervention on the basis of threats to Anamarie’s long and short-term
health. Many feared removing Anamarie from the home was the first slippery step towards
allowing the state to take draconian measures against parents anytime parental conduct was
called into question. In the final analysis, Anamarie’s parents reached a sealed court-approved
agreement with the state allowing the child to return home. 261
The Martinez-Regino case illustrates how the doctrine of parens patriae, in its most
extreme form, illuminates the injustices suffered by obese children, the need for balanced
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intervention, and how core community values that can be polarizing. A shared cultural model of
core values does not presuppose that everyone agrees with every decision made according to the
model, but rather, the community agrees with the values that support the decision. 262 The instant
case further evinces how, a community of interdependent people, share in the responsibility of
ensuring that a child’s personal dignity is preserved by the community itself and the social
network it creates. The community may disagree as to the outcome, as the case of MartinezRegino suggests, but it did not disagree with the direness of the concern, and the physician’s
affirmative duty to report.
Not all parens patriae interventions are as severe an Anamarie’s experience. However,
even in non-threatening interventions, the government’s police power to intervene cannot be
arbitrary. It must be rationally related to the public health protections targeted and reasonably
designed to correct a situation impacting public health. 263 As such, interventions should be
developed within an integrated chronic disease prevention model resident within the community
and home settings. 264 For example, the U.S. Institute of Medicine suggests that interventions for
obesity prevention target nutrition and physical activity, behavioral treatment, decreasing the
prevalence of sedentary activities, and social and psychological support involving families.265
Hassink goes so far as to suggest that intervention into childhood obesity begin before birth as
fetal life and intrauterine environment factors are influenced by maternal obesity to the extent
that it may render a child more likely to develop childhood obesity. 266These interventions require
environmental and individual behavior modifications which are necessarily supported by the
interplay of families and the medical community.
The pediatrician’s duty as a social parent is not unprecedented as they are concerned
about the health and growth of the children they treat practically from the moment the children
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are born. The correlation between good nutrition and optimal baby growth, weight and
development are foundational principles of pediatric medicine. Identifying failure to thrive, and
weight or height accelerations and decelerations have long been considered early warning signs
of significant illness. 267 Since the late 19th and early 20th centuries, pediatric medicine’s concern
for good food and nutrition consumption underscored efforts to promote breastfeeding, safe milk
supplies, remediate vitamin deficiencies, and even advocating healthy school lunches. Moreover,
the development of premature infants as well as those children who are vulnerable to the effects
of certain chronic conditions, remain integral concerns of pediatric practice. 268
Despite this, some primary care pediatric practitioners contend that universal obesity
prevention and management is an inappropriate use of their time and is best left to the parents
and family. They further argue that the sanctity of physician-patient relationship would be
compromised by discussing this sensitive and stigmatizing topic. They want to minimize
judgment repugnance. 269 Fortunately however, there are those who do consider secondary or
selective prevention – that which seeks to mitigate or reverse existing obesity – as an opportunity
to responsibly collaborate with parents and unify the effort- even if they do see parental
involvement as a significant barrier.270 However, many parents are not comfortable discussing
the child’s weight with the child for fear that the efforts are fruitless or attention will undergird
the stigma and further erode self-esteem.271 They expect the pediatrician to address the child’s
weight if it’s a problem.
Consider that almost all childhood obesity prevention and management programs
recommended by practitioners require calculating and charting BMI once-a-year during wellchild visits; including emphasizing healthy nutritional guidelines and encouraging physical
activity. But, despite the efforts of the practitioners, there is very little evidence of monitoring or
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accountability of the parents or family once the recommendation is made. An example of a
public policy adhering to the theory of principled communitarianism would be one that supports
mandatory reporting of all children whose obesity remains unchecked and unaffected for a
period of more than 12 months. This reporting would be transmitted via a data base registry
would be validated during each well-child visit. The physician’s duty to report parental
noncompliance would be mandated as a duty to report under appropriate state statutes and
professional codes of conduct. 272
Regardless of which view prevails, a proper relationship with food and the interplay of
physical activity must be taught to children, because it will be very difficult for the child to
change the way they view food once they reach adulthood. 273 Family-based treatment
interventions that promote and teach self-management of healthy eating can positively alter
parent and child behaviors, and thought patterns in order to also combat negative psychosocial
consequences. 274 By exercising parens patriae authority, the government can promote such selfmanagement interventions linking physicians and families to culturally tailored and competent
programs275 in order to support healthy nutrition and lifestyles. 276 Providing tax subsidies for
weight loss, finding a community champion, 277 increasing provider reimbursements for improved
outcomes from obesity management, and limiting foods that can be purchased with government
sponsored food stamps, are rationally-related and ethically justified government interventions. 278
And, as activist child health experts, pediatricians should exercise their authority as social
parents by leading community coalitions and legislative endeavors to take healthy eating
lifestyles beyond the clinic walls. 279
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4. G. Conclusion
Ethically accountable healthcare organizations have a moral duty to create opportunities
for the communities of stakeholders they serve. Their obligation to the common good includes
empowering the most vulnerable within those stakeholder communities, specifically pediatric
populations. Throughout history, children represent a highly vulnerable stakeholder group.
They have been exploited and harmed, intentionally or not, and oftentimes during efforts to
support policies to protect them; such as excluding them from clinical research. The need to
empower children, and the importance of research to understand the pathology of diseases and
disorders involving them is compelling. This is particularly evident when understanding children
infected with HIV, those who are victims of abuse, and those with cognitive disabilities.
Children with illnesses and disorders are contingently and contextually vulnerable vis-avis the cultural and environmental influences within which they live. Additionally, their
vulnerability is magnified by those who wield power and authority over them. It is that power
and authority that establishes the moral duty of the HCO, and its moral agents to understand and
respect the humanness of these children. To that end, physicians and researchers, who are often
the same person are obligated to adhere to ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and
fairness throughout the ethical research process. Adherence to these principles entails an
understanding beyond the intrinsic characteristics of the child and their special needs. It requires
examination of their experiential and conjectural perspectives.
Because healthcare and clinical research are relational, the importance of the child’s
interpersonal and social relationships with authority figures such as researchers, physicians and
caregivers, underscores the relevance of relational ethics. Specifically, the goodness-of-fit model
of relational ethics assesses all aspects of clinical treatment and research, against the child’s
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capacity to understand, their relationship with those upon whom they are dependent, and the
cultural and personal values that shape their world.
The collaboration between asymmetrical stakeholders such as the physician, researcher,
child, and even the broader community undergirds the moral accountability to vulnerable
pediatric populations. Their moral obligation and responsibility to better understand population
health in order to mitigate and prevent the psychosocial and physiological effects of pediatric
obesity includes executing their social parent duties. A social parent embodies the relationship
between the vulnerable child, the need which gives rise to their vulnerability, and the ones upon
whom they depend. The authority of interdependent social parents, and their attendant duties to
protect obese children in the face of obesogenic influences, is akin to the legal doctrine of parens
patriae.
By exercising this authority, self-management of healthy eating habits and culturally
tailored programs linking parents and physicians will improve outcomes for obese children
specifically, and public health obesity management generally. The challenges facing children
with HIV, those who are maltreated, those with intellectual disability, and children living with
obesity rarely improve with age or maturity. As such, the practical and ethical considerations for
this vulnerable population create ongoing opportunities for HCOs to enable ethical
accountability, social responsibility, and collaboration with communities of stakeholders across
the child’s life continuum.
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Chapter 5 - Community Stakeholders in Healthcare: The Elderly and Persons with
Disabilities
5.

Introduction
Vulnerability impacts certain stakeholder populations when consequences and conditions

render them susceptible to physical, emotional, economic and social harm or disadvantage.
People are also vulnerable from social biases that have less to do with their actual conditions and
more to do with social perceptions and preconceptions about them. Biases disadvantage,
discriminate, and disempower. They are innately evolutionary, however. Humankind’s earliest
ancestors needed to quickly decide, based upon their perceptions, whether a person, situation or
animal was likely to threaten their survival. 1 They characterized such encounters and made
judgements accordingly. Today, elderly persons and persons with disabilities are often similarly
judged and victimized by biases.
For example, at some point in the life continuum, the elderly face a culture that treats
them differently from youth; buoyed with the presumptive undercurrent that the future is less
relevant for them as they have lived a good life already. 2 Youth represents beauty and promise,
whereas the elderly demonstrate the transient nature of life and the death that is certain for
everyone.3 Similarly, persons with disabilities often face biases that render them the “other” in
dehumanizing ways; these biases often suggest that they represent a “counterpoint to
normality.” 4 Such biases exacerbate their vulnerability and threaten the dignity of their lives.
Propagation of such biases without substantiation also unfairly and unjustly denies
opportunities to those who very often need them the most. Creating opportunities for the most
vulnerable and inaudible stakeholders across the life continuum is a moral duty of the ethically
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accountable healthcare organization (HCO). Applying stakeholder theory, an HCO is
accountable to people and the environment, and ought to serve the common good for the sake of
many.5 To that end, this chapter is dedicated to examination of the duties of ethically accountable
HCOs to the third of three vulnerable stakeholder categories set forth in this dissertation: the
elderly and persons with disabilities.
Aging is an ambivalent reality. Presumably, the vast majority of people hope to live a
long life, however few relish the thought of growing older. Hardly anyone can admit a
willingness to embrace and welcome the physical, emotional and oftentimes economic
challenges that can accompany physical maturity. Yet, the reality that “aging, or just living life
does entail inevitable change” 6 is uncontroverted, and begins the moment one is born. Although
the process of aging as a stage of human development can be positive, living a long life can
present challenges to the vulnerable elderly, and to the communities within which they live.
Nowhere are these challenges more visible than in the resource allocation and mechanisms that
provide access to long-term healthcare services to the very old.
This chapter begins with a view of the demographic profile of today’s elderly stakeholder
and aged populations, and their contextual vulnerability vis-à-vis ageism biases and their unique
health needs. It then explores the current public policy trends for addressing their needs;
including a brief summary of age-based rationing and the different propositions advanced by
Daniel Callahan, Norman Daniels, Paul Menzel and John Kilner. This thesis then presents a
justification for revised public policy to address the unmet long-term informal care from an ethic
of care model that relies upon the interconnectedness of people. 7 It then illustrates how caregiver
and provider advocacy supports person-focused, compassionate long-term care through the
musings of Tellis-Nayak, Nancy Fox, and Muriel Gillick.
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Progression across the life continuum to old age practically guarantees people will
become dependent and at risk of severe illness and disability. 8 For some however, disability is
not a progressive old age event, but rather some permanent consequence of war, injury, illness,
or genetic precondition. According to the World Health Organization, “disability is part of the
human condition.” 9 Because concern for the human condition is at the heart of healthcare,
promoting the dignity of persons with disabilities is a moral duty of the ethically accountable
healthcare organization. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the healthcare profession’s
obligation to enhance the lives of those with disabilities by creating enabling environments
within which they can flourish.
It begins with an illustration of the definition and demographic of human disability. It
then explores the relationship between disability and human dignity, what it mean to be human,
to flourish, and to have a good life. Relevant evolutionary and theological interpretations of the
human condition of disability, including those by Celia Deanne-Drummond, William May, and
Hans Reinders are introduced. Specifically they investigate humankind’s desire to improve the
human condition of disability through genetic intervention. The argument for ethical
accountability to this stakeholder community, further unfolds to assert justification for creating
enabling opportunities that eliminate barriers to flourishing, reverse ableism biases their effects,
and impart a culture of disability ethics. It explores these matters through thought-leaders such
as Michael Oliver, Alicia Ouellette, Jackie Leach Scully and Eva Feder Kittay. Underscored by
care ethics, this chapter concludes that all of humanity moves “in and out of relationships of
dependence through different life stages and conditions of health and functionings,” 10 and that
care as a virtue is essential to understanding another’s needs. 11
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5. A.

The Elderly Population – The Cared For and the Caregiver
The term “elderly” typically conjures images of a frail and fragile person. Mindful of the

distortions of this imagery, the social sciences more positively refer to the population of aged
individuals 65 and older as “older adults.” 12 This dissertation uses these and other similar
conventions interchangeably without adopting a clear preference. Irrespective of the imagery
evoked, any conversation addressing their needs must emerge from an understanding of what it
means to belong to this stakeholder community, by examining a few of the notable definitions.
Traditionally, “’elderly’ has been defined as a chronological age of 65 years old or older, while
those from 65 through 74 years old are referred to as ‘early elderly’ and those over 75 years old
as ‘late elderly.’”13 Its origins are attributed to the German Empire more than a century ago when
65 was the age by which persons were eligible to receive national pension plan benefits. 14
Patterning itself after the European nations’ establishment of chronological eligibility for
old age insurance programs, in 1935 the United States determined age 65 as the benchmark
retirement age through the adoption of the Social Security Act. 15 Today, 65 is hardly considered
old age as people are living well past that milestone into their 90s, and beyond. In 2016, the
number of people over age 65 in the United States was 49.2 million, representing 15.2 % of the
population.16 Persons over 85 account for about 6.4 million people, 52 times more than there
were in 1900. In 2016, there were 81,896 people over the age of 100 in the United States; 17 more
than double the 32,194 reported in 1980. It is vitally important, however, that today’s elderly
represent more than mere census statistics. They are a heterogeneous population of persons who
once were parents, teachers, veterans, laborers, physicians, and most often caregivers
themselves. They represent the human condition in transition.
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5. A. 1.

Living with Unmet Needs
Aging is an individualized process. Individuals age differently and have highly diverse

needs, often influenced by their chronological age. Some demographers contend that these
differences and the sheer size and proportion of the population considered “old age” points to a
need to establish age groups in order to differentiate the “young old” from the “oldest old.” Some
argue for applying a four-age-group model breaking society into young people, working people,
younger retired people, and the oldest people. While others suggest adoption of an “oldest old”
based on two groups the 50-74 year old group, and the 85+ group. 18 Despite the need for
differentiation, there are some generalities within each of these age groupings that medicine and
science explore to objectively meet the unmet long-term health care needs of the elderly.
From the Greek geras meaning ‘old age’ and iatrikos meaning ‘physician’, geriatric
medicine is one of several groups of specialties defined by the patient’s stage of human
development, such as pediatrics and neonatology; rather than by organ system, such as
cardiology and neurology. 19 Geriatrics is concerned with disease and health problems specific
older adults.20 Accordingly, the benchmarks of geriatric medicine rely upon the age of the
patient. Because it is unlike most other specialties which look primarily to the physical and
biological aspects of illness, geriatrics by design pigeonholes its patients according to where they
are on the life continuum. As such geriatrics is innately predisposed to the unconscious or
conscious biases of the healthcare professional, according to their preconceptions of ‘elderly’.
There are inherent risks to such biases. Using stereotypes in the course of care can result in,
among other things, premature, and/or missed diagnosis “when clinicians fail to see their patients
as more than their perceived demographic characteristics.” 21
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Coined in 1968 by geriatric medicine pioneer Robert Butler, ageism is “a systematic
stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they are old.” 22 It can be conscious
(explicit), or unconscious (implicit), and is not the exclusive province of healthcare. It is an
attitude that is influenced by cultural ideologies and practices. 23 Throughout history in less
industrialize societies, older adults have been valued for their wisdom of counsel, and serve as
inspiring role models to the younger members of society. 24 In the United States, however, society
tends to presume that old age renders people unable to make good decisions because intellect,
wisdom, and decision-making capabilities are compromised by age. 25
Ageism can be subtle; for example, when healthcare professionals bypass direct
communication with the elder patient and address younger family members first. 26 Ageism can
also be overt as reflected in a survey of Johns Hopkins medical students revealing that 80 percent
would aggressively treat pneumonia in a 10-year-old girl, while only 56 percent would do the
same for an 85-year-old woman. 27 In either case, power relationships are linked to ageist
assumptions and ideologies, including those that suggest that all elderly are mentally infirm;
leading to treating old persons in authoritative and dismissive ways. 28
Stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination can clearly present obstacles to health equality;
not only in terms of quantity, but quality of care. A recent U.S. study evidenced “age-related
treatment of heart attacks relative to national treatment guidelines, with older patients less likely
to receive standard diagnostic procedures and recommended treatment.” 29 And unlike other
forms of discrimination that rely upon immutable biological characteristics such as sexism and
racism, ageism will affect anyone who lives long enough. 30 Although ageist tendencies can
penetrate the entire healthcare system, this dissertation concentrates primarily on its impact on
vulnerability in the clinical setting, and with respect to long-term care policy.

250

When the elderly can no longer care for their basic needs, and/or they are denied
dignified methods of dealing with their functional decline, their dependency on other caregivers
renders them particularly vulnerable. They are subject to threats or events that have the power to
advance them towards adverse and harmful outcomes. 31 Understanding the nature of elder
vulnerability entails examining contingencies, threats and risks, and the extent to which they are
defenseless against them. According to Schroder-Butterfill and Marianti, vulnerability in this
context of the elderly is a probabilistic concept that has incremental outcomes based upon their
proximity to harm. She argues that “a person’s risk of suffering harm – her vulnerability – is the
incremental outcome of a set of distinct but related risks.” 32 Probabilities are aligned to the
exposure to a threat, the materialization of the threat, and the ability to cope or defend against the
threat. This is a particularly useful framework for understanding the elderly who must consider
proximity to and accumulation of risk exposure across the lifetime. There is an incremental
reality to the dynamic process of aging. The probabilities of risk are best addressed when those
with moral authority recognize and act upon their interrelationships with the elderly and their
collective obligations to them; 33 enabling them to live their best lives.
Medical advances and technology have made it possible to prolong healthy human life.
These advances naturally include prolonging the lives of those with complex, chronic, disabling
conditions, and functional disabilities. The elderly represent some of the most acutely sick
persons requiring some of the costliest and protracted care. The top four leading causes of death
– heart disease, cancer, cerebrovascular disease and Alzheimer’s – are nearly all accompanied by
prolonged periods of functional decline, disability, and high rates of health services preceding
death.34 According to the 2017 International Health Policy survey, more than one in three people
(36%) of adults over the age of 65 in the U.S. had multiple chronic conditions. 35
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Women are more likely than men to suffer from multiple chronic conditions such as
diabetes, hypertension, migraines, digestive problems and other orthopedic maladies that are not
necessarily imminently life-threatening; although they generally result in limitations to mobility,
physical and social activities. 36 Stroke, heart attack and cancer are more common in men 37 who
utilize more in-patient hospital services – reimbursable by Medicare – whereas women use more
prescription and custodial care services. The net result is that Medicare covers a smaller portion
of women’s healthcare needs.
Paradoxically, women outlive men despite being disproportionately impacted by chronic
healthcare and access issues. 38 In 2016, there were 27.5 million women over age 65 compared
with 21.8 million men; or a ratio of 126 women for every 100 men. Beyond age 85, the ratio
increased to 187 women for every 100 men. 39 Because women tend to marry men who are older
than themselves, they are less likely to share their later life with a spouse. This fact helps to
explain why 75 percent of nursing home residents are single women.
Marital status is also directly linked to a number of economic, physical and emotional
measurements of well-being as a person ages. Older married persons typically have higher
household incomes, better health and lower incidences of depression than their unmarried
counterparts. Further, they experience reduced risks of institutionalization as spouses tend be the
primary caregivers for their frail and disabled partners. 40 Statistically, in 2017, 70 percent of men
over the age of 65 were married, compared to only 46 percent of women; of the unmarried
elderly women, 33 percent were widows. 41
Historically there has been a pervasive and strong societal dependency on family as
primary and even sole caregiver to the elderly. The presence of family caregivers is in general a
significant factor in keeping older people out of nursing homes. Fifty-percent of older people
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with long-term care needs who do not have family caregivers are in nursing homes, while only 7
percent who have a family member to care for them are placed in long-term care institutions. 42
Stalled population growth and the imbalance between the population of young and
elderly persons means that fewer offspring and other family members will be available to care
for the elderly. The fact that couples and unmarried offspring have more elderly parents to care
for than they have children to assist in that care, negatively draws on the human capital available
to provide informal care to the elderly. 43 Because of upward trends in the age composition of the
elderly, and the fertility histories of women who will be retiring, the shortage and the need for
long-term care solutions will be much greater. 44
5. A. 2. Long-Term Care
For purposes of this paper, long-term care refers to the services and support relied upon
by those who need daily help in order to function day-to-day. Such help includes a wide array of
services including personal care, assistive technologies, care coordination, home modification,
transportation and rehabilitation. Assistance may be needed regularly or intermittently, for
periods of months, years, or for the remainder of a person’s life. 45 The need for such care is
measured according to the person’s ability to perform daily activities and tasks.
The notion of long-term care incorporates formal (paid) and informal (typically unpaid)
services. Persons over the age of 65 account for approximately 75 percent of formal long-term
care spending in the United States. 46 Specific examples of formal long-term care services are
adult day care, in-home care services, care provided in residential facilities, and intermediate and
skilled nursing facilities.
In comparison to the delivery of high-technology healthcare for the acutely ill, for which
there is a strong preference in the United States, long-term care services are considered “low253

technology” low-cost care. Nancy Jecker states that most of the health care dollars spent in the
United States are spent on acute care, high-technology medicine centered on intensive, shortterm, crisis-driven health care.47 Yet, those who need long-term care are those whose care is
chronic rather than acute. Long-term care is a continual need, not episodic as is typically the case
with acute care. 48
Chronic health conditions most often restrict the elderly’s ability to perform activities of
daily living (ADLs) such as dressing, bathing, and eating as well as instrumental activities
(IADLs) such as meal preparation and housekeeping. Because these chronic conditions and the
accompanying limitations require continual rather than episodic care, the need for long-term care
is ongoing, most often permanent. A great percentage of the oldest old living in community
settings face ADL challenges – over 25 percent require assistance bathing and showering, 40
percent have difficulty walking without assistance and 10 percent need assistance with toileting.
A sizeable proportion of the oldest old also report difficulties with IADLs - 17 percent need help
to use the telephone, 24 percent cannot do light housework without assistance, and 23 percent
cannot prepare meals alone. 49 Formal long-term care services most commonly include skilled
nursing and other personal care home settings. Informal long-term care options are most
desirable and appropriate for many elderly with ADL and IADL limitations who desire to remain
in their home setting.
Home care is an informal outpost of the healthcare system by which services are brought
to patients in a setting that reinforces autonomy and self-respect, social integrity, familiarity,
safety, and low cost. 50 Providing supplemental services to the elderly in their homes most often
provides a cost-effective alternative to nursing home and other forms of long-term formal care.
In addition, it provides the elderly with a sense of continuity and safety in their comfortable
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setting, allowing them to ‘age in place’ near family and community networks. 51 The elderly
frequently associate living in their own home with independence as it provides evidence of their
ability to make decisions for themselves.52 It remains the one place where they can be themselves
– and be free from their “sick” identity and be more at home with their changing bodies. 53
Despite the need and the benefits such services confer, current policy trends, ageism, and
age-based rationing and allocation attitudes can obstruct access to these vital services. Such
attitudes bolster providing them to only those who are perceived to have the most dire, meanstested needs; while denying them to those on the fringes. Moreover, even though they are
significant consumers of healthcare services, the Institute of Medicine recently issued a report
alleging that negative attitudes toward the elderly exist even within healthcare communities and
disciplines across care settings. 54 Equally significant is the public ignorance, dogma and stigma
that influence the social figments associated with formal long-term care; particularly the negative
connotation of nursing homes. 55 Such attitudes widen the chasm of unmet needs, and further
punctuate the imperative for policy change.
5. B.

Public Policy and Age-Based Allocation and Rationing
The purpose of public policies are to articulate how governments distribute resources,

influence behaviors, and help to ensure the security of its constituents. They also reflect
common consensus about values, and tell a story about people, history and what is important to
the populace. Policies try to solve problems or support core beliefs. 56 Throughout the past several
decades, certain core beliefs concerning the rationing of healthcare needs of the elderly have
dominated policymaking thinking in this space. Public policy concerning care for the elderly is
shaped and influenced by perceptions of what it means to be aged, and how the human lifespan is
viewed in the United States.
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Older people are viewed as a homogenous and undifferentiated constituency, and the
human lifespan is typically considered to be a lifespan of production; spanning a pre-work, work,
and post-work life continuum. Those who have surpassed the age of 65 are seen as all belonging
to the same spot on the lifespan and therefore sharing the same undifferentiated needs. This
myopic thinking sparked many of the federal programs designed to provide for elderly – chiefly
Medicare. While these programs reflect compassion towards the elderly, many of them
encourage a view that the elderly are all weak, inferior and fragile. 57 Smith recalls that, coupled
with ageist ideology, the need to control rising healthcare costs and expenditures relating to the
elderly, while improving access to care, established the basis for allocation and rationing. 58
Allocation of healthcare resources considers what resources ought to be committed to a
particular program, and is typically assessed at a macro level considering only statistical lives.
When resource assessments consider the impact on the micro level of identifiable lives, it is
known commonly considered rationing.59 This paper accepts the definition of rationing adopted
by the Catholic Health Association as “the withholding of potentially beneficial services because
policies and practices establish limits on the resources available for health care.” 60 Because
governments and HCOs encounter the elderly at the macro and micro levels, they regularly make
decisions that involve both allocation and rationing. This paper highlights the predominant views
of age-based rationing and allocation in order to demonstrate that applying an ethic of care is the
moral alternative to purely age-based considerations, and therefore supports the provision of
dignified, long-term care services.
The belief that the elderly population is a “bottomless pit of needs” and that meeting
those needs will disproportionately stress already stressed financial resources - undergirds much
of current public policy and forms the basis for age-based rationing.61 Scarce medical resources
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is a reality, and as such there is no longer a debate about whether healthcare should be rationed,
but rather how to do it equitably. 62 Influential scholars and bioethicists have shaped the course of
public policy with respect to rationing, and their range of thinking spans a continuum from
rationing of services based on a perceived natural lifespan, to a care-oriented approach with
“care” as the core principle.
5. B. 1.

Perspectives on Age-Based Rationing
Daniel Callahan’s original communitarian model is the most extreme call for age-based

rationing of health care for the elderly. He argues that patients over 80-years-old ought to be
considered to have lived a natural life span, and for the sake of the good of the community, they
should not receive certain life-saving procedures and services, but merely accept a tolerable
death.63 His expectation is that the elderly will consider the value of their remaining lives in
relation to the larger intergenerational community, and because of their advanced age, they
should prepare themselves to pass the torch of life to subsequent generations. 64
According to Callahan, the elderly experience a meaningful life when they serve the
young, and that they serve as models of morality when they surrender medical services in favor
of the young. One way to ensure that the elderly comply with this moral expectation is to compel
them through age-rationing measures. 65 Callahan’s model is myopic at best. His approach misses
the richness of experiential reasoning and thought that the elderly bring to the intergenerational
community of younger people. It caters to a “youth oriented culture” demeaning the status of
older people. 66 Moreover, he fails to consider that the life plans of the elderly do not end at a
prescribed age, but rather remain an inseparable part of their optimal functioning, relative to their
condition and capabilities.
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Norman Daniels proposes his Prudential Lifespan Account of rationing. According to
this Account, the just distribution of limited health care resources between the young and the old
entails varying the health services provided through the different stages of life. A distribution
supported by stable policies at each stage. He argues that providing different levels of services –
essentially, treating people differently based upon their life stage – does not breed inequality if
everyone in the same life stage is treated the same way all of the time. This means that society
would treat the young one way as a matter of policy, and the aged another, and this is done over
their whole lives and the net result is that all persons are treated equally. 67
In contrast to Callahan, Daniels contends that it is necessary to provide healthcare to the
elderly in order to help them maintain their own degree of functioning and a fair opportunity to
enjoy their life plans. Unlike Callahan, Daniels does not assume that one stage of life is more
valuable than life at another stage, but rather the Prudential Life model turns on the judgments
that people would make concerning their care at each of the different stages of life; according to
an agreed upon principle. 68 As such, Daniels argues that providing public long-term care services
ought to be incorporated into the life of the prudent planner.
Incorporating vestiges of Daniels’ Account, Paul Menzel’s Prudent Consent model of
rationing works from peoples’ rational and prudent self-interest based upon the needs and goals
of their lives. It is not an age-based model, but one that is more “age-influenced” - based upon
the quality of life that the individual anticipates. This model allows persons to choose the
beneficial care that they want now and also what they anticipate wanting in later years; thereby
placing the rationing determination squarely in their hands. It respects autonomy and the
integrity of self-determination. 69
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Part of the challenge for United States as it considers the long-term care of its elderly
population, is that very little attention and planning takes place until the need for elder care
arises. The Prudent Consent model foresees a proactive rather than reactive system of rationing
influenced only by the characteristic of age rather than the age itself. The Prudent Consent
approach encourages persons to self-manage their lives and their resources and to take
accountability for long-range needs based on how they want to live their lives. In addition, this
approach presupposes that nobody will receive benefits unless they have contributed some share
of the costs, thereby avoiding the risk of free-riding.70 Menzel contends, however, that despite
the hollow words, preserving the integrity of self-management and avoiding free-riding are not
core values in the United States. As such, getting people to give up their attachment to their own
self-interest will require what Menzel calls, “moral missionary” work. 71
Expressing his alarm at the utilitarian culture that seeks to maximize the good of the
greatest number of younger citizens at the expense of adequate care for the vulnerable elderly,
John Kilner questions the wisdom of age-based rationing entirely. 72 Kilner examines the standard
age-based argument that as healthcare for elderly persons is costing more, and the population of
elderly is rising faster than any other population, it is necessary to cut back on all health
resources available to the elderly, including long-term, low-technology care. His position argues
instead for a standard of policy making that considers the person first before other economic and
social considerations.
Kilner presents a person-first approach. That is, the person needing long-term care is a
person who is elderly, not an “elderly person.” And, their needs are examined through economic,
cultural, social and political lenses. Accordingly, he concludes that one of the primary reasons
that society considers cutting back health services for the elderly is the cultural preoccupation
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with youth. And, he describes the increasingly utilitarian view in the United States that actions
should produce the greatest benefits for the greatest number of people. Coupled with the general
bias towards favoring those who are most productive within the market-driven U.S. economy,
the net result encourages the view that the elderly are nonproductive and subject to rationed
services.73
Kilner advances several strong arguments contending that such age-based rationale
guiding current policy trends are not ethically justified. He attacks the economic argument on
several fronts. Rising health care costs are due to a number of other factors that have no direct
relationship to the elderly, and that other countries with similar trends include the economic
impacts of other dependent groups – such as children – into the cost allocation equation. He
further questions the wisdom of a society seeking to ration available healthcare resources rather
than controlling other aspects of spending rampant in an excessive consumption-driven
economy.74 But most germane to the issue of long-term care is his contention that the most
needed form of elder care demands the least economic impact.
Most health care rationing focuses on lifesaving care, yet a very small proportion of
services for the elderly are of a lifesaving nature. 75 Most elderly need informal “life-sustaining”
care. Moreover, even in the event that lifesaving care is necessary, Kilner agrees that those
incidences and the likelihood of repeat episodes can be lessened by providing basic lowtechnology, preventive care – such as in-home medication management and assistance with
ADLs and IADLs. Reformulating the national policy on equitable resource distribution
necessarily begins with an understanding of current policy trends and implications.
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5. B. 2.

Current Policy and Trends
Society’s frail and elderly have unmet needs. Policymakers as well as ethically

accountable healthcare organizations must understand better how current cultural and economic
contexts coupled with the healthcare system’s reimbursement payment structure, fail to
sufficiently provide for these needs. As an example, Medicaid and Medicare programs were
constructed as entitlement programs designed to assist low-income beneficiaries, and serve as
primary insurance for the elderly over 65, respectively. However, even though they were
intended to help the disadvantaged and needy, they represent indirect forms of rationing as
Medicaid’s restrictive eligibility requirements more often than not limit individual enrollment,
and Medicare’s reimbursement rates and coverage limitations often fail to provide needed
services after the acute episode has passed. 76
Since its inception in 1965, the central focus of Medicare has been on paying for medical
services for acute and life-threatening conditions, not chronic, disabling conditions. Although it
is widely accepted as insurance for the elderly, historically it was more accurate to characterize it
as a funding mechanism for hospitals and professional providers. However, recent costcontainment initiatives and payment methodologies have lowered hospital reimbursements such
that the elderly are being discharged sooner thereby going home “quicker and sicker.” 77
Ironically, post-discharge events, which frequently lead to readmissions, often exacerbate the
unmet needs of the chronically ill elderly.
From discharge - the point at which acute care is no longer provided, the elderly and their
family are most often left to go it alone without access to necessary life-sustaining services.
Current policy trends fail to consider the total-care delivery package which takes into account a
comprehensive view of the elderly patient before, during and after acute care treatment.
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Healthcare cannot be considered independent of the social services required to support the
elderly when their capabilities begin to decline.78 Yet, despite its packaging as social insurance
aimed at keeping the elderly alive, current Medicare trends demonstrate little appetite for any
sustained care beyond acute that would actually allow them to live.
Although Medicare is the primary funding source for home healthcare, nearly threequarters of the nation’s elderly pay for these services out-of-pocket. At least one reason is that
despite the fact that Medicare reimburses for home care, it does so on the condition that the
services are skilled versus informal, and that they be hands-on, short-term illness resolution
services such as occupational and physical therapy modalities. Moreover, they are reimbursed on
a payment-per-visit basis and terminate as soon as the fiscal intermediary administrator
determines that the skilled services are no longer medically necessary and reimbursable. As such,
Medicare home-care services do not fully meet the post-discharge home-care needs of most
elderly, but appear to be a substitute for extended hospitalization leaving much of the residual of
necessary services up to the elderly to purchase. 79
Part of the reason why Congress, when it passed Medicare in 1965, opted not to cover
informal long-term care services had to do with the prevailing assumption in the United States
that the needs of the elderly are solely the purview of the family. As such, exclusion of these
services was supported by the fear that if a public benefit was available for family caregivers, the
inducement for fraud would have alleged family caregivers coming from everywhere. This is a
woefully short-sighted and cynical view of family caregivers, as today most caregivers want
respite, not remuneration or replacement. 80
In the United States there is a compelling interest in keeping the elderly out of skilled
nursing facilities for as long as possible, yet there are few if any informal care communities
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prepared to care for them as they transfer out of acute care facilities. 81 Societal needs have
significantly changed since social welfare programs were initially designed in 1935. At that
time, such programs responded to family arrangements that are no longer operative today, and to
a vastly different population composition. The social programs available today have not kept
pace with this changed demographic. 82
The economic cost of informal caregiving services is staggering and has steadily
increased since the beginning of this century. “At $470 billion in 2013, the value of unpaid
caregiving exceeded the value of paid home care and total Medicaid spending in the same year,
and nearly matched the value of the sales of the world’s largest company, Wal-Mart ($477
billion).” 83 In 2014, approximately $217 billion of the value of unpaid care was attributed to care
for persons with Alzheimer’s or other dementias. Contrast this to the $613 billion in total 2014
Medicare expenditures84 and it becomes apparent that the mere presence of informal caregivers
is a vital part of Medicare cost-containment and deserves the attention of policymakers.
Caregiver needs are important and policy trends must be attentive to the crucial role they play.
Throughout the U.S. healthcare system, more generous attention is paid to hightechnology, high reimbursement procedures and services rather than those that are low-cost, lowtechnology. One reason for the proliferation of costly technology is that cost-effectiveness is not
a Medicare criterion for determining whether to reimburse manufactures for new technologies.
There is very little incentive for manufacturers to invest in low-cost alternatives. 85
Hence, the United States system pays more for short-lived, costly procedures and
relatively little for low-cost, high-yield cognitive and other informal care services. 86 The lowtechnology needs of the frail elderly are as much a part of their illness/pathology as those of the
acutely ill. Nevertheless, decisions of who is entitled or not entitled to receive them are based on
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seemingly arbitrary assessments examined against standardized guidelines. Public policy
supports not paying for low-technology informal care whenever an assessment model is
conducted without regard for the delivery of care, or the facts and circumstances unique to each
person’s illness-related need. 87
Enacted in 1965 as a health benefit program to assist certain disadvantaged segments of
society – primarily low-income beneficiaries – Medicaid is a means-based, state run entitlement
program. Medicaid does authorize states to include home-based services and waiver programs
intending to keep people at home and in the community and out of nursing homes. 88 The
majority of states have set the coverage and eligibility limits such that the requirements fall
drastically below the federal poverty guidelines, which means that less than one-third of the
chronically ill and disabled elderly can qualify – leaving the remaining two-thirds forced to get
by without necessary services. 89
Because eligibility for Medicaid services is means-tested, many elderly are forced to
draw down and significantly dilute their assets in order to become sufficiently impoverished to
qualify for needed care. In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for example, a chronically ill
elderly person who has anything in excess of $8000 in assets 90 would have to spend the excess
on qualified expenses in order to become eligible for assistance. The mere process of forcing a
disabled elderly person to relinquish assets that likely represent the net sum of a lifetime of
productive achievement and accomplishments can be, in many ways, more painful than the
chronic condition. To beggar in order to receive care runs afoul of the very market-driven
economy that motivates the policy trends purporting to support self-determination and
autonomy.91
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The U.S. system of long-term care resides within a residualist model whereby the
government provides resources only after informal attempts have failed – either through resource
depletion or other failures. This model ensures that every claim for care becomes a needs-based
claim that is structured more on the perceived failings or inabilities of family, or other
caregivers, to take care of their own. These needs-based claims are catalysts for demobilizing
possibilities of shame, guilt and embarrassment for everyone – including the elderly person. 92
Society must move from providing health only to the residue of a person’s health and dignity, to
providing long-term care services that views caregiving as a collective societal concern, not
merely a private matter. One viable approach to this is through social insurance.
Such products could be designed to provide formal and informal long-term care services
to all chronically ill elderly who are in need. Universal compulsory social insurance programs
such as Medicare work as a distribution channel for payment for health services because they
create large risk pools while avoiding the stigmatization and stereotyping that often occurs with
means-tested programs such as Medicaid. 93 Social insurance for long-term care would eliminate
the need for a chronically ill elderly person to expend their assets and risk emotional and
financial impoverishment. The compulsory draining of lifetime savings for long-term care
actually discourages people from planning and saving for care in the first instance. 94
Paying into social insurance in the same way that people pay into Medicare through
payroll taxes would help to ensure lifelong, intergenerational risk sharing and would further
ensure that caregivers and the elderly would obtain at least a minimum of basic long-term
services – driven largely by coverage limits and insurance product design. According to
Rosemary Tong, publicly funded eldercare would force society to engage in dialogue about
caregiver and cared-for vulnerability as well as how the care is distributed between the state and
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the private caregiver.95 And, while the creation of social insurance for long-term care would only
partially address the question of how much to pay for these services, it would at the very least
address who should pay for them.
Coverage would require the establishment of care standards and quality measurements
for formal and informal care, however, those considerations are beyond the scope of this essay.
Nevertheless, for social insurance to be developed effectively and to receive broad support and
acceptance of prospective beneficiaries, the insurance must be functionally based, not population
centered. That is to say, it must include coverage for other long-term care stakeholder groups,
including those intellectual and physical disabilities, who may or may not be elderly. To that
end, it is important to note that despite ageist thinking, and the fact that chronic illnesses and
disabilities positively correlate to age, aging does not necessarily equal disability. 96 In sum, new
social mechanisms to provide long-term care must be created in response to social changes,
particularly in the nearly 50 years since Medicare and Medicaid were enacted.
5. C. Reshaping Public Policy through Ethic of Care and Compassion
Families and other informal caregivers must be empowered and enabled to discharge
their duties to care for their elderly. Similarly, society must be able to sufficiently meet the
healthcare needs of their most vulnerable citizens. The ethically accountable healthcare
organization has a moral duty to respond to the needs of these stakeholder populations and
provide later-life experiences that preserve human dignity and self-respect. The HCO is
uniquely empowered with authority to effectuate the change necessary to fulfill these needs. To
that end, it is necessary for them to engage and work to reshape public policy to better target
benefits to those with the greatest needs. As Weber suggests“[h]ealthcare organizations are
major stakeholders in public health policy…through either their own government affairs offices
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or the efforts of advocacy organizations such as the American Hospital Association, the
American Medical Association, and the American College of Emergency Physicians.” 97 As such
they are powerful influencers, and the value of their voice to serve this community of
stakeholders cannot be overstated.
With the patient at the center of an imaginary hub and spoke model, the delivery of
appropriate, affordable and quality care depends upon the relationships between the encircling
and interconnected communities of stakeholders. These multi-stakeholder communities include,
family, professional and facility providers, social workers and therapists. Many stakeholder
groups are often strategic partners not typically aligned with healthcare systems. 98 These
communities are further influenced by, facility administrators, state, local and federal
governments, and professional associations who establish standards of care, transportation
agencies, as well as third party payers. In addition, certain extenders such as religious
communities, social and civic organizations and volunteer agencies can be collateral caregivers
and are integral to this model.
Acknowledging this interrelatedness, Holstein, Parks and Waymack advocate for an ethic
of interconnectedness in policymaking.99 They argue that policies that consider individuals as
solely independent and autonomous persons do not have the gravity and effectiveness of policies
that purport to serve the majority of the population. The interconnectedness of the individuals to
their groups are bound together by the values and ethics of the group.
Since prehistoric times, humankind’s survival relied upon collective team cohesion and
support against life-threatening elements. That reliance continues and is amplified today, as
societies are more interconnected, specialized and complex; rendering connection a prerequisite
for survival physically and emotionally. 100 HCOs and policymakers can more readily effectuate
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policy changes to expand access to long-term care, once they acknowledge the need for such
access and understand the interconnected community values and experiences attributed to it.
Interconnectedness requires that policies represent a commitment to what Holstein, Parks and
Waymack refer to as “intergenerational solidarity” and a rejection of the view that individuals
and families can address the economic and social difficulties of caring for their elderly family
alone.101 They depend upon resources and support from the wider community.
However, ethical healthcare policy making, and specifically long-term care, is not just
about allocation of limited resources. Ethics, according to Smith, “[i]s an unparalleled regulator
of value selection and must therefore be factored into the formulation of a national elderly
healthcare policy.” 102 It is about compassion, and understanding the voices of those in need, the
ethical principles guiding decision-making, and the care that undergirds those decisions.
5. C. 1.

The Ethic of Care.
“Everyone who reaches adulthood does so because someone else cared for her or him.” 103

The simple truth of Groenhout’s account illuminates the reality that care is an emotion involved
in providing for the needs of another, and is indispensable for human life. 104 Caring is not
theoretical. It is an empirical reality that begins before birth in the form of a primitive caring
relation, and the survival of the infant is wholly dependent upon continuation of that relation. 105
Such caring, for Carol Gilligan, entails “paying attention to seeing, listening, and responding
with respect… it is a relational ethic grounded in a premise of interdependence.” 106 Hence, as a
normative theory of ethics, ethic of care arrives at moral decisions and actions from the
understanding that is acquired from interpersonal relationships.
For Virginia Held, “care has many forms, and as the ethics of care evolves, so should our
understanding of what care is.” 107 Nell Noddings espouses that caring “[i]nvolves attention,
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empathetic response and a commitment to responding to legitimate needs. It is sometimes
referred to as an attitude, but it is more that; it is a set of dispositions to respond positively to in
interpersonal relations. 108 She further argues that it “[i]s not merely a fuzzy feeling, nor is it a
prescription for how all care-fors must be treated. It is a moral response to expressed needs.” 109
Because it is relational at its core, the moral response is not only individualistically expressed; it
is collective.
The fact that lives are interconnected, and that isolation and misguided autonomy
increase the probability of risk and vulnerability, underscores the need for an ethic of care and
collective responsibility. 110 Recognizing the relationship to those most vulnerable, care is further
defined as “practices of responsibility in which the different persons involved take responsibility
in a process of reacting to vulnerability.” 111 According to Vanlaere and Gastman’s personalist
approach, “the dynamics and content of care are determined by the proper nature and origin of
the relationship between these persons, the vulnerability of the persons, and the context within
which the care takes place.” 112 The most consequential common denominator to all of these
perspectives for health care is the human relationship that binds stakeholders, and the ethic of
care model that guides actions and decisions.
Healthcare is about human relationships. The traditional medical model approach to care
recognizes the interdependent interactions between clinician, patient, and third-party payers for
the purpose of diagnosis and treatment of disease or conditions, and payment for services.
However, many more stakeholder relationships are involved when in-home and other
community-based long-term care services for the elderly are considered. 113 In addition, there are
social determinants that can also cast significant impact on the care, quality of life, and health of
the elderly such as proximity to children, access to food and nutrition requirements, adequacy of
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clothing and shelter, social isolation and access to healthcare services generally. 114 For a number
of reasons, these factors are not always apparent or made available to the provider of services
under the medical model, and are often not considered in the care plan. Adherence to the ethic of
care model brings these additional factors to the conversation because it supports a collective and
communal, rather than individualistic approach to care.
This communal care ethic does not vitiate the liberal notion of living freely and
autonomously, but rather reinforces the connectedness and sameness that makes people who they
are and fortifies them; it is, in many ways the ethics of empathy. The ethic of care balances
individual rights, freedom and human connections. It affords people the ability and opportunity
to develop and maintain nurturing relationships. To that end, moral leaders must not forget that
humankind will cease to exist when people stop caring with, for, and about one another; and
“without carefully developed and nourished relationships of care, human life cannot be lived to
the fullest.”115
Thereupon, it is worth considering how the Judeo-Christian tradition perceives the human
lifespan as encompassing a lifetime of dynamic mutual giving and receiving. Parents sacrifice for
their children who then sacrifice for them.116 Catholic traditions also teach the exercise of
responsible stewardship at every stage of life. 117 When policymakers and healthcare leaders
imbed these virtues into policy and practice, the moral justification for public support of longterm care communities becomes self-evident. Stewardship promotes the authentic good of human
beings and human society, and preserves human dignity and self-respect; with particularity, it
benefits the aged and their caregivers. 118 Importantly, human dignity transcends a person’s age,
condition, gender health, religion or stage of development. The inherent dignity and sacredness
of all human life is paramount. 119
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In applying the ethic of care, a transparent dialogue must also include the voices of the
professional providers and practitioners who have direct or indirect treating relationships with
the chronically ill elderly. The policies they follow must also consider the challenges they
encounter as formal caregivers, as well as their ethical obligations that are prescribed by their
profession. At the core of this dissertation is the recognition that few relationships are more
sacred than the relationship between a physician and her patient. Therefore in support of ethical
long-term care policymaking, professional and facility providers have a moral duty to work
collaboratively120 and in relation with other stakeholders, to advocate for the chronically ill
elderly.
While respecting fidelity to her patient, E. Haavi Morreim aptly argues that in the face of
limited resources and widespread rationing, there is an urgent need for providers to advocate for
their patients.121 Within the context of care for the elderly, such physician advocacy is necessary
in order to explore alternative post-acute services to support the long-term needs of the elderly
patient. Effective advocacy for elder services demands a commitment to the relational aspect of
care.
The traditional view of the physician’s duty to her patient has been that the patient’s
vulnerability, illness, impairment and even ignorance created strong duties of fidelity and
personal commitment to the patient. To assuage the assertions that the imbalance of power
between the physician and patient unfairly compromised the patient’s decision-making
capabilities, the principle of autonomy permitted the patient to decide themselves, free from
controlling influences. 122 However, as older patients encounter increased challenges to their selfdetermination, the principled approach to ethical advocacy may be insufficient.
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The values of independence and autonomy fit best within the acute care setting, and have
been overemphasized within the context of old age policy. 123 In long-term care, the decisionmaking does not typically center on single matters such as consenting to a particular treatment or
course of care. It is dynamic and nearly always implicates others and their resources. 124 As
suggested by Ludwick and Silva, “facilitating autonomous decision-making for patients would
be very straightforward if healthcare professionals could simply designate patients as competent
or incompetent to make decisions. However, in reality, decision-making is more nuanced.” 125
By adopting an ethic of care, the ethically accountable physician and HCO will see their
roles vis-à-vis the elderly patient differently. Instead of merely seeing an elderly patient who is
discharged from an acute setting because they are healthy enough to leave, but too frail to live
without informal care, the ethic of care asks that the providers accept that they are “self-in
relation” with the elderly patient. 126 It demands a degree of attentiveness that implies having
sufficient knowledge of what to look for and taking responsibility for care. 127 In adopting an
ethic of care, the provider will “strive to find solutions that reinforce relationship and uphold
values of caring, empathy and integrity.” 128 Thus, she should be compelled to give a voice to the
elderly patient and advise them of alternative care settings, and even facilitate the provision of
services by administering outreach to ancillary services.
A healthcare professional who becomes so imbedded in an elderly person’s care enabling
them to take better charge of their lives in their home care setting, contributes to the elderly
person’s dignity and self-respect. However, this advocacy, which arises from a normative ethic
of care applied to providers runs counter to the traditional medical model of care. As illustrated
earlier, the preferential medical model of high-technology diagnostic and treatment modalities

272

and respective payment systems which favor compensation for complex care rather than informal
in-home care dis-incentivizes physicians to promote such essential modalities.
Yet, the ethically accountable provider who embraces an ethic of care, will begin to see
her role in relation to the interconnectedness of the larger community and support the values and
norms that will reshape public policy for the elderly. She will have clearer insight into the impact
of decisions on other relationships and points of view that are important to the patient. 129 When
compassion effectuates positive change for her patient through an ethic of care, this change will
help reshape the norms and values for all physicians, health care practitioners and policymakers.
Her expression of compassion is “the most noble of human relations which lets us into the
personal world of the other and shares the other’s pain and trouble”
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according to Tellis-Nayak

and Tellis-Nayak. Such person-centeredness can transform the culture of long-term elder care
for the patient, the caregiver, and the community.
5. C. 2. Caregiver and Community-Based Person-Centered Care
While the principle goal of long-term community-based care is respect for the human
dignity of the aged and chronically ill elderly, policies must also respond to the needs of the
children, in-laws, spouses and other informal family caregivers. Because, as Virginia Held
suggests, “persons need to care together for the well-being of their members” and “we should not
lose sight of the deeper reality of human interdependency” 131 which supports collective
responsibility for caregiving. This collective recognition includes the interests of the caregivers
and their resource needs; both human, economic, and spiritual.
Sound policymaking must also to take into account the needs of the changing family
structure, find ways to support mutual caring activities, and challenge dangerous caregiver
assumptions; particularly those that ignore the needs of women caregivers. Caregiving by
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women is the unspoken foundation of contemporary long-term care policy. That is not a surprise,
as Gilligan holds, that “[w]omen not only define themselves in a context of human relationship,
but also judge themselves in terms of their ability to care.” 132 According to the U.S. Census
Bureau findings, in 2017 56.4% of the 51 million providers of informal eldercare were women;
43.8% of them were between the ages of 45-64.133 Roughly 36 percent of unpaid caregiving to
all older Americans is provided by daughters and daughters-in-law, and sons and sons-in-law
account for another 16 percent. Such caregiving typically lasts 4 years. 134
Most often, women caregivers are multigenerational 135 and hold other primary caregiver
roles – that of mother, wife and daughter - which add to the complexity of the informal long-term
care model. Children of female primary caregivers are often collaterally impacted by the efforts
of their mother to care for and sustain their elderly grandparents and/or parents. While family
neglect, either real or perceived, is generally unintentional, it is a quite often a natural
consequence of family caregiving. Additionally, feelings of stress, sadness and fatigue are
commonly reported by elder caregivers and other members of the affected family. 136
An ethic of care-based system of long-term care policies and programs will help to situate
older people in the context of home, family and community without exploiting others who care
for them. It will ensure that equal attention is paid to the voices of the recipients and the
caregivers to ensure that reciprocal care is morally responsive care. Understanding individual
voices and relationships are essential to HCO’s in executing their responsibility to disrupt and be
a change agent for the good of the vulnerable elderly. Gilligan contends that voices are
instruments of resistance that bolster transformative change. 137 The power of voice to effectuate
change is particularly evident when person-centered and compassionate care ethic is the
objective.
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The factors that affect health outcomes of a community of stakeholders are rooted in
complex systems. As submitted by Nancy Fox, the long-term care problem is an emergent
system. With complex causes, there are generally not just one or two solutions. Fixing the
problem requires understanding it holistically, not just according to its parts. 138 According to
Muriel Gillick, one way to consider long-term elder care holistically is to reorient the singleminded thinking about the patient as only an individual, and consider them in relation to their
caregivers, their home environment, and their wider community. She contends that physicians
ought to be the architect of plans that consider their homes and community design. 139 The effects
of these environments can determine the extent to which a person’s health thrives or fails. 140
Providing the elderly with technically competent and compassionate person-centered care that
considers their health state, what they value most, and is achievable within their unique
environments141 is not merely aspirational. Noteworthy examples of person-centered
compassionate care models inspired by physicians to change the culture of aging, are providing
long-term care that is life-affirming, humane and meaningful for all affected stakeholders.
As a resource created by long-term care professionals advocating for culture change in all
models of elder care services, the Pioneer Network was formed in 1997. 142 Its mission is to
change the culture of aging in American by encouraging communication, networking and
learning opportunities to create residential environments for the elderly that are persondirected.143 As the antidote to institutionalization, the Pioneer Network advocates for caring
communities for elders to live in. 144 The Network espouses movement away from provider and
staff directed long-term care towards care that is person-centered; where elder preferences and
past patterns form the basis for staff decisions making. Ultimately, the goal of the Pioneer
Network community is to go beyond person-centered to person-directed care wherein the elderly
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make their own decisions about their routines and the staff align patterns to meet their
preferences.145
Community-based long-term care for the elderly interconnects the caregiver and the
elderly patient to an environment that focuses on flourishing rather than illness. Thereupon, the
Eden Alternative, an international non-profit organization was founded in 1991 by Dr. Bill
Thomas, to “create a life worth living for elders in their care.” 146 Its founding mission is to
transform the way elder care is provided throughout the world. As of 2019, the Eden Alternative
Philosophy has positively impacted more than 111,000 elder care organizations globally, through
education, training and provider partnerships. 147
According to Thomas, the bulk of elder suffering is due to the three plagues of loneliness,
helplessness, and boredom. 148 The Eden Alternative antidote to these plagues is a reciprocal
caregiving environment that includes plants, animals and children. As an elder-centered
community, the Eden Alternative Philosophy creates opportunities for elderly to give and receive
care. It de-emphasizes top-down bureaucratic care decisions and places the maximum decisionmaking authority in the hands of the elderly themselves or into those closest to them. 149 Medical
treatment, according to this model, is subordinate to genuine human caring.
Also founded by Dr. Thomas, The Green House Project opened its first elder home in
Tupelo, Mississippi in 2003. Thomas, a self-described nursing home abolitionist, began tearing
down nursing homes and building in their stead small home-like settings designed for ten to
twelve residents. 150 These small homes provide private rooms and bathrooms, bright, open
kitchens and intimate dining settings similar to single-family dwellings. Without long hospitallike corridors and communal meal rooms, they are designed to closely resemble the familiar way
that many of the residents lived their independent lives. In addition, because of the small, family276

like atmosphere, elder residents interact with staff and other residents on more personal levels;
forming deeper relationships.
Their organizational structure is different from traditional nursing homes. Green Houses
practice consistent assignment. This means that the same aides routinely care for the same few
residents. This helps to promote relationship. In addition, the staff are cross-trained to work in a
variety of different roles from laundry to helping prepare meals. This more consistent contact
also helps the staff become aware of subtle changes in residents’ conditions which helps them
spot potential health concerns early. 151 To that end, research from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation concluded that the Green House model is a preferable model of care. 152 The study
demonstrated that hospitalizations and readmissions were lower than traditional nursing homes,
38 percent of residents were less likely to have pressure ulcers, and 45 percent less likely to have
catheters. All of which suggests that emphasizing quality of life did not necessitate sacrificing
quality of care. 153 These models, rooted in philosophies promoting person-directed, relationshipbased care, are changing the culture of care for the vulnerable elderly. The ability and capacity to
care for, and to be cared for by, another is united to the concept of human dignity. 154
5. D.

The Dignity of Disability
In 2019, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that 1 in 4 adults in the

United States had some form of disability. According to that report, they were most commonly
seen in adults over the age of 65. 155 Despite the statistical reporting and demographics, it is
difficult to measure the number of persons with disabilities, as it is not a single state, but rather a
multidimensional human condition. 156 As such, understanding disability as a human condition is
a complicated and dynamic endeavor.

277

Akin to the nature of elderly populations, disability is a condition that resides on the
human life continuum. The positive and negative effects of disability can wax and wane in a
variety of forms over time, affecting the ability of the person with disability to flourish. Some
conditions exhibit periods of long stability, some disabilities are characterized by steadily
increasing impairment, and some, particularly those that originate from injury, may even
demonstrate improvement. 157
According to the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF),
disability is an umbrella term defining the negative aspects of impairments, activity limitations
and participation restrictions affecting an individual with a particular condition, and that
individual’s contextual factors. 158 Defined in this matter, disability refers to the challenges
associated with specific areas of functioning, and not the underlying condition itself. Specifically
it looks at impairments to physical or mental functioning, activity limitations such as walking, or
eating, and participation restrictions such as employment, transportation, or access to social
settings.159
The ICF characterization of disability is concerned with the interaction between the
person and their environment, which is most often where impediments to flourishing are found.
The moral duty of the ethically accountable healthcare organization is to improve the human
condition and dignity of persons with disabilities and palliate vulnerability by creating
environments which enable them to flourish. To that end it also demands that persons with
disabilities, to whom leaders are accountable because of their role as stakeholders, are afforded
the dignity to live with their disability identity in right relationship with their environment. 160
Like the elderly, persons with disabilities are a heterogeneous group representing the human
condition.
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5. D. 1.

Understanding the Human Condition

Protagoras observed that “of all things the measure is Man; of the things that are, that
they are, of the things that are not, that they are not.” 161 Accordingly, in representing the human
race, man was the reference point from which all things of the world were known – including
what it meant to be human. Granting this subjective latitude to determine the terms of human
existence to man alone was bold and daunting. So much so that more than two-thousand years
after Protagoras espoused this ethical relativism, the human race has proven unable to even agree
on how to measure its world, much less on how to universally define and measure what it means
to be human. Understanding the nature of humanity, what it means to be human, and to possess
those characteristics and traits that are uniquely and typically human, has been the object of
attention for philosophers, anthropologists, politicians and theologians practically since the
beginning of time. Humanity’s ongoing search to define itself is further complicated and
distracted by its unending desire to improve itself - a self not even fully understood – through
technology,162 biomedicine and genetics. In its quest to improve the human condition, humanity
wrestles with reconciling the attraction of eliminating all unacceptable characteristics and traits
not deemed typically human, against those held to be ideal.
To profess that someone is disabled presupposes that there exists criteria for what it
means to be non-disabled; to be ideally human. To say that a being possesses ideal human
characteristics is largely a social construct. From an evolutionary perspective, humans and their
embodied nature are distinguished from other animals. They are studied according to how they
live in relation to tensions within their environment, as well as in terms of human biology and
characteristics. 163 They continually strive to change and break from the forces of nature. These
continual changes are driven by the human reflective capacities of knowledge and intelligence.
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Of course, the mere fact that humans are dynamic thinkers living in response an environment that
is, at times unfriendly, does not sufficiently explain what it means to be ideally human.
Irrespective of its malleability, according to Allen Buchanan’s observations, a human nature
possesses good and bad, common and natural, characteristics and dispositions that are
impervious to change and external influences 164 – such as the ability to make moral decisions
and engage one another socially. According to this view, without these and other impervious
and constant characteristics, a being would not be human. 165
The Judeo-Christian tradition has greatly influenced western thought on the question of
humanness. It holds that what makes the human animals human is the fact that they are made in
the image and likeness of God. Sharing the fact that they bear God’s image – that is, His
presence which remains within all created humans - human beings are in special relationship
with God and serve as co-creators and stewards for humanity. As stewards, humans have
divinely bestowed dominion and are responsible for overseeing things produced for the good of
humanity as well for the persons producing them. 166 This dominion presupposes the duty to
change and improve life for the rest of humanity. Despite the grace imbued with this
stewardship, their frailties as exposed through the fall of man, illustrate that what separates
humans and distinguishes them from being mirror images of God; it is their sinful nature. Before
the fall, a human being was the embodiment of body and soul in perfect union with God. There
was order. After the fall, the human body and its soul experienced disorder and became
disengaged from God. The incarnation of Jesus Christ gave humanity a model to emulate and an
opportunity to restore unity and emerge from sinfulness. 167 Human transformation is central to
Christian thought. “God becomes like us so that we may be might be made like God.” 168
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Both the evolutionary and theological perspectives of what it means to be human
prescribe the need for humans to change and to improve. Evolutionary humans measure
humanity’s physical and intellectual fitness against the chances of survival and elimination of
death in a hostile environment, and Christian tradition measures human sinfulness against the
pursuit of Christ’s redemption from an evil world through life in Jesus Christ. Human
transformation is central to Christian thought. Both scientific and religious traditions agree that a
fundamental human characteristic is the aspiration to become transformed into healthier, more
grace-filled, productive and enlightened beings. Even with these characteristics, humanity does
not provide normative rules dictating when and which parts of human beings can be changed or
even destroyed in its pursuit of self-improvement. What is clear is that human life is challenged
by a host of complex variables, including theological concepts, physical parameters, limitations,
and even its genetic framework; which can all affect human life. This is what Walter Doefler
refers to as conditio human or the human condition.169
The human condition – the endeavor to move humanity through these challenges and
variables – is collectively seen as broken and flawed. Accordingly, the human condition,
whether it is viewed theologically or scientifically is something that strives to eliminate human
limitations, alleviate the suffering and improve the quality of human life and human fulfillment.
Understanding the depth to which humanity may dive as it pursues elimination of limitations –
particularly those perceived limitations associated with human disability – requires examination
of the concepts of human flourishing and the good life. What constitutes a good life, and the
quest to select the qualities of human nature which ought to be preserved, is as old as humanity
itself. This thesis does not explore the many dimensions of this question, but will accept for the
sake of brevity that those qualities attributed to a good life depend upon what a good life is
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considered to be. 170 This dissertation adopts the perspective that the measurement of a good life
is one which promotes and allows for human flourishing. 171
5. D. 2.

Human Flourishing: Abilities and Attitudes
As Jonathan Glover examines human flourishing, he rightly states that what constitutes a

flourishing life, is not the same for all humans. Much of human flourishing relies upon the innate
differences attributed to each human and their unique circumstances and environments. In
addition, the good and flourishing life is only observable on the basis of life as we know it; it
does not consider things untried. 172 Further, there is no universal notion of normalcy with
respect to the good and flourishing life. It is “how life seems to the person who lives it.” 173
To that end, and with respect to human disability, Glover contends that while all human
disabilities involve some functional limitations, the mere presence of a functional limitation does
not create a disability; and a disability does not necessarily impede flourishing. A person with a
disability can have a good life in the same way a person without one can be miserable. The real
measurement of a disabling quality is found in the impairments or obstacles to human
flourishing. To that end, much of the ability to flourish depends upon the person’s reactions and
responses to the circumstances and settings that confront them. 174 This dissertation will
demonstrate that the reactions and responses that impact flourishing extend beyond the person
with the disability, and include those attributed to the wider communities and environments
within which they live. In sum, a flourishing life is not devoid of flaws or limitations, but is
rather one which respects those limits and learns to live alongside rather than beneath them.
Persons with disabilities can flourish on their own, because what constitutes flourishing is
dependent largely on their preferences. A disability which renders someone unable to engage in
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a particular activity may not be a disability at all if the person would not value that activity or
want to engage in it even if they could. 175 That is one reason why most persons with disabilities,
their families and loved ones express a sincere appreciation for the lives they live according to
their preferences. The joy that someone with a disability experiences in the ordinary course of
their lives – the joy they appreciate – can be markedly different from that which the able-bodied
experience; hence, the experiences are often misunderstood or ignored altogether. It is often the
inability or unwillingness to identify those preferences, by those upon whom persons with
disabilities depend, that impedes their flourishing.
Deficient societal settings and distorted perceptions of reality concerning persons with
disabilities inhibits flourishing. For example, the absence of wheelchair ramps, poorly designed
transportation systems, and the dearth of education on how to interact with persons with
functional limitations impairs human flourishing, oftentimes more than the limitation itself. The
ability to flourish is further hampered by cultural assumptions of what is normal, and society’s
frequent intolerance, discriminatory practices and preconceived opinions about persons with
disabilities and their limitations. 176 It is the way that normalcy is constructed that creates
problems for those with disabilities. 177 Such constructs and preconceptions further presuppose an
understanding of the experiences of those with disabilities. Because most people rarely talk
about the positive, relational life experiences of persons with disabilities, such experiences are
not generally associated with their flourishing. Furthermore, the dearth of shared experiences
results in more distorted preconceptions. It is for this reason that the presence of biases towards
persons with disabilities thwarts and creates real barriers to their flourishing on many societal
levels, including the delivery of healthcare.
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The same way that ageist tendencies discriminate and disadvantage the elderly, implicit
and conscious biases towards the idea of disability as well as those with disabilities reinforce
stereotypes, obfuscate flourishing and adversely affect the good life. Implicit, or unconscious
biases associate attitudes and stereotypes towards categories of people without conscious
awareness. They happen automatically and are hard to control or suppress. 178 They are generally
formed by personal experiences, attitudes, and culture; and develop and take shape over the
course of a lifetime. Specifically, implicit biases about persons with disabilities are pervasive. 179
While they are not consciously offensive, implicit biases reflect and reinforce stereotypes
when they are directed at members of marginalized groups such as persons with disabilities.
Implicit biases are typically subtle and not overtly offensive, however, they can offend. For
example, when someone addresses questions meant for a visually impaired person to their
companion, the message sent is that the person who is blind cannot think and respond
independently. These micro-aggressions reinforce negative stereotypes. 180 To extricate the roots
of biases against persons with disabilities, society must develop, through relational encounters,
greater understanding of the experiences and attitudes of persons within disability communities.
As a vital characteristic of human flourishing, the good life must recognize the gravity of human
relationships and the experiences emanating from them.
The relationships between persons with disabilities and their families, the persons they
choose as friends, and the communities within which they live can enhance and enrich the ability
to flourish beyond any biological characteristic or quality. 181 Martina Holder-Franz warns that
society must guard against creating a myth of normality that values people merely for their
biological characteristics and qualities. With great insight she contends that life is vulnerable and
relational, and persons with disabilities ought not to be judged by their ability but rather by their
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availability for relationships.182 Studies show that persons with disabilities generally show
warmth towards their own communities and peers. And the more visible the disability – such as
using walker or other assistive device, the stronger the positive attitude toward the disability
community.183 When persons with disabilities are introduced to others according to what they
enjoy doing, and the friends they have rather than what they cannot do, others will naturally
discover commonality with them. And with that, the desire to create relationships with them that
makes life rewarding for everyone involved. 184 Relationships are necessary to flourish. “The
flourishing of every person, whether disabled or not, is dependent upon others, on the support of
our families, friends, communities, and social structures, as well as the cultures given to us by
religious and national traditions.” 185 Personhood is sustained by relationship, and what sustains
relationship is love. 186
Christian theology teaches that humans are to live in communion with each other, to
share with one another and to serve one another. The Greatest Commandment is about humans
and their loving relationship to their neighbor. 187 Human flourishing demands loving
relationships that promote dignity, friendship and caring. Rather than adhering to attitudinal
barriers which create roadblocks to flourishing, humans must be motivated by a belief in the
goodness of creation and the image of a God that is present in everyone in order to reveal God’s
face and to allow His grace to emerge. Grace allows humanity to witness the reality that each
person is limited and broken in some manner and is need of others. This enables all persons, and
in particular those with disabilities, to live what Matt Edmonds calls a graceful life. 188 This
togetherness promotes interdependence which welcomes the presence of God, and helps to
eliminate the fear that often pervades the willingness to get to know a person with a disability.
Christian interdependence honors the value of all individuals – despite their limitations – not by
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what they can or can’t do, but by simply being who they are. 189 Interdependence means persons
are dependent upon God and each other, but it also acknowledges God’s dependence upon
everyone to be agents for God’s healing throughout the world. 190 Healing and cure are seminal
objectives often sought when justifying improvements to the human condition; particularly when
such improvements seek to eliminate disease and suffering associated with perceived disabilities.
5. E.

Improving the Human Condition of Disability
The flawed human condition seeking to continually improve human life for all persons

must reconcile with the fact that disability exists within a social world that privileges some
bodies and minds over others. Thus, it creates a world allowing some capacities to flourish while
others do not. 191 Implicit biases against persons with disabilities are further propagated by the
fact that the social world is largely designed for and supportive of able-bodied people. This
reality further stigmatizes those who are not; 192 promoting preferential communities and
lessening the opportunities for experiential relationships. It is as if societies and their cultures
were designed and formed around the presupposition that everything is to work and be
productive according to a preconceived design plan.
To that end, ableism emerged as the social prejudice in favor or persons who are ablebodied. In its most fundamental state, ableism contends that the able body is better than the disabled, and anything other than a fully able body is considered broken. Ableist thinking conflates
disability with disease, illness and pain, and can adversely influence improvements to the human
condition. According to Reynolds, ableism has been a central and unquestioned part of medicine
across its history. 193
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5. E. 1.

The Medical Model: In Search of a Cure
Throughout most of history, the idea of disability has been a medical one. Whether the

objective criteria of illness or injury resulted in rehabilitation or institutionalization for persons
who were blind, deaf or mentally ill, the biological explanation of the condition defined the
person. Today, classifications of diseases become the labels attached to persons with particular
conditions or disorders. For example, a person possessing the clinical characteristics of autism is
considered autistic, just as one experiencing seizures related to epilepsy is branded an epileptic.
Such characterizations are dehumanizing, as they place the disorder ahead of the person. Inquiry
into the person becomes not a question of who, but rather what they are. In addition, in an
attempt to be precise and pragmatic, the description of the disorder presupposes the person’s
needs, their abilities, and disabilities. 194
Because the medical model of disability views disability as a problem of the person that
is directly caused by disease, trauma or other health condition, addressing such biologic matters
instinctively requires medical care. The medical model relies on two assumptions, according to
Iezzoni and O’Day. The first assumes that individuals will strive to overcome their disabilities,
and the second presupposes that clinicians know what is best for their patients. 195 This model of
disability relies upon objective diagnostic criteria and observations that, per se, are not
demeaning to the person. However, a person’s needs are linearly connected to a clinically
identified abnormality, which in the spirit of medicine, must be normalized. 196 When definition
and diagnoses become synonymous with disabilities, we confront what Edmonds refers to as the
tyranny of normality. 197 To that end, the medical model of disability is flawed in that the
association of disease or disorder suggests that there is something wrong with the person that
needs to be fixed, or cured.
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Still and all, medicine has enabled significant breakthroughs in the treatment of
conditions affecting individuals with disabilities; many of which are attributed to extending their
lifespan. Advances in medical technology, including devices, pharmaceuticals, surgery, and the
creation of new clinical care pathways have added years to lives. For example, due to multiple
medical advances, the life expectancy of a person with Down syndrome has increased from 20
years in the 1980s to more than 60 years today. 198 Because of developments in cardiology,
people with Becker muscular dystrophy are living decades longer in the 21 st century.199 Such
life-extending advances improve upon clinical understanding of disease as well as diagnostic and
therapeutic successes. 200 Nevertheless, the World Health Organization cautions that adding
‘years to life’ is devoid of benefit without adding ‘life to years.’ 201 Lengthening life-expectancy
without mitigating vulnerability and enabling flourishing merely transitions the person with a
disability from one vulnerable stakeholder community to another.
Embodiment is the crux of the medical model. It defines the disability as a physical
property of individual that requires medical intervention, according to Tobin Siebers. 202 In
essence, this model proposes a superficial distinction between disability and ability. Chiefly that
disability is a medical matter, while ability concerns ones natural gifts, physical prowess,
imagination and the capacity and desire to strive – the essence of the human spirit. 203 Because
the medicalization of disability holds that something is wrong with persons with disabilities, to
the extent that they are underserved because they compete with other groups for resources, this
model generally regards that they are the source of their own problem. 204 They lack ability.
Paradoxically, this perception of inability materializes and is very often compounded into
reality within the care environment. As a delivery mechanism for medicine, the healthcare
setting according to disability advocate Alicia Oullette, is “a dangerous and difficult place” from
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the perspective of disability. 205 Those with mobility limitations may have difficulty entering
exam rooms, using physical examination tables, or mammography and other imaging
equipment. 206 Communication issues are also associated with general access issues, but also
relate to the ability or inability of the care provider to recognize the person’s capacity to hear or
understand what is being said. 207
Oullette further contends that bioethicists perpetuate the problem by applying decisionmaking frameworks that legitimate biases when determining when it is appropriate to use
medical technology to promote health and maintain life. In particular she argues that they rely
on assessments of health, medical appropriateness, quality of life and familial best interests to
justify decision-making for persons with disabilities. Factors which ignore the unique cultural,
social, and personal aspects of the disability. 208 In addition, they are often assessed from the
paternalistic perspective of the non-disabled bioethicist, clinician or physician, supported by the
medical model undercurrent that the defect must be cured if the person is to achieve full capacity
as a human being. 209
The distinction between cure and healing is frequently blurred. When the word cure
appears in the English language, it typically refers to the elimination of a disease and its
symptoms.210 A cure is sought in order that a person may be restored to the same health and
physical condition as before the disease appeared, or as if it hadn’t appeared at all. If a cure
seeks to eliminate disease and suffering, it must be distinguished from healing which, as Nancy
Lane asserts, is a process of integration and wholeness and not simply being free from illness,
and is not necessarily a physical manifestation. According to Lane, healing is letting go from
false and unrealistic expectations. Healing allows one to live with a disability rather than suffer
from it.211 Healing brings about grace, peace and well-being and often involves finding a sense
289

of meaning and purpose – a spiritual wholeness, but not necessarily a cure. 212 Accordingly, a
healing may or may not include a cure, and a cure clearly does not ensure a healing.
Because society traditionally perceives healing very narrowly and typically recognizes it
only in the physical improvements and manifestations of those persons with an easily detectable
disorder or disability, its inclination is to follow only the physical effects of the healing or cure.
This tendency severely limits how society ought to see the collateral, life-affirming, impact to the
able-bodied as well as disabled persons who are spiritually healed, even in the absence of a cure.
To find a cure, society turns to the medical arts. By exercising prudence, religious traditions
espouse the view that humans can intervene as stewards of the faith and co-creators of life to
cure and heal; seeing medical professionals as God’s agents on earth. 213
It is in society’s best interest to place a high value on health and well-being, to value
good health over ill-health and to reduce morbidity and improve overall health. However, as
Wilkinson correctly argues, placing a high value on good health, ought not to conclude that those
who are ill or disabled are valued less. The value of health cannot mean that less value is
accorded to those who are blind, paraplegic or cognitively impaired. Important to this is the
objective reality that one who is disabled is not necessarily unhealthy. A particular impairment
may be unassociated with any disease pathology. While presumably most people would prefer
being able-bodied to being disabled, and healthy rather than unhealthy, the reality is that much of
what is considered normal and able, and the attitudes about certain illnesses are subject to
normative belief.214
The medical model provides very little, if any, understanding of the descriptive realities
of disability, and there is little incentive to investigate beyond what it takes to fix the impairment.
Moreover, the medical model misses the universality of disability. Failing to see the ubiquity of
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disability is incongruous with the reality that even the most robust members of society are only
temporarily able; in time, all are broken to some degree. 215 As such, the ambition to fix
impairments appears unreasonably and unnecessarily aspirational. So, a principle issue for
contemporary society seeking to improve the human condition is whether it is right to judge what
it means to be healthy, normal, and able; and in particular to determine the state of any future
person by eliminating disability through genetic intervention.
5. E. 2.

Genetic Interventions: A Search for Perfection, or Path to Flourishing?
There are inherent cultural and societal challenges in determining which human

characteristics render a person able-bodied or disabled, or normal versus abnormal. However,
applying a medical model that relies on the human genetic code can prescribe a predictable
baseline of acceptable and healthy genetic characteristics. Influenced by the principles of
beneficence and autonomy genetic technology and medicine undergird the duty to improve the
human condition by preventing mortality, morbidity, and disability. 216 This is so because genetic
technology has the capacity to fundamentally change human nature by preventing the birth of
certain persons who may have a disease or disorder for which there is no cure. 217 Understanding
the societal impacts and the human practices that result from genetic technology218 is an
imperative that must begin by examining its deep roots in the evolution of eugenics.
The term eugenic was coined in the late 19 th century by Sir Francis Galton to refer to
those who were well born and was applied to the study of heredity. 219 For Galton, Charles
Darwin’s cousin, heredity centered on discovering ways to improve the genetic makeup of the
human race by removing undesirable individuals from the societal gene pool. These studies and
subsequently well-funded eugenic movements in the United States clearly did not reflect the
American principle that all men are created equal. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1927
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upholding the eradication all imbeciles through forced sterilization bolstered and fortified this
movement.220 Henceforth, it became an obligation and reproductive duty of all good citizens who
were the right type, to leave behind their blood in the world through procreation, and to prevent
the wrong type of person from reproducing. A form of birth control, forced sterilization laws
mandated that prisoners, residents of mental facilities and paupers – those deemed manifestly
unfit – be irreversibly prohibited from reproducing. 221
It wasn’t until Hitler’s perverse world of eugenics, genocide and mass murder resulted in
the systematic execution of those persons classified as defective that the American eugenics
movement began to die. Eventually, any association with Nazi eugenics was shunned. However
today, eugenic-like conduct has been reintroduced into American culture. In contemporary
times, eugenics is typically characterized as a study of the conditions under which the human
condition or the biological character of the human race and its offspring can be improved. For
Wilkinson, it is not whether eugenics expressed in this manner is intrinsically wrong, but rather,
whether or not a particular form of eugenics is morally acceptable or not. 222
Often influenced by political and social controls, positive eugenics occurs when the goal
of a eugenic activity is to produce humans of high quality by increasing the good gene pool – to
enhance the human condition. And negative eugenics seeks to reduce undesirable genes that
cause disease and disability – to prevent harm to the human race by minimizing the number of
sick babies born. 223 The positive and negative dichotomy of eugenics and the motivating factors
for each type, determines whether disability is seen as a defect requiring enhancement or
elimination, a condition that seeks healing, or as an illness seeking a cure.
Mahowald contends that negative eugenics under the guise of genetic advances appear
largely through prenatal testing, the killing of embryos, and abortion of fetuses with genetic
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disorders. This is evidenced in the way that the presence of the single trait of Down syndrome or
other chromosomal anomaly has come to define the whole person in utero without ever getting to
know the rest of the person. 224 To that end, Jeffrey Bishop contends that the objectifying tools of
medicine – ultrasounds, prenatal testing and screenings – reduce the disabled fetus to a faceless
object in the womb. 225 It is in this sense that modern medicine, in its endeavor to prevent the
coming of a person, leans towards negative eugenics. It is also in this way that the person born
with a genetic anomaly and functional disability is vulnerable to becoming a dehumanized
dysfunctional object. 226
For some opponents like Joseph, prenatal testing is a form of backdoor eugenics, and for
others like David Wasserman, genetic technology could be used irresponsibly to deliberately
create children with disabilities. 227 Such selective impairment is controversial and uncommon,
but not fictional or imaginary; as shown by the McCullough and Duchesneau case involving an
American deaf lesbian couple who deliberately selected a congenitally deaf sperm donor to
successfully give birth to a deaf daughter. 228 Wasserman also maintains that preconception and
prenatal selection are incompatible with the unconditional welcome that parents should exhibit
towards their unborn child. 229 Ethicists who argue against eliminating disability aptly contend
that genetically screening out and deselecting disability, or even attempting to correct
characteristics of disability in the absence of a diagnosis, advances the view that the objectified
person is unfit. Such beliefs may be projected onto the persons themselves. And even ethicists
who support negative eugenics admit that continued efforts to reduce the number of sick babies
will increase the list of unfit characteristics, qualities and conditions to be eliminated; further
propagating discriminatory ableism.
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Contemporary eugenics, particularly selective reproductive techniques such as
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) emboldens preconceived notions about what kind of
life is desirable versus those that are less meaningful, have less purpose, and deemed unworthy
to live.230 For Wilkinson, the notion that deselecting embryos that are believed to carry a
disabling condition in order to avoid creating a low-quality life is unacceptable. He asserts that
the happiest person with a disability will likely experience a better quality of life than the most
miserable able-bodied person. 231 Wilkinson further contends that selective reproduction such as
PGD and prenatal testing accompanied by selective termination presents the risk that present and
future children are commodified, discarded and replaced with a more desirable variety. 232
Similarly, Paul Ramsey considers all forms of genetic control unethical arguing that positive
eugenics suffers from cultural influences determining normalcy and defect. Instead, he favors
very limited negative eugenics through voluntary childlessness and avoiding pregnancy
altogether if a known genetic predisposition existed. Taken further, some ethicists see eugenics
as genetics in the absence of Christian thought. 233 On balance, however, not all efforts to
improve the human condition through genetic interventions carry the indicia of negative
eugenics.
Although it is possible to improve the human condition and create opportunities for
people to flourish in the absence of biological interventions, disease avoidance typically involves
some physical interventions. Population screenings administered to preemptively identify
conditions, and testing to determine the probability of having a child with a hereditary condition
are methods of disease avoidance commonly employed today. Appropriately administered and
consistent with approved criteria, many screening techniques improve the lives of children with
certain conditions. 234
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Newborn screenings were considered revolutionary when introduced in the 1960s, and
now detect and provide early intervention health benefits and treatments for more than 30 genetic
diseases and abnormalities. Pre-symptomatic identification and diagnosis can help to establish
early intervention treatments such as introducing dietary modifications to avert a life-threatening
consequence; and moderate the effects of a disease while improving prognosis. In addition,
advocates further suggest that screening can assist parents in their future reproductive planning
and avoid a diagnostic odyssey once actual symptoms present. 235 To that end, newborn screening
provides a mechanism for human flourishing which serves to avoid needless suffering for
newborn children and their families in order to improve the human condition without
controversy. Although, as mechanisms for improving the human condition, newborn screening
and carrier/prenatal testing are opposite sides of the same coin. While the presumed intent of
newborn screening and prenatal testing is to create a healthier world, the primary difference
between the two turns on the choices future parents make.
As partners in care, and because they wield enormous power over the care and treatment
of persons with disabilities236 ethically accountable healthcare organizations and their clinician
leadership also play a crucial role in these decisions. The scope of their influence on the human
condition extends beyond the constraints imposed by the medical model of disability. Their
influence and actions depend upon adoption of ethic of care and disability ethics frameworks to
enable flourishing lives.
5. F

Creating Enabling Environments through Ethic of Care and Disability Ethics
Joel Reynolds attributes negative health outcomes, ill-conceived state and federal

policies, oppression, discrimination, and stigmatization of persons with disabilities to clinician
misunderstanding of disability and the resultant miscommunication between them. He argues
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that anyone who wants to improve their understanding as well as improve health outcomes must
first reflect upon “the meaning of disability and the moral obligation and responsibilities owed to
communities of disabilities.” 237 The medical model of disability, with its reliance on medical
description and labeling, is largely responsible for much this knowledge gap. Pathology alone
does not prepare the healthcare professional to contribute to a flourishing life for patients with
disabilities. The impetus to transform healthcare organizational leadership in this milieu is
derived by examining its moral obligation through the lens of ethic of care and disability ethics.
For Jackie Leach Scully, there are two ways to consider disability in terms of ethics. She
distinguishes the ethics of disability from disability ethics. For Scully, the ethics of disability
reflects upon the morally correct way to behave towards persons with disabilities in everyday
interactions such as employment policy, law, and healthcare. 238 The ethics of disability
implicates normative moral behavior based on what has been determined necessary and
appropriate for persons with a disability. It derives its normative standards from the medicalized
view that disability is a nominative pathology – a deficit that is determined by reference to a
norm of physical or mental function. 239
Offering a differentiating view, Scully refers to disability ethics as “the particular moral
understandings that are generated through the experience of disability.” 240 That is to say, it is a
form of ethical analysis that is “consciously and conscientiously attentive to the experience of
being/having a ‘different’ embodiment…disability ethics looks at the embodied effects of
impairment.” 241 Understanding disability through the experience of one with a disability
provides needed insight into the judgments of the moral issues in disability communities. Scully
advocates undertaking a phenomenological approach to understanding the embodied experiences
of persons with disabilities. 242 Unless and until ethical analysis moves beyond merely
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understanding the features of disability, and towards the perceptions and understanding of the
world of disability, Reynolds’ gap of understanding and attendant biases will persist.
Assimilating the experiences of persons with disabilities into a culture of disability ethics entails
starting from a collective perspective on the giftedness and of every person, explicitly those
persons with disabilities.
5. F. 1.

The Gift of a Flourishing Life
To live and thrive within an optimal range of functioning does not demand physical or

cognitive perfection. It first entails embracing all life as a gift through acceptance, tolerance, and
stewardship that capacitates a good and flourishing human life. A good life that enables human
flourishing is measured and enriched by the experiences, opportunities and even the choices
available to that person. Although, with respect to choice, Hans Reinders asserts that what
accounts for having a good life is not whether a person would choose to live their life again, if
given the choice. But rather, such account is found in the recognition that their life is good
merely because being is in itself good.243
The goodness of human life must also recognize that humanity’s exercise of free will and
choice can run counter to the argument that all human beings are good. According to Aquinas,
humans can exercise their free will to perfectly or imperfectly actualize their natural
capacities.244 When such faculties do not function properly and result in imperfect reason and
choice, the human being is imperfect; as evidenced by the choices giving rise to humankind’s
fall. However, reliance on perfection of the human capacities to establish human goodness is
antithetical to persons with profound disabilities, as many of their capacities may exist only
marginally; if at all. According to this account, disabled persons lacking capacity are
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imperfect.245 For all that, reason and proper faculty functioning alone cannot account for the
goodness in persons with disabilities. There needs to be something more.
Fortunately, that something more is found in the Judeo-Christian tradition espousing that
life is good because it is given with divine intentionality, and cannot, therefore, be anything but
good. The goodness of life is a gift of divine goodness – a donum; a gift and giftedness that has
a divine purpose. 246 Life as a gift is received from God who intended it to be good and is
grounded extrinsically in God’s act of giving. 247 The goodness of life, therefore, is preordained
because of its giftedness.
The goodness of human life turns to humanity’s willingness to learn how to acknowledge
giftedness, respond to Him, and find peace with Him. God’s gift of life cannot be returned if it
isn’t exactly what was desired, or doesn’t quite align with normative beliefs. Gracious recipients
of gifts know that the highest compliment a person can pay the giver is to show gratitude, and to
love, protect, and care for the gift. This good and great gift of human life was created by God. He
gave it to humanity to guard and protect, and to be its stewards. 248 And so it is that the highest
expression of gratitude a human can give God is to thoroughly respect and care for their good
life,249 and empower it to thrive.
Recognition of giftedness is empowering to persons with disabilities. Scarlet fever left
Helen Keller deaf and blind at 19 months-of-age. Yet her life story is “a paragon of several key
virtues…that commonly constitute a good life: courage, strength, resiliency, self-knowledge,
compassion and wisdom”250 Despite immeasurable odds, her life’s triumphs included achieving
academic excellence at the most prestigious universities. Empowered by her experiences as a
disabled woman, she established the American Civil Liberties Union, and exemplified a life of
advocacy and inspiration. Her life was not something to be judged against the idealized norm of
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a life typically stifled by such debilitating limitations. That is to say, Keller didn’t flourish as a
disabled women. She flourished as a person first. It was the context of her disability – its
giftedness - that made her flourishing what it was. 251
Autism is not a barrier to flourishing for William Stillman. An award-winning author and
internationally recognized autism support advocate, Stillman is the founder of the Pennsylvania
Autism Self-Advocacy Coalition. He has educated state and federal government leaders and
program sponsors, as well as families and caregivers, on the giftedness of persons with autism.
As a writer with Asperger’s Syndrome, his works have illuminated the giftedness of persons with
autism by telling their stories of extraordinary spirituality and sensory capacities that very often
exceed those of persons not on the autism spectrum. 252 He describes how an inability to produce
verbal speech is not a barrier to communication for persons with autism who may understand
dormant telepathic intuitions by merely observing the verbally communicative world. 253 Keller
and Stillman’s lives exemplify the giftedness that is made manifest through disability. Their
victories, in harmony with their giftedness, afford communities the opportunity to celebrate and
embrace them as such.
As all of humanity are called to be co-creators with God, the duty to respect and care for
the giftedness of the good lives of others is obligatory. The Catholic Church and other Christian
faiths recognize the duty to be stewards for Creation and improve the human condition through
activities that demonstrate a continual respect for human life. It is a communal imperative that
calls everyone to accept the giftedness of the disability “without resentment, receiving and giving
love as companions together in God’s time.” 254 Improving the human condition of disability by
receiving the gift of life in this way involves the collective willingness of persons and groups. It
calls upon the receptivity of the person with the disability, the community in which they live, and
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their family or caregivers. Illustrated this way, acknowledging the giftedness of life is triune as it
is interdependent on the presence of God within each of those three bodies of persons.
William May further illustrates this unity of persons as one centered on proclaiming the
Gospel of Life by caring for others for whom God has made humanity responsible. 255 To
proclaim the Gospel of Life in this way, requires communities to enter into relationship with, and
help to empower and support people who suffer or are otherwise vulnerable; particularly in this
context, persons with disabilities. In confronting the moral duty of the HCO, May contends that
“a unique responsibility belongs to health-care personnel: doctors, pharmacists, nurses,
chaplains…administrators and volunteers” and those in relation, to build a new culture of life
that considers the inviolable worth of every human life.256
For Eva Feder Kittay, persons with disabilities should not be seen outside of those
connections and relationships that have infused their life with value. In the same way, others in
relationship with persons with disabilities should not see themselves as separate from them. The
carer and cared-for coexist within an inextricable bond that defines and nurtures the dignity of
the persons. 257 Moreover, care, whether given or received, is an indispensable and central good;
and for Kittay, it is impossible to have a life of dignity without care – it is an expression of a
person’s dignity. 258
Though inextricably bound, the contextual vulnerability that is constitutive of disability
draws forth the reality of mutual dependency – or interdependency - between the carer and the
cared-for. Just as the ethically accountable healthcare organization is an interdependent
construct, its normative stakeholders are also interdependent and rely upon the relational quality
of their human interactions with providers of care. To that end, care and interdependency
undergird the ethic of care in disability. As Kittay beautifully portrays, “giving care to another
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infuses the other with the worth of the one who does the caring – to do damage to the cared-for is
also to violate the caring individual.” 259
By its very nature then, the ethical accountability of HCO leadership, specifically
concerning its clinicians, researchers and providers of care, must see themselves as ‘selves-inrelation’ to their patients and other stakeholders with disabilities. These providers of care must
come to understand that their sense of well-being is also tied to the care and well-being of
another.260 Over and above the imperative of interdependency, the moral duty to protect and
care for the vulnerable rests with those who are most empowered, and especially those to whom
a person is most vulnerable. 261 For Kittay, authority and power to care for the vulnerable is
paramount because “providers of care…have to co-exist with the individuals they care for…they
exert direct control over the minutiae of the life of their charge.” 262 Hence, their moral duty to
enable flourishing and effectuate change in the lives of persons with disabilities is unequivocal.
5. F. 2.

Ethics and Removing Disabling Barriers
Disabilities, as part of the human condition, are contextually vulnerable. They are so in

part because they are the “product of a social response to embodied difference, not just as an
individual pathology.” 263 This social response is the central point of the social model of
disability. In contrast to the medical model, the social model “shifts attention from a medical
description of a person to a consideration of how the environment creates obstacles for people
who have disabilities.” It purports that society’s social, political and physical arrangements need
fixed, not the person with the disability.
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For Scully, the social model suggests that disability is

a product of the interaction, at both personal and structural levels, between the physical or mental
impairment and the social world in which the affected person lives. 265 To illustrate simply, it is
not the mobility impairment that prevents the person in a wheelchair from entering a doctor’s
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office for care; it is the absence of wheelchair ramps, and even more significantly, it is the gap in
understanding the experiences and preferences of that person. And to that end, the model
anticipates a commitment from society and its accountable members to promote mutual
understanding and effectuate change.
According to Tobin Siebers’ perspective of the social model, disability is not reduced to a
physical or mental defect, but is rather a cultural and minority identity. For Siebers, to refer to
disability as an identity means that it is “an elastic social category both subject to social control
and capable of effectuating change.” 266 That is to say, that the cultural and minority identity of
disability is powered by a force and a voice that can be effective and audible, or stifled and
disempowered. As with other minority identities, disability suffers from negative connotations,
such as ableism. Healthcare leaders have an obligation to comprehend the effects of the social
model of disability on the community of persons with disabilities they serve, and to reverse these
negative connotations through their actions, and by innovating for change.
Michael Oliver posits a most determined social model argument, asserting that illness
may be caused by disease, and impairment by some injury or condition, but disability is caused
by social organization. 267 According to this analysis of the social model, social organizations
actually create disability and disadvantageous conditions when they discriminate against persons
with impairments, through ignorance, exclusion and isolation. The inability to participate in
mainstream social activities is deemed the fault of society, culture, and the environment; not that
of the underlying condition or impairment. 268 Oliver’s assessment of the social model does not
ignore the significance of impairment on the fulfillment of human flourishing, and does not
diminish the importance of medicine or therapeutics. On the contrary, this model acknowledges
that the disabling condition is in many ways due to the lack of medical and related services 269
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that ought to be provided through social constructs and persons with authority. All intended for
the sake of furthering a culture of life.
Building a culture of life must consider other impediments to flourishing that can be
influenced and even deconstructed by those with authority. For example, social determinants of
health refer to the socioeconomic, psychosocial and community systems that contribute to
disparities in access to healthcare. These overlapping and intersecting categories can also impact
access to employment, education, and other aspects of life. Wilkinson submits that social
determinants of health such as poverty, poor schooling and environmental causes can particularly
impede flourishing for those with disabilities. 270
Statistics show that individuals with disabilities are more likely to experience difficulty
securing employment, receive preventive health care services, and gain access to and use health
information technology, compared to those without disabilities. 271 These determinants coupled
with environmental conditions and barriers, amplify the disparities and compound the negative
impact to flourishing. The World Health Organization established recommended principles to
address key issues in order to achieve health equity among persons with disabilities and to
mitigate impediments to flourishing. These issues include the need for better health data to
inform program development concerning critical issues of health disparity; the need for
evidence-based health and wellness programs that can be transferred from clinical settings to
community-based programs to promote greater access; and the need to improve
facility/environmental designs and public and private infrastructures 272 Instituting these
principles to serve as a catalyst for change involves the explicit and affirmative obligation of
ethically accountable healthcare professionals.
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Given the interdependency that is inherent in the relationship between the provider of
healthcare and the person with disabilities, the effectiveness of that relationship first calls for
reconciliation between the experiences of the disability community, and awareness of its
healthcare providers. For Oullette, establishing an informed disability-conscious requires that
the healthcare community engage in civil discourse with disability scholars, advocates and
experts to understand the cultural and social dimension of disability. 273 Although Oullette’s work
centers specifically on disability-consciousness in bioethics, the framework she suggests for
developing disability-consciousness is adaptable to the care provider and social communities.
She contends that carers ought to incorporate principles such as respect for inherent dignity in all
decision and action points; including, for example, avoiding language and terminology that
offends such as “abnormal” and “normal.” 274
Clinicians also have responsibilities to develop what Reynolds refers to as a disability
humility. Such humility is directed to learning about the experiences, cultures and history of
disabilities. It also entails a willingness to admit that understanding the dynamic condition of
disability will never be complete. 275 Studies show that physicians may be poorly prepared to
meet the medical and psychosocial needs of this community that are required to create
environments that support good care and positive experiences” 276 because they lack formal
training. The absence of life span perspective on care is particularly evident when patients with
disabilities transition from pediatric care to adult care physicians. Moreover, “clinicians and
members of society at large have a responsibility to educate themselves about disability and
actively work against the effects of ableism that have long undermined the justice and
effectiveness of health care delivery.” 277 This responsibility mirrors the cultural humility
required to understand the pediatric and elderly communities.
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When disability humility prevails, clinicians will also recognize and act upon their
responsibility to communicate more effectively with their patients with disabilities. Their
deference to the disability perspective will enhance their ability to listen. And, they will come to
appreciate and respect the authority of those with disabilities as experts about their own lives and
community experiences. 278 Disability humility will help to lift the voices of those with
disabilities far above the barriers that very often silence them.
Removing the barriers to flourishing is a matter of collaboration. It calls for initiating
enabling environments that respect the identity of disability, reverse negative thinking and
ableism, understand the culture of disability, and promote access to care that is dignified and
welcomed. In the traditional model of care, the relationship between clinicians and patients
promote clinicians as experts in what is best for their patients, and patients as passive to their
direction. This paternalistic posture intensifies the vulnerability of patients with disabilities. The
collaborative care model, however, departs from this traditional view.279
According to this model, clinicians and patients share their expertise. Clinicians are
experts in diseases and conditions, and patients are experts concerning their own lives and
preferences.280 Together they identify problems, issues and health management matters and
collaboratively set goals that are jointly managed. The share responsibility and work
interdependently, however clinicians teach patients how do self-manage their worlds to help
them flourish independently, as much as possible. 281 Collaboration in this way not only
unleashes the voices of persons with disabilities, it admits to their rights and responsibilities,
their individual and collective identities, and their capacity to flourish in right relationship with
their environment.
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5. G. Conclusion
While vulnerability is an ontological condition that impacts all beings across the across
the human life continuum, consequences and conditions render certain stakeholder populations
more susceptible to physical, social, emotional, and economic harms. Vulnerability is amplified
by aggravating influences such as biases, negative public policy trends, societal and cultural
pressures, and barriers to flourishing within particular environments. The healthcare delivery
setting is one such environment that, very often, intensifies human vulnerability. Because
individuals and organizations with authority and power to impact the lives of at risk populations
have a moral duty to attend to their interests, improving the human condition for vulnerable
stakeholders is a moral imperative of the ethically accountable health care organization.
The elderly and persons with disabilities are particularly vulnerable stakeholders who are
often victimized by disempowering and discriminatory biases that threaten their dignity, deny
them needed healthcare and services, and prevent them from flourishing. Cultural, political, and
medical models can undergird and promote ageist and ableist tendencies that adversely influence
opportunities to meet the unmet long-term care needs of the elderly, and create barriers for
persons with disabilities. While medical advances and technologies have made it possible for
both of these stakeholder groups to add years to their lives, the challenge for accountable
healthcare professionals is to ensure that those years are filled with lives that flourish.
To enable and empower these vulnerable individuals to experience a life that preserves
human dignity, autonomy, and respect for the giftedness of all human life, policymakers and
healthcare communities must focus on the interdependency and interconnectedness of care. To
that end, ethically justified care for the elderly must shift its focus to community-based
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interdependent relationships. Relationships that support low-technology, informal care standards
based on the ethic of care.
Improving the human condition for persons with disabilities entails recognition that the
goodness of human life is not determined by physical or mental perfection, but rather by its
giftedness. The giftedness of human life requires acceptance of the responsibilities that all have
to one another as stewards in relationships of care. It also requires recognition of the mutual
dependency between the one providing care and the one to whom it is provided. The
interdependency that is inherent in the relationship between the provider and the person with
disabilities calls for the provider community to establish a disability consciousness that is
strengthened by disability humility.
Healthcare is about relationships. Relationships which, as they span the life continuum,
are comprised of bi-directional interactions and care experiences that represent the dependency
of all human life upon one another. The objective truth is that no one exists who has not been
cared for. For the human condition to continue to evolve and improve, the ethically accountable
healthcare organization must remain in relation with its most vulnerable stakeholders to satisfy
their needs, and to ensure that their moral response to those needs is cloaked in care.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion
Like the human body, a singular healthcare organization (HCO) is an amalgamation of
affiliated and interdependent pieces and parts that provide, support, and help to sustain health for
a wide array of stakeholders. Composed of facility and professional providers, insurance
companies, and patients, the HCO must maintain function and order while cohabitating with
environmental forces that threaten its ability to maintain organizational homeostasis. One way
that organizational homeostasis is achieved and measured is through ethical decision-making in
light of competing interests and values. Hence, homeostasis in this sense is observable through
the ethical accountability of healthcare organizational leadership to its diverse communities of
stakeholders.
Organizational moral agency is the cornerstone of ethical accountability and decisionmaking to support a common morality of norms, moral principles, and rules that are shared by
moral persons across different cultures. Ethics, as it is used throughout this dissertation,
represents the moral beliefs, behaviors and rules adopted by people to prevent conflict and
preserve the norms of moral society. Moral soul is the distinguishing characteristic of
accountable leadership; and it innervates the ethical decisions of an HCO’s individual and
institutional moral agents, who are the embodiment of an organization’s moral soul. Just as soul
is a unique attribute of humanness, the good that is attributed to an organization is manifest
through the actions motivated by its soul. Moral agents act, and are unified to the HCO through
its moral soul.
An HCO acts through the collective decision-making of its moral agents whose beliefs,
norms, and values ought to be aligned with the organization’s moral identity, as expressed
through its culture of ethics. Robust ethical cultures endeavor to transfer ethical identity onto the
317

organization’s moral agents and decision-makers; most particularly onto and through its
leadership. In as much as soul is aligned to moral agents, conflicts of interests and
disengagement from an organization’s values and norms can upset an HCO’s homeostasis.
Imprudent and undiscerning decision-making, Faustian bargaining, and conflicts of interest and
conscience can weaken accountability and threaten the organization’s moral soul. The
Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foundation (AHERF) case study is a vivid example
of an HCO’s dispossession from its moral soul.
Specifically, AHERF’s actions and decisions did not respect the interdependent character
of an HCO. The death of its soul and its inevitable demise, gave rise to criminal and civil
investigations revealing a host of individual and institutional moral deficiencies. Deficiencies
which, had they been identified, communicated and remedied could have not only saved the
HCO, but enabled its moral soul to remain intact for its own sake as well as that of its
stakeholders. Because the moral soul of an organization is manifest through rational and
systematic decision-making, it is exhibited most vibrantly when its actions yield to the interests
and preferences of its communities of stakeholders.
Rational decision-makers care about the consequences of their actions, and their impact
on others to whom they are accountable. The stakes and consequences are even higher in
healthcare as decisions made directly affect the length and quality of human life rather than
solely on products, services and profitability. Accordingly, stakeholder theory, an approach to
organizational ethics that heeds to the rights and interests of those who affect, or are affected by
an organization’s decisions, 1 is well suited to healthcare. It shifts the managerial mindset from a
focus on shareholder interests alone to communities of normative and derivative stakeholders.
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Thus, it allows organizations to exercise social responsibility by applying moral theory and right
behavior to management decisions.
Because of the complexity of the intertwined and interdependent interests within an
HCO, applying normative stakeholder concepts such as the ethic of care, and principle of
stakeholder fairness is critical to ensuring homeostasis. Both theories look respectively to the
relational quality of human interaction, and to the principles of fairness that serve as an
undercurrent to decision-making; as well to the moral commitment to the HCO’s communities of
stakeholders. Obligations between stakeholders and the idea of accountability are bi-directional
and multi-dimensional. Because stakeholder relationships exist between persons or groups of
persons, there is a fundamental moral duty to treat people with respect, and to recognize their
human dignity. HCO’s have additional moral obligations because of the role-based nature of
their relationships. Depending their particular role (e.g. that of employer, enforcer, strategists,
etc.), accountable leaders must act in deference to those multi-stakeholder obligations.
The duty of stewardship in healthcare underscores the tenet that all resources of the HCO
are held in trust by the organization and its leadership for the good of others. 2 It is a fiduciary
duty and an ethic that transcends healthcare and is integral to other disciplines. Accordingly, the
diversity and vulnerability of stakeholder communities, and the balancing of competing and
conflicting stakeholder claims means that ethically accountable leadership in healthcare must be
cognizant of stakeholder expectations; especially those that are less obvious.
To that end, not all HCO stakeholder interests are purely corporeal. Having and keeping
secrets is innately human and affords individuals the opportunity to control aspects of their life
and establish boundaries between themselves and others. The ethics of secrecy underscores the
importance of secrecy in healthcare as a stakeholder interest. Because few industries cut as close
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to the core of what it means to be human as healthcare, the secrets that a patient conveys to her
physician in the course of their relationship creates a sacrosanct duty of confidentiality that is the
cornerstone of trust in that relationship.
Trust in others enables intimacy and is needed most when a person surrenders some
aspect of control to another. Surrendering control of ones secrets to a powerful HCO contributes
to stakeholder vulnerability. As such, an HCO’s moral duty to preserve trust, promote human
flourishing and respect human dignity includes recognition of the individual’s right and interest
in the confidentiality and privacy of their most intimate thoughts, facts, and secrets.
Although the terms are often used interchangeably, confidentiality and privacy are not the
same thing. The physician’s duty of confidentiality is rooted in antiquity through principles of
ethics such as autonomy, and codified professional codes, oaths, laws and rules of conduct that
bind the physician as a keeper of secrets. Privacy is a legal right. It is an expectation and
privilege of confidentiality held by a patient enforceable by and rooted in law. Compliance with
privacy mandates is a preeminent concern in contemporary healthcare as it is a core legal
obligation of the HCO.
The interdependent character of the HCO which includes the divergent interests of
stakeholders who frequently want patient information, practically ensures that the sharing of
patient secrets is no longer binary. This reality, coupled with duty of confidentiality, and the
patient stakeholder’s rights and expectations of privacy present ethical dilemmas for the HCO.
Oftentimes, the rights and interests that internal and external stakeholders have in patients’
secrets and their other health information are in conflict with the physician’s fundamental moral
precepts and professional responsibilities to respect confidentiality and patient privacy. For
example, information used for advanced analytics, complex care management, patient data320

dependent technologies, clinical collaboration, genomic medicine, as well as compliance with the
rules of civil and criminal procedure can test the mantle of confidentiality.
In addition, technology and medical advances, and the competition for more data, better
data, and immediate access to it conflict with and threaten confidentiality and privacy. Every
aspect of the transformation of American healthcare is dependent on improved third party access
to patient information, so much so that healthcare is predominantly now an information business.
These competing values and interests underscore and challenge the physician’s dual allegiance;
that which she has to her patient in preventing breaches of trust, and that which undergirds her
role in supporting transformative medicine.
But, not all breaches of patient confidentiality and privacy are unlawful or inappropriate.
Compelled disclosures of patient information to normative and derivative stakeholders can often
override the physician-patient fiduciary relationship. Disclosures necessary for public health,
infectious disease control, workers compensation, litigation defense, and to prevent imminent
harm to others are examples of legitimate and necessary exceptions to absolute confidentiality
and privacy rights. In these cases, the law recognizes these legitimate interests and ensures that
appropriate notices of certain disclosures are made to patients and their representatives to
promote transparency and trust.
However, as dataism dominates and mathematical algorithms replace human discernment
and thought, humans will move away from making their own decisions and move toward
artificially driven and machine learning digital tools that decide matters for them, using their
data. In healthcare, a large part of data-centered decision making control has already been ceded
to algorithmic analysis, but not necessarily at the will of the patient. Beyond threats to individual
control and privacy, algorithmic inferences can result in discriminatory biases fueling decisions
321

that are harmful to the patient and other stakeholders. The future of privacy in healthcare is more
than the maturation of a legal right. Privacy as a stakeholder interest is an indivisible constituent
of human dignity that involves respect for human flourishing in a digitally connected world.
A data-driven world that makes decisions devoid of human judgement must regain
human accountability. Because confidentiality and privacy expectations are created from social
values that are defined by culture, it is incumbent upon the ethically accountable healthcare
organization to create a culture of ethics that recognizes its duty as an accountable keeper of
secrets. This begins by creating an overall data strategy that relies upon principles of data ethics
incorporated into ethical decisions, actions and practices constituent of its data governance
model. It also entails recognizing that an HCO’s moral agents must exercise their moral
judgements in place of the void left by algorithmic and machine learning decisions. They must
do what machines cannot in recognition of the vulnerability and fragility of human dignity that is
part of the human condition. A condition so closely tied to the context of the healthcare
experience.
As a condition of human life, vulnerability is the universal and inevitable capacity and
ability to be harmed. All of humankind is susceptible to harm by virtue of its dependent nature.
However, susceptibility to harm is relational in that power inequalities and dependency render
some stakeholders more prone to injury than others. Vulnerability is also contextual in that
certain social, economic and cultural factors create and exacerbate risk of harm; thereby
expanding the scope of at-risk stakeholder groups.
Those in positions of power and authority have special responsibilities to the vulnerable.
As such, ethical accountability in healthcare includes an HCO’s moral commitment to the most
vulnerable and disempowered normative stakeholder communities it serves across the life
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continuum. This commitment to empower and enable human flourishing while respecting
human dignity includes an obligation to mitigate threats, and provide for unmet needs. Because
of the long and notorious history of exploitation towards children, pediatric populations represent
a stakeholder community that depends upon this obligation of the HCO and its moral agents.
Particularly compelling is the moral duty to empower children by understanding the pathology of
diseases and disorders that affect them through clinical research; most notably the pathology of
HIV, child abuse and mistreatment, and cognitive disabilities.
Ensuring adherence to ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence and fairness
throughout the clinical research process is essential. Because healthcare and clinical research are
relational, for physicians to fully adhere to these principles they must understand the importance
of children’s experiences, their interpersonal and social relationships, and unique perspectives.
For instance, children infected with HIV are contextually vulnerable to clinical research practices
as they are introduced to their disease state reality and struggle to reconcile living with a highly
stigmatized communicable disease. Children who are victims of maltreatment or neglect are
similarly vulnerable to the effects of injury research that explores non-accidental trauma. And,
children with cognitive disabilities are contingently and contextually vulnerable to research as
they are heavily dependent upon the authority and control of others, and often experience
communication and sensory barriers.
Relational ethics recognizes the importance of these contexts in addressing contingent
vulnerability of pediatric populations. According to the goodness-of-fit model of relational
ethics, the vulnerability of the child is considered beyond her age and capacity. The researcher
and/or physician applying this model of relational ethics will assess all aspects of clinical
treatment and research against the child’s capacity to understand, their relationship with those
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with authority upon whom they are dependent, and the cultural and personal values that shape
their world.
In addition to clinical research considerations, moral accountability to vulnerable
pediatric populations includes the responsibility to understand and manage population health;
that is, understanding the epidemiology of a particular population. Principles of stewardship,
normative stakeholder theories, community-oriented health programs and the duty to provide for
the common good underscore the commitment from the HCO to influence public health
vulnerabilities. In particular, the HCO has a moral obligation to mitigate and prevent the
psychosocial and physiological effects of pediatric obesity, which is upheld as a critical public
health threat.
Pediatric obesity is a multi-factoral, two-stage disease. Respectively, it is a disease that
has wide ranging genetic, societal and behavioral causal factors. Left unabated, pediatric obesity
continues into adulthood as a two-stage disease, increasing the likelihood of higher death rates in
middle age from heart attack, diabetes, depression, and respiratory disease. In addition, obese
children are contextually and conditionally vulnerable from the physiological and psychosocial
effects of pediatric obesity. Obesity-related medical conditions such as Type II diabetes,
hypertension, asthma and sleep apnea will threaten the life of a child if they become sufficiently
severe. As significant are the psychosocial effects from stigma, shame, bullying and isolation
pervasive in Western culture’s obsession with thinness.
The contextual and conditional aspects of vulnerability underscore the fact that
individuals are vulnerable to the actions and inactions of others. Children are particularly
vulnerable to the acts and omissions of those responsible for keeping them safe, as well as for
their physical, emotional, intellectual and moral development. It is from the notion of relational
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care that the authority to act as a social parent emerges. The social parent theory contributes to
ethical accountability and undergirds the relationship between pediatricians, families of children
living with obesity, and the communities of obesogenic influences within which they coexist.
Tensions in public health ethics appear during attempts to reconcile the individual and
collective, or the private versus public view of what must occur in the name of community
health. Where those with authority fail to provide for adequate protections, the state as a
sovereign may become a de facto parent invoking the legal doctrine of parens patriae. The legal
standard for this doctrine is the notion of what is in the best interest of the child. Because of
relational dynamics consistent with care ethics, the HCO and its clinicians and pediatricians are
akin to social parents, and share in the moral duty to act and intervene, when conditions warrant,
on behalf of the vulnerable child.
Vulnerability, a human condition universally present across the life continuum, is further
amplified by aggravating influences such as biases, negative trends in public policy, societal and
cultural pressures, and barriers to human flourishing within particular environments. The elderly
and persons with disabilities represent vulnerable and largely inaudible stakeholder communities
whose human dignity and flourishing are threatened by such influences. The healthcare setting
can be particularly intimidating to vulnerable stakeholders. As such, the power, authority, and
influence of the HCO underscores its moral duty and ethical accountability to positively impact
the lives of these groups, and to improve their human condition and dignity.
The elderly are a demographically diverse, heterogeneous group whose members age
differently and have highly individualized needs that are often influenced, rightly or wrongly, by
their chronological age. Even the science of geriatric medicine benchmarks medical decisions
according to the stage of development of the patient rather than the functioning of the organ
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system, or the biological aspects of illness. Ageism, which can be subtle or overt, discriminates
based upon biased assumptions of elder needs. It affects power relationships and presents
obstacles to health equality, access and particularly to decision-making concerning long-term
care.
Chronic health conditions, which affect a majority of elderly in the U.S., most often
restrict their ability to perform activities of daily living. These limitations increase their
dependency upon others to not only provide for, but understand their unmet needs. Such
dependency in the absence of understanding their needs and those of their informal caregivers,
does little to mitigate their vulnerability. To reshape the public perception and policy concerning
rationing and allocation of limited long-term care resources, those with influence must recognize
the cultural and economic contexts, the changed demographic and family arrangements, and the
social services necessary to empower the vulnerable elderly.
HCO’s are significant stakeholders in public health policy. Their interdependence with
the communities of stakeholders they serve demands that they understand the values and
experiences of the members within these communities. To that end, a relational ethic of care
emphasizes the relationship between the physician, the elderly patient, and the context within
which the care addressed by public policy will take place. Adherence to the ethic of care model
also brings additional factors such as social determinants into the care decisions, thereby
embracing a communal rather than individualistic approach to care. The ethic of care model
encourages the HCO and its professional moral agents to engage in effective advocacy for longterm elder care services that are community-based. It enables them to see themselves as inrelation with the elderly patient, exercising empathy and compassion for their dignity.
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Acceptance of the reality that care is relationship-based and person-directed will also
assist in redefining the culture of care for the vulnerable who live with disabilities. Akin to
elderly stakeholder populations, disability is a human condition that exists on the life continuum,
and persons with disabilities are a heterogeneous group. As normative stakeholders, persons
with disabilities must be afforded opportunities to live in right-relationship with their
environment. Correspondingly, the ethically accountable HCO has a moral duty to improve the
human condition and dignity of persons with disabilities to palliate vulnerability by creating
environments enabling them to flourish.
There is no universal standard for determining what it means to flourish. A flourishing
life depends upon the unique differences, circumstances and environments attributed to each
individual. Moreover, what it means to flourish in life is determined by the person who lives it,
and is dependent upon individual preferences and experiences. Barriers to human flourishing,
are often the result of misperceptions and cultural assumptions of disability, normalcy and
preferences that foster intolerance or discriminatory practices.
Much like ageism, ableism represents the implicit and conscious biases that reinforce
stereotypes against persons with disabilities. This species of bias is cultivated by a society that is
designed for and supportive of those who are able-bodied. At its core, ableism forms judgements
about persons with disabilities according to perceived abilities, notions of brokenness and
associations with illness, and has been a central influence on medicine throughout history. As
such, the medical model of disability provides little towards understanding the descriptive
realities of impairment beyond those characteristics of illness or disease, which are not
synonymous with disability.
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Negative health outcomes, discrimination, and stigmatization can be reversed when
accountable healthcare organizations and its care professionals examine their moral obligations
through the lens of ethic of care and disability ethics. To that end, it must begin with an
understanding of disability through the embodied experience of those with disabilities and the
communities within which they live. It relies upon the collective and interdependent willingness
of persons and groups to build and support a disability culture. Specifically, a culture that shifts
the attention away from the medical description of a person, and moves toward understanding
society’s role in creating enabling environments. To extricate the roots of biases against persons
with disabilities, society must develop, through relational encounters, greater understanding of
the experiences and attitudes of persons within disability communities.
Ethically accountable HCOs and their clinicians are responsible for developing a
disability humility that entails learning about the experiences, culture and history of disability to
ensure they can work against the effects of ableism. Moreover, removing barriers to flourishing
is a matter of collaboration between the physician, the community of stakeholders, and patients.
It enables each to direct their expertise and voices to the issues that matter most in the quest to
improve the human condition – those complex variables that challenge human life across the life
continuum.
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